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Abstract 
The financial crisis that started in 2008 led to issues of corporate financial distress and 
bankruptcy. The global financial crisis has resulted in many venerable institutions being 
rescued by the government. There is an ongoing research debate in law and economic 
theories about the efficiency of the US bankruptcy code (Senbet and Wang, 2012; Jory 
and Madura, 2010; Zhang, 2010; Faelten and Vitkova, 2014). Due to the global financial 
crisis, there is a fundamental issue questioning whether the bankruptcy law (e.g., 
Chapters 11 and 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code) is efficient in rehabilitating economically 
efficient but financially distressed firms and liquidating economically inefficient firms 
(Senbet and Wang, 2012). Mergers and acquisition (hereafter M&A) involving financially 
distressed targets and bankrupt targets have become a common practise in the US. 
Theoretically, restructuring is meant to be a way of reorganizing operations and 
generating extra resources. However, due to the complexity of businesses and recent 
global financial crises, there is inconsistency in the association of rewards for Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) and management with the firm’s performance.  
This thesis explores the issues about corporate restructuring, performance and 
governance of firms including banks in the US emanated from the economic crisis. It 
comprises three empirical pieces of research. The first empirical research is on the 
wealth creation of bidders and of M&As of financial distressed and bankrupt targets. 
Our second research is about the earnings management behaviour of managers. Of 
those that were involved in the restructuring and reorganization of an organization. It is 
especially related to carve-out, sell-off, spin-off and other types of divestitures. Our third 
essay is on bank efficiency; taking into consideration the importance and crucial and 
urgency in the research related areas, such as the pay structure of the top management, 
and the existence of the internal monitoring. Institutional ownership plays an important 
role in corporate performance of firms particularly to banks in the US. 
First, we examine the wealth effects of M&A activities involving financially 
constrained targets (hereafter FCTs). By interrogating the wealth creation of bidders of 
these target firms, this study extends the analysis on the relationship between the 
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discount on deal value, and the financial health of bidder firms. Based on sample data 
between 1985 and 2012, the study finds that bidders of FCTs earn abnormally positive 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) the day of the M&A announcement. This contrasts 
with the findings of negative to zero CARs accruing to bidders of financially healthy 
targets, as documented in the literature. The bidder firms benefit from a low M&A 
premium on these deals. However, in the long run, both their stock and operating 
performance lag those of bidders of healthy targets.  
Second, we examine the earnings management (hereafter EM) behaviour of firms 
engaged in corporate reorganization and restructuring. More specifically, our sample 
includes carve-outs, spin-offs, asset sell-offs, and divestitures. We follow 
Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2015) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) to calculate the 
EM variables. This is so especially the accrual-based and real EM variables. To measure 
firm performance, we use industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA), cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs), and Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHARs). We use the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns (SDAR), as the proxy to measure the stock 
volatility and information asymmetry. We document a direct relationship between firms 
that manage earnings above the industry-year median EM index, and changes in the 
ROA, CARs, and BHARs. Conversely, firms that manage their earnings EM are associated 
with lower standard deviations in the firms’ stock returns for carve-outs.  
Finally, we examine the relationship between the CEO’s pay (CPS) and each of the 
bank’s efficiency and risk. We use several measures of CEO pay including the ratio of 
CEO pay-to-the total pay of the top five managers. The ratio of CEO pay to the total pay 
of executives who also serve on the firm’s board. We use the Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA) to measure bank efficiency. To measure firm risk, we compute the Z-Score and 
standard deviation of daily and annual returns. We document an inverse relationship 
between CEO pay ratio and bank efficiency. Conversely, high pay disparity is associated 
with lower insolvency risk, lower Z-scores, and lower standard deviations in the banks’ 
stock returns.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Theoretical Background 
The global financial crisis that started in late 2008 led to issues of corporate financial 
distress and bankruptcy, which resulted in many vulnerable institutions being rescued 
by the government. Due to the global financial crisis, there is an ongoing debate whether 
the bankruptcy law (e.g., Chapters 7 and 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code) is efficient in 
rehabilitating economically efficient but financially distressed firms and liquidating 
economically inefficient firms (Senbet and Wang, 2012; Jory and Madura, 2010; Zhang, 
2010; Faelten and Vitkova, 2014). Restructuring is meant to be a way of reorganizing 
operations and generating extra resources to resolve financial distress. For example, 
mergers and acquisition (M&A) involving financially distressed/constrained targets and 
bankrupt targets have become a common practice in the US. However, due to the 
complexity of businesses and recent global financial crises, there is inconsistency in the 
association of rewards for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and management with the 
firm’s performance. CEO compensation package most of the banks before the financial 
crisis in the US is consider as excessive (Ritholtz, 2011). Many of CEO or executives of big 
banks received large compensations, then bailed after they destroyed their banks (e.g., 
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Countrywide Financial1). Lehman Brothers Chairman 
and CEO Richard Fuld Jr. sold his $490 million Lehman Brothers stock in the years before 
Lehman filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy (Ritholtz, 2011).  
This thesis explores the issues about corporate restructuring, performance and 
governance of firms including banks in the US emanated from the economic crisis. It 
                                                     
 
 
1 Countrywide Financial is now owned by Bank of America. 
2 
 
 
 
comprises three empirical pieces of research.  We analyse the issues that emanated 
from the global financial crisis dates in 2008 that was characterized by the collapse of 
major financial institutions and stock markets. Businesses took on more risks than 
originally thought (Liu et al., 2014; Cheng et al., 2015; Yu and Van Luu, 2016), bank Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) were grossly overpaid (Vallascas & Hagendorff, 2013; Yu & Van 
Luu, 2016) and firms engaged in earnings management practices (Mollik, Mir, Mclver, & 
Bepari, 2013). The global financial crisis of 2008 was the most severe world financial 
crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s (Yen, 2017). It raised concerns about the 
solvency and liquidity of venerable institutions, and huge financial commitment by 
governments in the form of bailouts; these affected economic activity as a whole 
(Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010).  
CEOs enjoy high pay even though they engage in non-value-maximizing behaviour. 
For example, Lehman Brothers Chairman and CEO, Richard Fuld Jr., made US$34 million 
in 2007 and nearly a half-billion, US$490 million, from selling Lehman stock in the years 
before Lehman filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Ritholtz, 2009, 2010). Overconfident 
CEOs receiving high excess pay undertake activities such as overinvestment, 
restructuring and value-destroying mergers and acquisitions that lead to shareholder 
wealth losses (Cooper et al., 2016). CEO pay structure should be re-evaluated to 
safeguard shareholders’ assets and long-term profitability of the firm. CEO pay structure 
is also partly to be blamed. 
“Lehman’s failure resulted in part from significant problems in its corporate 
governance, including risk management, exacerbated by compensation to its 
executives and traders that was based predominantly on short-term profits.” 
(FCIC (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission), 2011, p.343).  
The high pay ratio between CEOs and the other top management executives led to 
excessive risk-taking behaviour. This led to business expansion that was not necessarily 
considered value maximizing activities. Agency problems may lead to non-value 
maximizing behaviour or hubris among management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This 
includes the M&As of bankrupt or financially distressed targets.  
In the first quarter of 2016, total corporate bankruptcies slightly increased : March 
2016 was the busiest filing month since April 2014 (Golubow, 2016). In fact, 2014 was 
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the year where M&As in the US were the most active; the deal value of M&As in the US 
in the first three-quarters of 2014 reached almost US$1 trillion (KPMG, 2015). A recent 
Mergermarket and RR Donnelley survey reports a record-breaking year for deals in 2015. 
The value of corporate spinoffs, carve-outs, and divestitures rose to US$523.6bn, 
representing a 30% year-over-year increase; this trend will continue into 2016.  
It is likely that managers of the bidding firms view takeovers as a means of 
maximizing their own interests at the expense of their shareholders (Cartwright and 
Schoenberg, 2006). Firm restructuring is one form of redistributing firms’ resources to 
maximize the shareholders’ wealth. However, due to agency problem and management 
hubris, behaviour leads to the possibility of engaging in earnings management 
(hereafter EM) activities to cover a firm’s financial underperformance. Furthermore, it 
is worth examining how the market reacts to current issues surrounding the 
restructuring practices. It could be just a ‘game’ that top management play for the sake 
of rent-seeking behaviour and to make their profiles active. This could explain the 
complexity of the issues raised after the global financial crisis. Markets should have 
perceived the economic consequences resulting from the global financial crisis.  
In analysing corporate performance and governance, we analyse the performance 
of firms, including banks in the US. We also consider the current issue of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) involving bankrupt or financially constrained targets (hereafter FCT), 
restructuring activities through carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and divestitures in the US. 
We also include the controversial issue of CEO pay disparity in the banking industry, and 
the need to explore the gap in the related literature.  
Adhering to the above explanation, our first two empirical chapters of the thesis 
intend to examine the corporate performance of the bidders and targets post-
restructuring. What are the determinants that contribute to the choice of FCTs or 
bankrupt targets over healthy targets? What will be the impact of the choices in bidders’ 
corporate performance? Do the earning management (EM) activities among targets, 
before the restructuring through cave-out, sell-off, spin-off and divestiture, have an 
impact on the corporate performance of the targets? 
Understanding how a corporation sets executive pay, and the role of shareholders 
in the process of setting it, takes us into the issues of corporate controls, corporate goals, 
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and corporate reorganisation and restructuring. We analyse factors that contribute to 
corporate performance through restructuring and CEO remuneration. The falls of 
Lehman Brothers where the CEO received high pay a year before the crisis is 
questionable. The rewards should compensate the efforts of maintaining the 
performance and safeguarding the shareholders’ assets. Hence, our third study is on 
CEO pay disparity and the association with bank efficiency, and risk-taking behaviour 
among bank managers. Furthermore, starting from 2018, firms must publish, in their 
annual financial statements, their pay ratio between the CEO and the other top four 
management teams.  
The requirement to publish CEOs’ pay is not without controversy. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) took five years to settle on an agreed set of pay ratios, which 
was made public in 2015. Companies, however, are not required to publish these ratios 
until 2018. The “say on pay” and related governance rules are now incorporated into 
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank 
Act). The Act mandates companies to publish CEO’s annual pay, top executives’ pay, and 
the median pay of all their employees; this is to inform investors of their pay structures. 
More research is needed to establish the link between executive pay and bank 
performance since it continues to preoccupy public interest (also see Yu and Van Luu, 
2016). There may be more aspects to explore when it comes to theories that seek to 
explain the usefulness of pay disparity and its impact on firm performance. The 
existence of institutional ownership could stabilize and control management hubris 
among the top management. 
The next three sections of this chapter provide a short explanation of the research 
objectives, methodology, findings, and contributions of the three essays in this thesis. 
1.2 Does the bidder of financially distressed firms in M&A in the US earn 
positive firm performance? 
We use the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index (henceforth KZ-Index), to measure the 
financial condition of M&A targets, and provide new dimensions related to the financial 
constrained targets (FCTs) versus healthy targets (HTs) in at least four ways. Ultimately, 
we attempt to:  
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(i) identify the financial characteristics that influence US bidders’ decisions to 
acquire one target rather than another;  
(ii) determine how M&A involving FCTs influence bidders’ wealth, both in the 
short and long run; and  
(iii) examine the discount or premium paid by the bidder firms in the M&A of 
FCTs. 
To conduct our empirical approach, we construct a sample of 4,405 US M&As from 
the Thomson One Deal database over the period 1985-2012. We require that bidders 
should have data in the CRSP database to calculate the announcement period returns, 
buy-and-hold returns, and the discount/premium data. We retrieve the stock returns 
data from the Eventus database. 
Methodologically, we provide an analysis of the wealth effect of bidders that acquire 
FCTs, as well as the bankrupt targets, by taking the universe of public US M&A from the 
Thomson One Deal database. After adjusting for self-selection bias, which may result in 
the choice between higher FCTs or bankrupt targets, we document that there is a certain 
consistency in our results. We find that the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the 
three-day event window of (-2, 0) for acquirers that acquire financially constrained or 
bankrupt targets, is greater compared to those acquirers that acquire healthy targets. 
However, there is no significant finding when it comes to the long-term wealth creation 
of acquirers. We also find that in terms of the M&A deals, bidders of FCTs pay discounts 
to FCTs rather than a premium. 
This research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we use the universe 
of US M&A from the Thomson One Deal database for the years 1985 to 2012. Our sample 
size comprises of 4,405 completed M&As in the period of analysis. Second, we examine 
the wealth effects between FCTs that are not bankrupt and bankrupt targets. The 
analysis of both types of financial condition of targets, provide the understanding of the 
similarities of the wealth effect between the two types of M&A. Third, our findings are 
contrary to the previous findings by (Khatami, Marchica, & Mura, 2015). They claim that 
financial constraint targets (FCT) significantly increase acquisition premiums for targets. 
We find that FCT are acquired at discounts. The discount in the deal value compared to 
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acquisitions of healthy targets represent the fee bidders charge to lessen the target’s 
financial constraint condition. We suggest that M&A of FCT or bankruptcy targets 
represent a feasible corporate restructuring and reorganisation strategy to lessen the 
financial constraints of targets and to extract value for the bidder shareholders. Fourth, 
we examine the factors that contribute to the choice of the bidders to acquire financial 
constraint targets (FCT) and bankruptcy targets, by applying the Heckman Selection 
Model (HSM). Lastly to our knowledge, this paper is the first paper that analyses the 
comparisons between the two types of financial conditions of targets in one study, i.e., 
financial constraints (using KZ-Index) and bankrupt targets. 
We submitted some parts of the first essay to the Journal of Applied Economics. The 
paper from the first essay, “Acquisitions of Financially Constrained Targets,” is a joint 
paper with Dr Surendranath Jory and Dr Nnamdi O. Madichie.  We enclosed the paper 
in the appendix section for reference only and to show the outputs from Essay 1. The 
paper sent to the Applied Economics Journal focuses only on M&As involving financially 
constrained targets, and not M&As of bankruptcy targets as in Essay 1 of the 
dissertation. Our first essay presented in the thesis is more detailed and comprehensive 
and include as targets both financially-constrained and bankrupt ones. The thesis 
version of the first essay is solely the work of the candidate. The co-authors ‘contribution 
is merely refining the whole paper and make it more precise and clear. Co-authors 
involved in mapping out the whole structure of the paper. 
1.3 Are there any earnings management activities among the targets that 
are involved in restructuring? 
Due to the importance of future company restructuring, and the wealth creation of the 
targets, in our second empirical chapter we are motivated to fill the gaps in the 
literature. We explore the earning management (EM) of firms involved in restructuring, 
especially through carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other divestitures. We argue that 
information asymmetries between bidders and targets may lead managers to 
opportunistically manipulate their earnings. This may be because real earnings 
management activities are hard to detect (by auditors) as managers will be able to give 
reasonable and rational reasons for certain actions or transactions on their part.  
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In order to investigate the EM activities among the target firms that are involved in 
restructuring through carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other divestitures, which 
impact the future wealth of the targets, we aim to address four main research questions:  
(1) Whether the firms are engaged in earnings management activities in the years 
prior to corporate restructuring;  
(2) Whether the EM activities by firms engaging in corporate restructuring affect the 
wealth creation of target parent firms  
(3) Whether the firms who manage their earnings above the median industry year 
EM index have less stock volatility; and  
(4) What are the factors that could explain the choice of accrued versus real earnings 
by the management.  
Among the firms that are involved in the restructuring, we analyse both the accrual-
based and real earnings management activities to have a complete view of the EM 
activities by targets firms, especially carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other 
divestitures. To avoid any selection bias, we use the Heckman Selection Model (1979) 
(hereafter HSM). 
We document a direct relationship between firms that manage earnings above the 
industry-year median EM index (hereafter AEM), and changes in return on assets (ROA), 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). 
Conversely, firms who manage their earnings EM are associated with lower standard 
deviations in the firms’ stock returns for carve-outs. We provide evidence that, on 
average, target companies manage earnings downward through accrual-based and real 
EM the year before the announcements, and continue after the announcements. This 
finding is consistent with our hypothesis of our third essay on EM. Our hypothesis H1 
states that firms that engage in corporate reorganisation and restructuring i.e., carve-
out, sell-off, spin-off and other divestitures exhibit evidence of accrual based earnings 
management (AM) and real earnings manipulation (RM). Our finding suggests that 
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parent targets2 that are involve in restructuring tend to engage in income-decreasing 
EM activities to increase chances of being acquired. The differences in the changes in 
ROA, CARs, BHARs, and standard deviation of monthly stock returns (SDARs) between 
(1) parent targets that manage earnings below the industry year median EM index 
(hereafter BEM) and, (2) parent targets that manage earnings above the industry year 
median EM index (AEM) are associated with EM activities. The differences in ROA 
between the two groups can be explained by the negative coefficient of the EM proxy. 
We find that there is a negative relationship between the changes in ROA and the EM 
for the carve-out sample. We do not find any significant coefficient of EM proxy for other 
samples. 
We have made a contribution to the literature by documenting that firms use 
accrual-based EM and real EM activities around a specific corporate finance event 
restructuring. This research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we extend 
the work of Balatbat and Lim (2003) and produce evidence on the relative effects of EM 
around corporate restructuring regarding a firm’s future performance. We provide new 
empirical evidence on the impact of the EM activities on the targets’ future accounting 
performances, as well as the stock returns in both the short and long-term. Second, we 
add to the literature by showing that targets that engage in restructuring through carve-
outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and divestitures also engage in accrual-based and real earnings 
manipulation EM in the years surrounding the announcements. Third, we analyse the 
factors that affect EM activities by firms that are involved in restructuring. By examining 
both types of AM and RM activities, we provide the evidence of trade-off between the 
two types of EM. Lastly, we show the significance of specific items in financial 
statements, i.e., items correlated with accruals-based earnings management (AM) and 
real activities manipulations (RM) activities, instead of relying on overall earnings. For 
                                                     
 
 
2 A parent target is a parent company of a target company that being involved in the restructuring 
events used in this study. Parent target owns or controls other firms (i.e., subsidiaries). The restructuring 
events in this study are carve-out, spin-off, sell-off and other divestitures. 
9 
 
 
 
example, the level of net operating assets (NOA) reflects previous EM to some extent 
(Barton and Simko, 2002). 
As has been discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the understanding of how 
organisations set their CEO compensation structure and the rest of the top management 
team sets the qualities of the corporate controls, corporate goals, and corporate 
restructuring. Due to the importance of the pay ratio of the CEO and the rest of the 
management team, our research focuses to the banking industry, and to analyse the 
impact of the CEO pay disparity between CEOs and the rest of the management team. 
We analyse the efficiency and risk-taking behaviour among bank managers. In the next 
section, we will explain the research in more detail. 
1.4 Is the efficiency of banks in the US associated with the CEO pay slice 
(CPS)? 
Our third empirical research is on the effect of CEO pay disparity (CPS), governance and 
bank efficiency, and risk-taking behaviour among the management. CEO compensation 
represents a fundamental internal governance mechanism to mitigate the inherent 
agency conflict present in public firms (Pissaris et al., 2010). There are various aspects 
to explore in the relationship between pay disparity and bank efficiency. Our work 
provides an analysis between pay disparity and firm efficiency, returns volatility and 
insolvency risk.  
In this study, we devise alternative measures of disparity in pay between CEOs and 
other bank staff, and study the link between those measures and the bank’s 
performance with regard to efficiency, risk-taking activities, and bank stability. To 
measure pay disparity, we compare the pay of the bank’s CEO with various groups 
comprising their management staff. More specifically, we compare the CEO’s pay (CPS) 
to (i) the pay of the total remuneration of the bank’s top five executives, including the 
CEO; and (ii) the top management team’s pay. The top management team refers to all 
members of the board of directors of a firm. 
We also address endogeneity issues of pay disparity by examining the causal link 
between firm performance and CEO compensation. We use a two-stage least square 
regression and simultaneous equation methods to mitigate issues with omitted 
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variables and reverse causality. We also want to show the consistency, and the need to 
replace the variables with instrumental variables in our analysis and to correct the 
endogeneity issues.  
We find that a higher pay disparity is associated with lower bank efficiency. 
Conversely, CEO pay disparity is inversely associated with the standard deviation in the 
bank's stock returns and its bankruptcy risk. Thus, stable banks are associated with high 
CEO pay. We also find that institutional shareholdings and stability positively contribute 
to bank efficiency. Cumulatively, our results are consistent with our hypothesis that 
higher pay ratios are associated with rent-seeking and agency theory, and indicate that 
pay ratios are a useful tool to analyse bank efficiency and risk.  
This study contributes to the literature in banking and finance in several ways. 
Despite the public and media outcry regarding the pay cheques of the CEOs at the largest 
US financial institutions, there are very few papers that examine the link between CEO 
pay and bank efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that directly 
addresses the topic is Matousek and Tzeremes (2015). However, our study uses a 
different methodology, i.e. SFA: their study used the DEA. Our sample size is bigger, i.e., 
121 US banks covering the period up to 2014, but their study is limited to only 37 banks 
for the period 2003 to 2012. We also examine the CEO pay disparity (CPS) in four 
different types of compensation, taking into consideration the current and contingent 
portion elements. However, Matousek and Tzeremes (2016) study the CEO salary and 
bonus payments, but not the pay disparity between the CEO and the top management. 
Additionally, we consider both the stock market risk and insolvency risk of the sampled 
banks. Our study offers various elements of CEO pay disparity (CPS) and bank efficiency, 
as well as corporate governance. Thus, our paper offers a rich set of interactions 
between the various elements of CEO pay and bank efficiency.  
In terms of theoretical contribution, our study finds that there is not enough about 
the tournament theory that could explain the situation when it comes to CPS. 
Tournament theory suggests that executives will compete among themselves to move 
up the ladder until they reach the top job. This theory stipulates that large pay gaps 
provide incentives to executives to compete, leading to greater effort and improvement 
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in firms’ performance. However, our findings suggest that CPS is merely directed to 
achieving short- as opposed to long-term targets, causing banks to take more risks.  
Rent-Seeking theory is more appropriate in explaining the association between CPS and 
bank efficiency. This theory explains that rent-seeking behaviour is the attempt of 
individuals or groups to increase their welfare while making a negative contribution to 
net society welfare: focussing on short-term goals leading executives to take excessive 
risks. This basically contradicts the tournament theory that is normally used to explain 
the reason why certain CEO pay disparity is abnormally high in certain industries. When 
it comes to the association between CPS and efficiency, the rent-seeking theory is more 
suitable to justify the relationship. Our findings suggest that the higher the CPS, the 
lower the firm’s efficiency due to excessive risk-taking behaviour among the executives.  
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Chapter 2 
Mergers and Acquisitions of Targets in Corporate Financial 
Distress and Bankruptcy 
2.1 Introduction 
During 2014, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity in the US reflected the most active 
12 months of deals since the 2007-2009 global financial crisis (Thomson Reuters, 2014), 
and the deal value in the first three-quarters of 2014 reached almost US$1 trillion 
(KPMG, 2015). M&A are one of the ways in which firms can opt to reorganize their 
operations and restructure payments to their creditors, rather than file for liquidation, 
especially if they are in a state of financial distress. When acquirers decide to acquire 
targets, they must analyse their target characteristics as well as the financial condition 
of the target firms. A review of M&A suggests some commonality between M&A 
involving financially constrained targets (FCTs) and M&A involving healthy targets (HTs). 
However, the existing research on M&A do not directly address what determinants one 
type of target to be preferred over the other. Target firms’ financial conditions can range 
from healthy to distressed. To the best of my knowledge, there is limited research on 
the effects of target firms’ financial health on bidders’ wealth in M&As. This essay 
attempts to fill this gap in the literature. Consequently, this study attempts to (i) identify 
the financial characteristics that influence a bidder’s decisions to acquire one target over 
the other; (ii) determine how M&A involving FCTs influence bidders’ wealth, both in the 
short and the long run; and (iii) examine the discount or premium paid by the bidder 
firms in M&A of FCTs (we use the terms financially constrained and financially distressed 
inter-changeably).  
We extend the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index (henceforth KZ-Index), which 
measures the financial condition of M&A targets, and provide new insights in 
acquisitions of financially constrained targets (FCTs) and healthy targets (HTs). Lamont, 
Polk, & Saá-Requejo (2001), whose study draws heavily from Kaplan and Zingales (1997), 
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define “financial constraints” as frictions that avert a firm from financing all its 
anticipated investments. The interesting question, therefore, is whether investors 
perceive the M&A market as a place to resolve target firms’ financial constraints. Erel, 
Jang and Weisbach (2015) examine a sample of European acquisitions and follow target 
firms post- acquisition and provide evidence that following the acquisition, target firms 
lower their cash holdings, experience lower sensitivity of cash-to-cash flow and report 
lower sensitivity of investment-to-cash. The authors suggest that acquisitions relieve 
financial frictions at target firms and is a potential source of value. However, 97.4% of 
their sample targets are private firms. It would be of interest to see whether investors 
reward the acquisitions of publicly-listed traded targets, which are subject to more 
public scrutiny and have access to more sources of funds (for instance, the stock market) 
than private firms. Our paper is a test for evidence using a different sample (i.e., US-
based domestic acquisitions), wealth variables (i.e., stock market-based M&A 
announcement period returns and M&A premiums) and measures of targets’ financial 
constraints (i.e., the Kaplan-Zingales Index) to determine the value created in 
acquisitions of financially-constrained targets. We believe that the sample of public 
targets provides a stiffer test of the benefits of M&A since these firms have access to 
more sources of funds than private firms do and, therefore, they would rely on the M&A 
market less than private firms do as a mean to resolve their financial constraints. 
The wide usage of the KZ-Index as a measure of financial condition in the past 
literature indicates that it is widely accepted as an accurate, simple, and consistent 
measure of a financially constrained firm(Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Lamont et al., 2001; 
Livdan et al., 2009; Khatami et al., 2015; Meier and Servaes, 2015). The KZ-Index is, 
therefore, adopted in this study because it provides a comprehensive measure that 
allows for classifying targets into discrete categories of financial constraints. It also 
enables the use of the probit regression to relate to such classifications, with the data 
emerging from the current study. The dependent variable in the probit regression takes 
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a value of 1 for targets that are in the fourth quartile 3  (i.e., the most financially 
constrained) and a value of 0 for targets in the first quartile (i.e., the unconstrained 
firms). The usage of this index is consistent with (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997; Lamont et al., 
2001; Livdan et al., 2009) as they classify firms on a scale from one to four on financial 
constraints. The element of the index consists of proxies for financial constraints. These 
include cash flow-to-assets, debt-to-assets, dividend-to-assets, liquid assets or cash-to-
assets, and Tobin’s Q. (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997) classify firms on a scale one to four and 
perform an ordered logit regression but we consider the two extreme groups to 
compare between the highly financial constraints and healthy firms. Furthermore, the 
KZ-index is a measurement of reliance on external financing. Firms with higher KZ-Index 
scores are more likely to experience difficulties when they are in financial constraints 
conditions and may have difficulties financing their ongoing business. 
In this study, we extend the previous literature in a number of ways. First, we test 
the role of financial constraints on M&A activity on a recent sample of data using a 
comprehensive financial constraints index, i.e., the Kaplan Zingales Index (1997). To 
perform our test, we use a large sample of M&A announcements (i.e., 4,405) made in 
the US between 1985 and 2012, where both bidders and targets are publicly listed 
companies. We also perform another test for another sample of M&A announcements 
(i.e., 407) but involving bankrupt targets.  
Second, we provide direct evidence that the level of financial constraints of target 
firms is an important source of value creation in M&A. We find that bidders of financially 
constrained targets pay higher acquisition discounts and earn higher announcement 
period cumulative abnormal returns than bidders of unconstrained targets. The higher 
discounts and positive stock market reaction are both creates wealth for bidder firms 
and sources of value for bidders’ shareholders. Our results contrast the findings of the 
literature that document an insignificant wealth transfer to bidder shareholders. 
                                                     
 
 
3 We also extend our analysis by adding the third quartile into the most financially constrained group. 
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Third, we show that financial constraints are a key determinant of the probability to 
be acquired by bidders. To this end, we employ a Heckman Selection Model (HSM). The 
HSM regression shows that bidders that acquire bankrupt/FCT have a positive market 
reaction surrounding the announcement day. This suggests that future studies that 
model M&A decision should account for the level of financial constraints in the targets 
firms to achieve a better estimation of bidders’ wealth creation. Our results complement 
the literature as we show that target financial constraints play a major role in value 
creation. 
In this study, the objective is to examine not only the drivers that motivate acquirers 
to acquire FCTs over healthy targets, but also to extend the study to examine the wealth 
creation of acquirers and the discounts/premiums in their deal value. We organize the 
paper as follows: we review the literature and articulate our hypotheses in Section 2.2. 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1 The characteristics of targets or bidders that engage in M&A involving FCTs 
Certain bidders, targets and deal characteristics have been identified to correlate with 
the success of M&As and bidders’ wealth. Among the characteristics are: the size of 
bidders (Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011); having M&A advisors (Agrawal et al., 
2016) high market-to-book acquirers; frequent acquirers; low risk acquirers; higher 
takeover premiums (Bruyland and De Maeseneire, 2014); acquisition of certain assets; 
targets operating in the same industry as acquirers (Laamanen et al., 2014; Hotchkiss 
and Mooradian, 1998; Jory and Madura, 2009; Bruton et al., 1994); and target financial 
liquidity (Jaffe et al., 2015).  
Most of the prior literature examines the factors that contribute to the wealth 
creation of acquirers, rather than the selection of targets, which is the focus of this 
essay. Humphery-Jenner and Powell (2011) indicate that post-takeover operating 
performance increases with acquirer size. It can be related to one of the factors that 
drive acquirers to acquire FCTs. Acquirers may perceive that besides taking advantage 
of all the benefits of acquiring financially constrained targets, operating performances 
could be related to the size of the acquirer.  
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Agrawal et al. (2016) examine the determinants of private sellers’ choice of hiring 
M&A advisers and the effects of these choices on deal valuations. They point out that 
bidders’ announcement returns are significantly lower in deals where the targets have 
M&A advisers, as this could have improved the targets’ bargaining power and deal 
valuations. This relationship serves as a good basis for us to examine the existence of an 
acquirer’s advisor as one of the drivers or determinants of the likelihood of an acquirer 
to acquire FCTs. 
Jaffe et al. (2015) find that there is no relationship between the liquidity of the targets 
and the acquirer’s CARs. This is an interesting finding and we intend to compare and 
contrast the wealth creation of bidders of M&A involving bankrupt targets, versus FCTs. 
The liquidity of targets could be one of the determinants of an acquirer to prefer FCTs 
over their healthy counterparts. (Oh, 2014) claims that target firm- level distress 
negatively affects a target’s bargaining power, thus inducing a fire-sale discount that 
results in larger gains to bidders. 
In addition, a financial constraints prediction model is very useful. In fact, for 
decision-making processes, it is a better tool compared to the traditional ratios for 
obtaining the first insight on the financial condition of a firm. However, it is important 
to analyse the factors or drivers as to why bidders acquire FCTs over healthy targets. 
2.2.1.2 Wealth effects of acquirers that acquired FCTs 
M&As remain an important corporate restructuring and reorganization strategy, and 
research on the topic has been on-going for several decades. The findings from the 
finance literature suggest that while M&As reward target firm shareholders, they fail to 
deliver for bidder firms’ shareholders (Gregory, 1997; Agrawal and Jaffe, 1999). There 
are various propositions that have been advanced to explain this underperformance. For 
example, it is likely that managers of the bidding firms view takeovers as a means to 
maximize their own interests at the expense of their shareholders (Cartwright and 
Schoenberg, 2006). This is consistent with the classic agency theory of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). There is also the possibility that these managers may overestimate the 
value of their target firms (Seth et al., 2000), which is consistent with the managerial 
hubris hypothesis of Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Fuller et al. (2002). 
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Besides the finance literature, attempts to explain the disappointing performance of 
M&A have been made in the strategy and organizational behaviour literature. While not 
an exhaustive list, the following reasons have been advanced as explanations of the 
bidding firms’ underperformance: wrong decision-making and poor integration 
processes (Schweiger and Very, 2003); poor organizational learning from prior M&A 
experiments (Hayward, 2002); and a lack of culture fit between the bidder and the target 
(Cartwright, 2005). 
Despite the voluminous research on M&A, the empirical findings to date suggest that 
M&A continue to underperform. This situation has prompted calls for the examination 
of omitted variables in the extant literature (King et al., 2000). We offer to examine the 
financial conditions of the target firms. A priori, it is difficult to imagine the exact effect 
of this variable on bidders' wealth. There are arguments for both sides, i.e., the 
successes and failures. Among the reasons that could help bidder firms is the possibility 
of benefitting from the deal discounts on financially constrained targets (FCTs).  
Gilson et al. (2016) seek to provide a new perspective on the increased use of M&A 
for resolving or bailing out distressed firms. They highlight that M&A in bankruptcy cases 
often achieve similar economic outcomes as traditional re-organization exercises. This 
blurs the line between traditional reorganization vis-à-vis liquidation. There is also a 
noticeable shift towards the use of M&A in bankruptcy as a means of resolving 
challenges faced by financially constrained targets (FCTs) (see Khatami et al., 2015; 
Lamont et al., 2001; Livdan et al., 2009). M&As are now an established alternative to 
pushing FCTs through the bankruptcy courts for a “Chapter 7 liquidation” or “Chapter 
11 reorganisation”. Chapter 7 and 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code are both main choices 
in corporate bankruptcy. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is regarding reorganisation 
and Chapter 7 is regarding liquidation. Most scholars favour Chapter 7 liquidation as it 
generally allocate resources to those who value them most (Lopucki & Doherty, 2004; 
Senbet & Wang, 2012; Shleifer & Vishny, 2011). Chapter 7 liquidation is a 
straightforward procedure. The court will appoint a trustee. The trustee liquidates the 
firm’s assets and any proceed are then distributes to the firms’ claimants. The court 
establishes the hierarchy of claimants. However, Chapter 11 reorganisation are more 
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complicated and allows the incumbent management to prepare a reorganisation plan 
that proposes an allocation of firm value among the existing claimants (Senbet & Wang, 
2012).   
However, there is also the real possibility that the target fails to add to the bidders' 
wealth because its poor financial state could not be resolved, which acts as a drag on 
the bidder's performance. The discounted value of the target firm may even reflect the 
lack of potential of the firm's assets. The true effect of the financial condition of the 
target firm on bidders' wealth can only be established via an empirical study, which we 
offer to do in this essay. 
Studies that examine how financially distressed targets affect the wealth of bidders 
include Johnson and Abbott (1991) and Senbet and Wang (2012). They define the 
financial condition of firms from varied perspectives. In most of these studies the tools 
employed in categorizing firms as being in financial distress are different from the 
studies that examine financially constrained firms. Some of the most widely used tools 
for measuring financial constraints include the KZ-Index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; 
Lamont et al., 2001), the Composite I and II, the pay-out ratio, and Hadlock and Pierce 
Index, which has also been employed by Khatami et al. (2015).  
Although Johnson and Abbott (1991) do not show direct comparisons between M&A 
that engage with FCTs and non-FCTs, they provide grounds for a comparison undertaken 
in this study – albeit adopting a different methodological approach, i.e., Altman's Z-score 
(1968) to measure the financially constrained US firms for the period of 1973 to 1985. 
They also examine the wealth effects of FCTs and acquirers, along with the other factors 
that contribute to the wealth effects from the M&A activity involving FCTs. The key 
finding in their study is that bidders who acquired FCTs earned positive CARs around the 
first announcement of the event. The results are consistent with the findings of Jory and 
Madura (2009), as well as Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998), which suggests that bidders 
who acquired bankrupt targets experience or earn positive CARs around the first 
announcement of the event. 
Using the KZ-Index as one of the financial constraints prediction models, Meier and 
Servaes (2014) investigate the wealth impact of the fire sales of assets by financially 
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constrained firms on the wealth of the acquirer, as well as the factors that affect such 
wealth. They use data, which consists of 428 completed US M&As involving FCTs over 
the period 1982-2012, and they find that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for 
bidders of FCTs are higher than bidders who bid for general acquisitions. Meier and 
Servaes (2014) do not differentiate between the M&A of bankrupt and non-bankrupt 
firms, and neither the M&A of financially constrained versus healthy targets. Their study 
is important as the finding suggest that the performance of bidders of M&A involving 
financial constraints targets is better than the bidders that acquired healthy targets.  
Existing literature on the wealth effects of acquirers that acquire bankrupt/financially 
constrained targets can be summarized, first, according to the impact of M&As on 
announcement returns; second, on the long-term performance of an acquiring firm, and 
lastly on the discount or premium on the deal value.  
Although studies on CARs surrounding the announcement date of bidders who 
acquired bankrupt/financially constrained targets are limited, most of the research on 
wealth creation has been primarily undertaken using event study methodology. This 
event study methodology involves the application of CARs to analyse the wealth 
creation of bidders surrounding the announcement dates. This is based on the 
proposition that, in an efficient market, the wealth effects around the announcement 
day reflects the capital market’s overall unbiased assessment of the present value of the 
future benefits of the M&A (Datta et al., 1992). This event study methodology relies on 
two assumptions to estimate the wealth effects of mergers: (a) the markets are efficient; 
and (b) the merger announcement about to be released by the merging firm is unknown 
to outside investors at the time of the announcement (Mulherin and Aziz Simsir, 2015). 
Previous studies show that bidders who acquire bankrupt targets experience positive 
CARs around the day of the announcement (Clark and Ofek, 1994; Faelten and Vitkova, 
2014; Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1998; Jory and Madura, 2009, 2010; Jory et al., 2012). 
Early studies in the field of M&A in resolving FCTs include Clark and Ofek (1994); Bruton 
et al. (1994); and Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998).  
Clark and Ofek (1994) examine 384 takeovers between the years 1981 and 1988 from 
W. T. Grimm and Associates’ Mergerstat Review. They find that the success of the 
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restructuring process is negatively related to the premium size paid for the target by the 
bidders. The success of the restructuring process is also positively related to the financial 
constraints of the target. This finding could explain the rationale of engaging in M&A 
activity with targets that are either bankrupt or in a financially constrained condition. 
While Clark and Ofek (1994) find that takeovers involving bankrupt targets are not 
successful, the authors did not study the factors affecting the wealth effect of bidders 
that acquired bankrupt targets or FCTs. They find CARs of bidders to be positively and 
significantly related to the post-merger returns earned by bidders on their investments 
in the targets. Clark and Ofek (1994) provide evidence by taking a current and larger 
sample size. It also extends the previous study with the application of the Kaplan and 
Zingales Index (1997), to show the relationship between the short-term wealth effects, 
and the long-term wealth effects to the bidders of M&A involving bankrupt and FCTs. 
Furthermore, Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) analyse the effects of acquisitions 
involving bankrupt targets and non-bankrupt targets. Their sample consists of 55 public 
companies that have filed for Chapter 11 between 1979 and 1992. Hotchkiss and 
Mooradian (1998) find that acquirers who acquire bankrupt targets show significant 
improvement in their operational performance, but there are no significant 
improvements for acquirers that acquired non-bankrupt targets. Hotchkiss and 
Mooradian (1998) also find positive and significant CARs for both bidders and 
bankruptcy targets for days surrounding the announcement of an acquisition. A study 
by Jory and Madura (2009) on the wealth effects of bidders that acquired bankrupt 
targets assesses and analyses 314 acquisitions of bankrupt assets in the US over the 
period of 1985-2006. They find that acquirers of bankrupt assets experience significant 
positive valuation effects, i.e., the mean 3-day CAR following the announcement is 
2.40%. We extend the duration of the period from 1985 to 2012 with more M&As 
involving bankrupt targets. We compare the M&A of bankrupt targets with FCTs, using 
the KZ-Index.  
There are connections between the financial conditions of targets and the wealth 
creation of bidders that need to be explored in more detail. Financially constrained firms 
are normally faced with future uncertainties and liquidity issues. Cooney et al. (2009) 
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examine returns to acquirers who purchase private targets who had previously 
withdrawn their IPOs. The authors argue that, under the assumption that managers are 
risk-averse and under-diversified, acquirer CARs should reflect the compensation for the 
transfer of uncertainty from the target to the bidder. Although the finding is consistent 
with Boone and Mulherin (2008), who claim that target valuation uncertainty positively 
affects the acquirer CARs, both studies do not make a comparison of the acquirer 
performance in the long-term. Indeed, both studies do not consider M&A activities 
involving bankrupt targets or FCTs. M&A are one of the ways in which firms can opt to 
reorganize their operations and restructure payments to their creditors, rather than file 
for liquidation, especially if they are in a state of financial distress. Nonetheless, the 
relationship between the bidders’ returns and the financial uncertainty of targets is an 
element that needs to be explored in more detail. However, it should be explored in a 
different context, i.e. M&A activity involving bankrupt targets and FCTs.  
The study by Khatami et al. (2015) on the role of financial constraint on M&A activity 
using data from 1985 to 2013, and of an announcement made in the US market, as well 
as a comparison of various measures to measure financial constraint, serves as a good 
platform for the development of this study. According to them, FCTs significantly 
increase acquisition premiums and CARs for both parties. Contrary to the current study 
where they only consider FCTs using the KZ-Index, we retain and analyse the ‘universe’ 
of US M&A deals from the Thomson One Deal Database. We also make a comparison 
between FCTs and healthy targets based on that index. 
M&As reward target firm’s shareholders, and yet they fail to deliver for bidder firms’ 
shareholders (Gregory, 1997; Agrawal and Jaffe, 1999). Most of the explanations are 
based on the classic agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) or managerial hubris 
hypothesis of Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Fuller et al. (2002). However, some of the 
studies show that M&A rewards both target firm shareholders as well as bidder firm’s 
shareholders for the case involving financially constrained or bankruptcy targets. We 
would like to suggest a supplementary theory i.e., The Costly Signalling Theory to 
support the proposition of M&A involving FCTs and bankrupt targets creating value for 
the shareholders of bidders.  
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Spence (1973) first explained the Costly Signalling Theory, which states that if the cost 
of the signal is higher for the bad type than it is for the good type, then it is hard for 
other firms to copy, and so the signal can be regarded as being credible. Costly signalling 
theory proposes that expensive and often apparently subjective behavioral signals are 
designed to express honest information benefiting both signallers and observers (Zahavi 
1975, Grafen 1990, Johnstone 1997).  
We posit that when bidders make an announcement to acquire bankrupt or 
financially constrained targets, the cumulative abnormal return surrounding the 
announcement could be positive. Adopting the characteristics of the Costly Signalling 
Theory of behaviour by Smith and Bird (2000) should be beneficial to others. It will also 
be observable by others, but costly to the signaller in ways that cannot be mimicked or 
reciprocated. Furthermore, it will also be associated with some strength or fitness of the 
signaller (bidder). Bidding for bankrupt or financially constrained targets can also create 
the perception that the bidder is stable and willing to take the risk of acquiring 
problematic targets. Even though it is indirectly costly in terms of future uncertainty, it 
will also benefit the bidder indirectly by establishing a more positive reputation for 
them. This could result in a positive wealth creation to bidders surrounding the 
announcement date; as such announcements are positive signals to competitors and 
investors. Therefore, the wealth effects are presumably better for the bidders that 
acquire FCTs. Thus, we hypothesize that the positive market reaction to M&A 
announcements will be higher in M&A involving FCTs as compared to bidders of HTs.  
𝐻1𝑎∶ Bidders that acquire bankrupt/financially constrained firms have a positive 
market reaction compared with bidders that acquire healthy firms. 
Based on past literature, we extend the study and examine the long run wealth 
effects of bidders. We also examine the wealth effects of bidders of fire sales with the 
discount received by acquiring financially constrained targets. Financially constrained 
targets may be forced to conduct fire sales at significant discounts from the asset value 
in order to increase the liquidity level to cover future debt repayments (Laamanen et al., 
2014; Pulvino, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1992). Oh, 2014 suggests that distressed targets 
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are sold at discounts when the target industry is in distress. Thus, the following sections 
will discuss in more detail the two aspects that we have highlighted. 
2.2.2 Post-acquisition performance in response to bids for FCTs  
It is well documented that the wealth valuation of acquirers of bankrupt targets have 
positive CARs on the day of announcement (Jory and Madura, 2009; Jansen and Stuart, 
2014; Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011). There are few studies that attempt to 
examine the long-term effect of M&A involving bankrupt targets. Jory and Madura 
(2009) and Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) find that, in the long run, there is no 
significant difference in the performance between bidders that acquire bankrupt targets 
and non-bankrupt targets. Contrary to the findings by the Jory and Madura (2009) and 
Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998), Bruton et al. (1994) claim that related acquisitions of 
FCTs perform better than unrelated acquisitions of financially constrained targets. Oh 
(2014) finds that acquirers of FCTs in a financially constrained industry tend to earn 
positive buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). The findings on the long-term wealth 
effects of bidders that acquired FCTs is mixed. 
The application of the method to analyse the long run post-acquisition for M&A 
involving bankrupt targets and FCTs in previous studies is common (Barber and Lyon, 
1997; Jory and Madura, 2009, 2010; Jory et al., 2012; Oh, 2014). Jory and Madura (2009, 
2010) and Jory et al. (2012) show that BHARs are not significantly different from zero for 
bidders that engage in asset purchases and acquisitions of equity of bankruptcy targets. 
They examine the wealth effects of bidders from M&A involving bankrupt targets. They 
find that there is wealth creation for bidders that acquired bankrupt targets in the short 
run, but not in the long run.  
Furthermore, Oh (2014) shows that acquirers of FCTs in a financially constrained 
industry earn positive BHARs. The abnormal returns of acquirers in fire sale acquisitions 
are substantially higher than the returns of acquirers of FCTs in non-financially 
constrained industries in the same two-year window. The application of different 
models than those used by Oh (2014) may provide a better idea of the wealth effects of 
bidders that acquire bankrupt/FCTs. The study examines the wealth effects of M&A 
24 
 
 
 
activity over a longer period of a three-year window with well-known bankruptcy 
prediction models.  
Jory & Madura (2009) find that the CARs of bidders of bankrupt targets are positive 
around the three-day announcement window but find no evidence of long run abnormal 
returns. We argue that in cases where bidders earn positive CARs around the 
announcement days, but fail to earn positive BHARs in the long run, they could be 
explained by the Rent-Seeking Theory. According to Latkov (2014, p.2):  
…rent-seeking is defined as the attempt of individuals or groups to increase their 
welfare while making a negative contribution to the net society welfare. It means 
that some resources will not be consumed for productive purposes, but to the 
property rights structure change to the favor of individuals or groups to obtain 
them in the form of surplus rents. 
This application of rent-seeking theory is relevant when the top management is more 
interested in achieving short-term goals rather than in the long-term survival of the firm. 
Measuring market reaction over a three or four -day window surrounding the M&A 
announcement poses some challenges. The market reaction in the three or four days 
may be incomplete. If investors need time to assess the consequences of an M&A fully, 
then their valuation will be reflected in the stock price movements over a longer period. 
The long-term abnormal returns, in response to bids for financially constrained targets, 
are different compared to non-financially constrained targets. Thus, we also track 
bidders’ share price performances over a longer period.  
We apply the methods of buy-and-hold returns (BHRs) for financially constrained 
targets and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for bankrupt targets (Barber and 
Lyon, 1997). Jory and Madura (2009, 2010) and Jory et al. (2012), show that BHARs are 
not significantly different from zero for bidders that engage in asset purchases and 
acquisitions of equity of bankruptcy targets. However, Oh (2014) shows that acquirers 
of financially constrained targets in a financially constrained industry earn positive 
BHARs. Over the same two-year window, the abnormal returns of acquirers in fire sale 
acquisitions are substantially higher than the returns of acquirers of financially 
constrained targets in non-financially constrained industries. The application of different 
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models than those used by Oh (2014) would test the wealth effects of bidders that 
acquire bankrupt/financially constrained targets. We also try to examine the wealth 
effects of M&A activity over a longer period, i.e., a three-year window using robust 
bankruptcy prediction models.  
In addition, in a competitive bid the winning bid may overpay to kill off other 
competing bidders, thus jeopardizing the long-term benefits to be derived from the 
acquisition. However, many would think that bidding for bankrupt or financially 
constrained targets is non-competitive for various reasons including lack of liquidity, 
asset specificity, bank covenants, low employee morale and other issues relating to the 
law in particular. Under these circumstances, a few bidders will have more time to 
properly assess the targets, especially if they belong to the same industry and/or the 
bidder has expert knowledge in the assets of the target firm. They lead to better 
evaluations and assessments of targets, and therefore will improve the long-term 
performance of the bidders. We hypothesise that because the deal value is normally 
below the market value, bidders will usually try to ‘seal the deal’ as quickly as possible 
to win the bid. Furthermore, the decision to acquire FCTs could be related to the Costly 
Signalling Theory, where it is only applicable in the short-term. However, in the long-
term, the wealth creation to bidders is questionable. If bidders fail to create wealth from 
the acquisition of bankrupt and FCTs, then it could be due to the rent-seeking behaviour 
of the top management of the bidders.  
Theoretically, other than filing for bankruptcy, there are other ways of identifying if 
a firm is financially constrained. There are bidders and specialist advisers who are 
experts in acquisitions of financially constrained targets (FCTs). They would use their 
expertise to identify FCTs with the potential to add wealth following an investment from 
an interested bidder. The restructuring would consume resources that the bidder can 
afford. We hypothesise that the M&A announcement returns would be positive for the 
bidder under these circumstances. Additionally, we expect the long-run outlook of the 
M&A to be favourable following the investments by the bidder to redress the business 
of the target firm. Conversely, the M&A is less likely to succeed if the bidder had other 
intentions as under the rent-seeking hypothesis.  
26 
 
 
 
We posit that the BHARs of bidders that acquire bankrupt or FCTs should earn 
negative BHARs.  Coelho, John, & York (2012) reveal a statistically significant post-
bankruptcy announcement drift of -28% over the following year for firms that remain 
listed on the main exchanges, which is relatively more negative when investors are more 
active, and the stocks exhibit speculative features. This is because the market reaction 
is not complete at the time of the M&A announcement. The motive of bidders is not 
clear in the short-term and there are more factors that investors cannot foresee at the 
time of the announcement. As these factors materialize over time, the performance of 
the bidder of the bankrupt targets or FCT will be seen in the long-term. Thus, we 
hypothesize as follows: 
𝐻1𝑏∶  Bidders that acquire bankrupt financially constrained firms have negative 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns when compared with bidders that acquire healthy 
firms. 
The following hypothesis is related to the post-acquisition operating performance of 
bidders:  
𝐻1𝑐∶  Bidders that acquire financially constrained firms have lower operating 
performances compared to bidders that acquire healthy firms. 
2.2.1.3 Deal value in M&A of bankrupt or financially constrained assets  
Empirical research studies have shown the existence of fire-sale discounts bankruptcy 
(for instance, Pulvino (1998) and Campbell et al. (2011)). However, there is little 
evidence of its existence amongst financially-constrained targets that are not necessarily 
bankrupt. Most literature focuses on the losses suffered by sellers in fire-sale 
transactions, but little research has been done to examine the effect of fire sales on the 
wealth of the buyers of financially-constrained targets.  
A fire sale is essentially a forced sale of an asset at a discounted price. The asset sale 
is forced in the sense that the seller cannot pay their creditors without selling off their 
assets (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011). By definition, fire sales are sales of goods at extremely 
discounted prices and normally happen when sellers are facing bankruptcy, or are in 
financially constrained conditions. Fire sales are said to occur in the financial market 
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when bidders that have highly valued assets are prevented from entering the bidding 
process. These will result in the price of the assets being sold at below the market prices. 
In this study, we test for the extent of fire-sales in M&As of FCTs. 
Previous studies, such as Oh (2014), Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998), Clark and Ofek 
(1994), Goergen and Renneboog (2004), and Bruyland and de Maeseneire (2014) 
examine the relationship between the financial condition of targets and the deal value 
of M&A. Financially distressed targets are sold at discounts when the target industry is 
in distress (Oh, 2014), and bankrupt targets are on average purchased at a 45% discount 
relative to prices paid for non-bankrupt targets in the same industry (Hotchkiss & 
Mooradian, 1998). There are also studies that examine the relationship between the 
deal value and characteristics of the targets, bidders and deals of M&As (Agrawal et al., 
2016; Alexandridis et al., 2013; Madura and Ngo, 2008). Agrawal et al., (2016) find that 
targets receive significantly higher acquisition premiums when they retain advisers. 
Madura and Ngo (2008) suggest that the deal value in a takeover is more closely 
associated with the recent premiums paid in previous takeovers in the target’s 
corresponding industry. Alexandridis et al. (2013) results show that large firms are 
acquired at a significant discount relative to small ones. These studies (Agrawal et al., 
2016; Alexandridis et al., 2013; Madura and Ngo, 2008) serve as the basis for the current 
study to apply the method of calculating the discount or premium in deal value in M&As 
involving FCTs.  
It is a common practice that FCTs must sell their assets at a discount because of being 
in a desperate situation of liquidity or financial constraints. Their values are inversely 
related to the discount in deal values (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011). This gives the bidders 
the opportunity of acquiring bankrupt/financially constrained targets at a discounted 
value. Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) reveal that FCTs normally receive lower prices 
as they have less bargaining power due to their poor financial conditions. Additionally, 
financially constrained targets that are in a desperate situation to raise their liquidity 
level to cover their debt repayments may be forced to agree to a fire sales transaction. 
This may result in a significant discount in deal value (Lee and Madhavan, 2010; Pulvino, 
1998). Moreover, financially constrained firms are more likely to be poorly managed as 
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compared to non-financially constrained firms and the discount in their deal values 
would constitute a price they need to pay for their inefficiency. The discounts in deal 
value will also be higher if FCTs have less bargaining power during the acquisition 
process.  
Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) suggest that, on average, bankrupt targets are, on 
average purchased at a 45% discount relative to deal value paid for healthy targets in 
the same industry. When bankrupt assets have limited value on their own, they may 
become valuable when they are combined with another firm in the same industry and 
produce synergies (Jory and Madura, 2009). This pattern should be similar for the case 
of FCTs. As suggested by Jory and Madura (2009), acquisitions involving bankrupt targets 
in the same industry with acquirers are more favourable only if the selected assets are 
in the same industry. Bruton et al. (1994) report consistent findings and claim that 
related acquisition of FCTs perform better than unrelated acquisitions of FCTs. Previous 
researchers do not classify them as the drivers or determinants of the likelihood of 
acquirers to acquire FCTs over HTs.  
Oh (2014) investigates how the combined effects of target firm and industry-level 
FCTs affect acquisition outcomes through the fire-sale channel. The author’s sample 
consists of 1,627 completed mergers between US non-bankruptcy public targets and US 
public bidders between 1980 and 2010. Oh claims that FCTs are sold at a discounted 
price when the target industry is financially constrained. In this essay, we compare the 
prices (in the form of M&A discounts) between financially constrained targets (FCTs) and 
healthy targets (HTs). Differences in the prices paid would confirm the existence of a 
fire-sale in the acquisitions of FCTs.  
We perform the above in this paper by comparing deal values in M&As involving FCTs 
versus HTs. Oh’s (2014) findings that there are fire-sales in M&As involving firms that 
are in FCTs is consistent with Clark and Ofek (1994), Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998), 
and Goergen and Renneboog (2004). Valuation discounts tend to be positively related 
to the degree of information asymmetry between acquirers and targets (Agrawal et al., 
2016). In a situation where market participants are liquidity-constrained, prices become 
less informative (Dow and Han, 2016). While there is evidence to suggest that FCTs are 
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sold at a discounted price when the target industry is financially constrained (Oh, 2014), 
however the discounts are mostly due to the diligent assessment undertaken by the 
bidder prior to the M&A. Additionally, there is the risk that FCTs would window-dress 
their financial statements (Hu and Sathye, 2015). This creates information asymmetry 
between the bidders and targets, which would explain the discounts in the deal’s value 
between an M&A involving FCTs. 
The deal value of the M&A of healthy targets is different from the deal value of the 
M&A involving financially constrained targets, or bankrupt targets. Shleifer and Vishny 
(2011) predict that firms with financial constraints will have to sell off their assets at a 
discount as a result of being in a dire liquidity situation. Financial constraints and firm 
value are inversely related, which gives the bidders the opportunity to acquire 
bankrupt/FCTs at a discount value. The propensity of FCTs that need to raise liquidity at 
short notice to agree to a fire sales transaction is high, which would result in a significant 
discount in the deal value (Lee and Madhavan, 2010; Pulvino, 1998). FCTs are more likely 
to be poorly managed, an inefficiency that could explain how they became financially 
constrained in the first place. The discounts in deal value will also be higher if financially 
constrained targets have less bargaining power due to their adverse financial condition. 
If this is the case, then the deal value of an M&A involving financially constrained targets 
will be below the deal value of healthy targets. This is because non-financially 
constrained targets are more stable, and are not in the process of restructuring their 
operations. 
However, Khatami et al. (2015) suggest that acquisition premiums are significantly 
higher when targets are financially constrained. Their findings contradict Clark and Ofek 
(1994), Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998), Goergen and Renneboog (2004) and Oh 
(2014).  Although Khatami et al. (2015) use multiple methods to classify FCTs, yet their 
findings are more related to bidder characteristics than target ones. What Khatami et al. 
(2015) find from their analysis is that the M&A involving financially constrained targets 
would normally increase the acquisition premium, whereas we postulate that M&As 
involving financially constrained targets will normally be at a discount resulting from 
fire-sales. Agrawal et al. (2016) find that targets that have advisers will normally enjoy 
30 
 
 
 
an acquisition premium. Alexandridis et al. (2013) find that a premium is negatively 
related to the target's size. These two studies presage that the premium paid to targets 
is not only related to the financial condition of the target, but may reflect other 
determinants. We argue that a comparison of the premiums paid for FCTs versus HTs is 
important to establish the existence of a premium or a discount in M&As of FCTs. 
To this end, we test the M&A premium in acquisitions of bankrupt assets against the 
M&A premium paid for similar firms that are not bankrupt or financially constrained. 
We hypothesize that the deal value of FCTs is lower than comparable firms that are not 
financially constrained.  
Prior to acquisition, acquiring managers sometimes overestimate targets future 
values (they suffer from managerial hubris (see eg., Goergen & Renneboog, 2004; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Roll, 1986)) and overestimate the potential synergies of 
business combinations (John and Ofek, 1995; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003). These 
managers are more likely to overpay for a target. According to Bruton et al. (1994), 
overestimating a target’s value is less likely when an acquisition target is a financially 
constrained firm and in a business related to the bidder, i.e., within the same industry. 
Furthermore, valuation discounts tend to be positively related to the degree of 
information asymmetry between the acquirers and targets (Agrawal et al., 2016), which 
is likely to exist among liquidity-constrained market participants (Dow and Han, 2016).  
Valuation discounts tend to be positively related to the degree of information 
asymmetry between the acquirers and targets (Agrawal et al., 2016). Financially 
constrained targets are sold at discounted prices when the target industry is financially 
constrained (Oh, 2014) or in a situation where market participants are liquidity-
constrained (Dow and Han, 2016). Bidders may take precautions steps and processes 
prior to M&A to prevent from overpayment. Targets that could potentially experience 
financial constraints in the near future may window-dress their financial statements (Hu 
and Sathye, 2015). This creates information asymmetry between the bidders and 
targets. This in turn will create discount in the deal’s value between an M&A involving 
FCTs. Hence, we put forward our last hypothesis as follows: 
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𝐻1𝑑∶ The M&A premium is inversely related to a target’s degree of financial 
constraints. 
2.3 Sample Selection and Data Description 
Our study collects a sample of M&A announcements made between 1985 and 2012 from 
the Thomson One Deal database. We consider only completed M&A in our study. 
Although this study is about firms that are in financial constraints, we have downloaded 
the universe of M&A transactions from the Thomson One Deal database. Our objective 
is to compare the performance of acquisitions of financially constrained firms with the 
acquisitions of non-financially constrained firms. We also have collected the whole 
dataset on the M&A involving bankrupt targets for the robustness test in our analysis. 
The bidders are US public firms and the targets are US public, private, or subsidiary firms. 
We require that bidders must have data in the CRSP database to calculate the 
announcement periods returns, buy-and-hold returns, and discount/premium data.  
To assess the financial condition of target firms we use several methods. We first use 
the Kaplan and Zingales Index (1997) model in identifying targets that are financially 
constrained. The final dataset for the M&A involving financially constrained targets 
contains 4,405 observations, and 407 observations for M&A involving bankrupt targets. 
The event date is the first announcement date of the takeover by a successful bidder. 
Accounting and financial data are obtained from COMPUSTAT. All databases are 
accessed via Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). To compute Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) and Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs), we use the 
Eventus database. 
We eliminate financial firms with SIC codes 6000-6999, and utility firms with SIC 
codes 4900-4999, because they are highly regulated firms. We include only deals that 
are complete and where the amount of the deal value is reported. We consider only 
domestic deals and ignore cross-border ones. Bidder firms are listed either on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or NASDAQ. To 
determine the financial status of a firm (i.e., whether it is financially constrained or not), 
we require the firm to be publicly incorporated. For the bankrupt database, we consider 
the entire universe of M&A in the US. For a clearer picture of the sample distribution of 
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this study, we present the frequency per year of announcement in Figure 2-1 for 
financially constrained targets, and in Figure 2-2 for M&As involving bankruptcy targets. 
Figure 2.1: Frequency of M&A involving FCT 
 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Thomson One Banker 
For a clearer picture of the sample distribution of this study, we present the 
frequency per year of announcement in Figure 2.1 for financially constrained targets, 
and in Figure 2.2 for M&As involving bankruptcy targets. The highest number of M&A 
involving FCT in our study is in the year 1998 and the lowest in in the year 2009. Whereas 
for the sample involving bankrupt targets, the highest number is for the year 2002 and 
the lowest is in 1985. It seems that, more M&A involving FCT and bankrupt targets 
during the tech bubble period. However, there is no obvious pattern during the global 
world financial crisis. There is a reduction in the number of M&A involving FCT from 
2007 to 2008. Unlike, there is an increment in the M&A involving bankrupt targets from 
2007 to 2008. The pattern of M&A involving FCT is relatively decreasing immediately 
after the introduction of SOX in 2002. Nevertheless, there are slight increases for a few 
years after the introduction of SOX in the M&A involving FCT from 2002 onwards.   
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Figure 2.2: Frequency of M&A involving bankruptcy target 
 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Thomson One Banker 
In Table 2.1 the sample distribution is based on the year of announcements. The 
highest number of M&A was in the year 1998, with 309 M&A (7.01% of the total sample). 
The second highest number of acquisitions was in 1999, with 280 M&A involving 
financially constrained targets, which equals to 6.36% of the total number of 4,405 M&A 
in the period of analysis. The minimum number of M&A was in the year 2011. There 
were only 77 M&A in the year 2011, i.e., 1.75% of the overall sample. In 1985, there are 
no observations available for us to apply the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) Index to and to 
analyse.  
For further analysis in the later chapters, we will use the four quartiles to classify the 
targets into financially constrained and healthy targets. The distribution of the quartiles 
is presented in Table 2.3. Based on the KZ-Index, a high index score of a firm means the 
firm is highly constrained. Thus, the higher the index, the more financially constraint the 
firm is. We classify the index of all the sample firms into quartiles. We classify the 
percentage of highly safe firms in the first quartile, and the highly financially constrained 
firms in the fourth quartile. 
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Table 2.1: Sample Distribution of M&A Involving Financial Distressed Targets* 
 FCT BANKRUPTCY 
Year of 
Announcement 
N % N % 
1985 0 0 2 0.25 
1986 158 3.59 12 1.47 
1987 184 4.18 6 0.74 
1988 184 4.18 8 0.98 
1989 194 4.40 16 1.97 
1990 171 3.88 14 1.72 
1991 141 3.20 34 4.18 
1992 107 2.43 30 3.69 
1993 123 2.79 33 4.05 
1994 208 4.72 37 4.55 
1995 240 5.45 28 3.44 
1996 240 5.45 35 4.3 
1997 247 5.61 25 3.07 
1998 309 7.01 35 4.3 
1999 280 6.36 21 2.58 
2000 264 5.99 53 6.51 
2001 150 3.41 82 10.07 
2002 96 2.18 96 11.79 
2003 125 2.84 71 8.72 
2004 131 2.97 43 5.28 
2005 147 3.34 30 3.69 
2006 125 2.84 11 1.35 
2007 150 3.41 7 0.86 
2008 102 2.32 15 1.84 
2009 81 1.84 24 2.95 
2010 86 1.95 20 2.46 
2011 77 1.75 14 1.72 
2012 85 1.93 12 1.47 
Total 4405 100.00 814 100 
*Year of Announcement.  
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Thomson One Banker 
The percentages of these two extreme quartiles are almost the same, i.e., 24.63% 
and 24.99% respectively. Most firms fall under the second quartile. There are 1,115 
M&A involving healthy targets, or 25.31%, that are considered to be in the first quartile. 
The second largest were 1,104 M&A involving financially constrained targets, or about 
25.06% out of the total M&A in the sample based on the KZ-Index. We present some of 
the descriptive statistics of the variables we use in our analysis in Table 2.4 for better 
understanding of the sample. The next section is a discussion on the measurement used 
to define our target sample. 
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Table 2.2: Distribution of Targets (FCTs?)*  
Number of Targets Based on Kaplan-Zingales 
Index (1997) 
N % 
1st Quartiles 1085 24.63 
2nd Quartiles 1115 25.31 
3rd Quartiles 1104 25.06 
4th Quartiles 1101 24.99 
Total 4405 100.00 
*Financial data taken two years before the announcement (Based on Kaplan-Zingales Index 1997) 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat 
2.3.1 Measuring financial constraints 
The literature has proposed several models and criteria to identify the degree of 
financial constraints faced by firms. The initial study to identify the degree of financial 
constraints is undertaken by Fazzari et al. (1988). However, there is no consensus on the 
best measures available (Khatami et al., 2015). We compute the degree of financial 
constraints of targets based on the KZ-Index following Lamont et al. (2001) and Khatami 
et al. (2015). The KZ-Index is a relative measurement of reliance on external financing 
for non-financial firms. Companies with higher KZ-Index scores are more likely to 
experience difficulties when financial conditions tighten, since they may have difficulty 
financing their on-going operations. Even though it cannot be precisely predicted which 
companies are financially constrained and which are not, it is helpful for the current 
researchers to gauge the standing of the firms. The KZ-Index is based on the following 
five-factor model as described in Lamont et al. (2001):  
𝐾𝑍 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 = −1.001909 (
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1
) + 0.2826389 𝑄𝑖
+ 3.139193 (
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑡
) − 39.3678 (
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1
)
− 1.314759 (
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡−1
)      
 
 (2.1) 
   
Where KZ index is consists of five elements. Cash flow is computed as EBITDA; Q is 
computed as (Book Assets – Book Equity – Deferred Taxes + Market Equity) / Book 
Assets; and Debt is computed as Long-term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities. PPE is the 
start-up total cost of plant, property and equipment of the firm. This index captures the 
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extent to which other firms in the industry are capital constrained. A higher index means 
that the firm is more financially constrained.  
We retrieved all the elements in the equation 2.1 from COMPUSTAT. These variables 
will form into five independent ratios. The data are taken two or three years before the 
year that the firms listed in the Thomson One Deal database. The general rule of applying 
this index is that the higher the index means the firm is highly constrained. 
However, the current researchers divide the index into four quartiles, having the first 
quartile as a safe set of targets and the last quartile as the set of targets that are highly 
constrained targets. For the robustness check we also consider the third and the fourth 
quartiles as the set of M&A involving FCT as well in our analysis. As has been explained 
in the previous chapters, the current researchers are interested in examining the M&A 
involving the FCTs. We use the quartiles when categorizing the targets.  
We use the Heckman Selection Model (HSM) to control for endogeneity. This 
method is appropriate because we have a non-random sample selection, i.e., bidders’ 
performances are only observed for targets that accepted an offer. Hence, our estimator 
could be biases since we do not know what the outcome would be for those targets that 
refused a bidder’s offer. To control for the sample selection bias, we predict the 
likelihood of a target firm accepting a bidder’s offer at the first-stage of HSM using a 
probit model. We calculate the predicted inverse mills ratio (IMR) for each M&A 
transaction in the first-stage of HSM, and in the second-stage HSM, we estimate the 
bidders’ performances using the IMR as a predictor in the model ( see Maddala, 1983; 
Wooldridge, 2009). To test our hypotheses regarding characteristics that influence 
acquirers to choose FCTs, we apply the first-stage HSM probit regression to the following 
model: 
𝑙𝑛
𝑣
1 − 𝑝
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐼𝐶𝑅𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖 +  𝛽6 𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖 +  𝛽7𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑅𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐿𝑌𝑖
+ 𝛽9𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑖
+ 𝛽12𝑇𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖 +  𝛽13𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑃𝐿𝐸𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖
+  𝛽14𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽15𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖 +  𝛽16𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖
+  𝛽17𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽18𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝐵𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
 
 (2.2) 
The binary response (i.e., outcome or dependent) variable is assigned a value of one 
when the target is classified as financially constrained, and 0 if the target is a healthy 
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firm; Where the binary response (i.e., outcome or dependent) variable is assigned a 
value of one when the target is classified as financial constraints, and zero if the target 
is a healthy firm; DEBTRATIO is the bidder’s total liabilities divided by market value of 
equity, as of four weeks prior to the announcement; ICR is the interest coverage ratio of 
the bidder calculated as EBIT divided by interest expenses; SIZE is the log of book value 
of total assets of the bidder; RELATED is equals to one if the buyer’s and target’s SICs are 
equal at the two-digit level; CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for years 
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 and zero otherwise; SOX is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one for years from 2002 onwards and zero otherwise; ALLCASH is equals 
to one if the deal is financed by all cash; FRIENDLY is equals to zero if the bid status is 
friendly and one if hostile; ACCOUNT is equals to number of bidder’s advisor; 
SIZETARGET is the log of book value of total assets of the target; ACA is equals to one if 
the bidder only acquired certain assets only and zero if otherwise; TENDEROFFER is 
equals to one if the deal is tender offer and zero if otherwise; MULTIPLEBID is equals to 
number of bidders; MAACTIVITY is equals the logarithm of total value of the mergers 
and acquisition in the same year; TACOUNT is equals to number of target’s advisor; 
COMPLETION is measured as the number of days between deal closing and 
announcement date; TECHTARGET is equals one if the target is a high-tech firm; and 
TECHBIDDER is equals one if the bidder is a high-tech firm and zero if otherwise. We 
control for year fixed effects, as well as robust standard errors. We estimate the effect 
of the financial health of targets on the CARs, BHRs, ROA and discount, subsequently 
using the following model of the second-stage HSM: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
 
 (2.3) 
 
𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
 
 (2.4) 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 𝑜𝑟 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
 
 
 (2.5) 
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𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖 𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
 
 
 (2.6) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the cumulative abnormal return of an acquirer in the sample; 𝐹𝐶𝑖 is equal to one 
if the M&A involves FCTs, and 0 if the target is a healthy target. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖  is all the 
independent variables used in the first-stage probit regression. 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖 is the inverse mill 
ratios generated from the first-stage HSM probit regression. 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖 is the buy-and-hold 
return of the firm in the sample. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖  is the return on assets calculated as the net 
income divided by total assets. ∆ROA is the changes in the ROA calculated as 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 minus 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1  divided by 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 . 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖 𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇  is the 
percentage of the deal value divided by the targets market value four weeks prior to the 
announcement. 
To the extent that bidders alleviate the financial constraint of the target firms and 
enable them to finance their desired investments, as well as to reduce their costs of 
capital, it is conceivable that this improved state of affairs will reflect positively on a 
bidder’s performance, now that the target is part of the combined entity. To test this 
hypothesis, we compare the Return on Assets (ROAs) between bidders of constrained 
and unconstrained firms. 
Heckman (1979) states that the self-selection sample produces a specification error 
that leads to biased estimators. The two-stage method is used to mitigate the biases and 
to control the selection bias. In our t-test and Wilcoxon test results, we report the 
difference in mean and median of the performance and the wealth effects of the bidders 
between the different groups of our examinations. Therefore, we employ a two-stage 
Heckman method to confirm that selection bias does not affect our regression models. 
We use the financial constraints (FC) of the targets to run the first-stage probit 
regressions. These variables are presented in the first and the third columns in every 
regression table presented in this study. From the first-stage regression, we calculate 
the inverse mills ratio and use it in our second-stage regressions. The coefficient of the 
IMR is always insignificant for the case of CARs and BHRs. This means that selection bias 
does not affect our findings. We will discuss the analysis in detail in the next section. 
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2.4 Empirical results 
The results are presented at two levels: first a discussion of the univariate analysis of the 
M&A involving FCTs is undertaken in light of the effect of financial constraints on firm 
performance. That discussion also encompasses the first-stage of HSM. In the second 
part, a multivariate analysis is undertaken to highlight the effect of financial constraints 
on the wealth creation of bidders. 
2.4.1 Univariate analysis 
M&A involving FCTs or healthy targets differ significantly from each other. Figure 2.3 
represent the lines graph of KZ Index Mean.  
Figure 2.3: Lines Graph of Mean of the Kaplan- Zangales (KZ) Index (scores) 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat database 
From the graph, it shows that the KZ index mean of the sample targets is the lowest 
in the year 2008 and the highest is in the year 1986. The average KZ-Index in 2008 is -
51.61 and in 1986 is -1.43. The average KZ-Index of the sample targets is -9.66. This index 
captures the extent to which other firms in the industry are capital constrained. Firms 
with higher KZ-Index scores are more likely to experience difficulties financing their 
ongoing business. In our opinion, the KZ-Index mean of the sample targets is the lowest 
during the global financial crisis in 2008 could be due to the due diligence and cautious 
behaviour among bidders during that period.  
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Table 2.4 reports the descriptive characteristics of variables used in this study. The 
univariate results are presented in Table 2.5 where Panel A represents the CARs of 
bidders of financially constrained targets, which fall into the fourth quartile based on 
the KZ-Index. The 3-day event window (-2, 0) represented in the table shows that the 
CARs of bidders are positively significant and not equal to 0 at 5% significant level. 
Comparing the first and the fourth quartiles of the targets based on the KZ-Index, where 
the fourth quartile represents the bidders that acquired FCTs, the t-test shows that the 
means of the CARs of bidders that acquired financial constraints are not equal to zero. 
Table 2.3: Data Descriptive Statistics of M&A Involving FCTs*  
 N Mean  Median Stdev 
Kaplan Zingales Index (1997)-
overall 
4,405 -9.308*** 1.105*** 98.526 
Kaplan-Zingales Index (1997     
-1st Quartiles 1085 -43.078*** -9.233*** 194.637 
-2nd Quartiles 1115 -0.518*** -0.314*** 1.115 
-3rd Quartiles 1104 1.997*** 2.045*** 0.468 
-4th Quartiles 1101 3.733*** 3.205*** 5.360 
CAR (-2,0) 4405 0.300*** 0.200 7.000 
CAR (-3,0) 4405 0.400 -0.100 8.600 
BHR (+1, +12) 4405 16.800*** 8.100 61.700 
BHR (+1, +36) 4405 37.000*** 8.500*** 146.300 
Return on Assets     
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 4070 0.007 0.049*** 0.400 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+2 3756 0.002 0.046*** 0.645 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+3 3696 -0.001 0.043*** 0.518 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1-Industry median 
adjusted 4068 0.002 0.031*** 0.399 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+2-Industry median 
adjusted 3754 0.005 0.032*** 0.645 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+3-Industry median 
adjusted 3693 0.003 0.028*** 0.518 
Discount/Premium 4005 12.868 -1.693*** 587.289 
Debtratio 4250 1.234*** 0.989*** 9.281 
ICR 3813 45.935*** 5.336*** 470.833 
SIZE 4263 6.584*** 6.616*** 2.225 
Sizetarget 4405 5.616*** 5.420*** 2.055 
Tobin’s Q 4370 2.160*** 1.604*** 2.509 
Completion 4405 169.971*** 92.000*** 282.696 
* Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables (Based on Kaplan-Zingales Index 1997).  
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% 
level. 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from CRSP and COMPUSTAT 
Figures 2.4 shows the line plot of the mean CAR (-3,0) for both the FCT and non-FCT. 
The FCT are those firms classified in the first quartile and the non-FCT are those firms 
fall under the fourth quartile.  From the line plot of Figure 2.4, the mean CAR (-3,0) of 
non-FCT is seems to be lower than the mean of FCT in most of the periods. The mean 
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CAR (-3,0) of FCT in year 2008 is higher than the mean CAR (-3,0) for bidders that 
acquired healthy targets.  
Figure 2.5 represent the line plot for BHR (+1, +36) of the bidders that acquired FCT 
and non-FCT. It is clear that the BHR of the bidders that acquired non-FCT to earn higher 
BHR (+1, +36) from the year 1985 to 1997 as well as the year 2008. However, the BHR 
(+1, +36) of bidders that acquired non-FCT is lower for the post-financial crisis is 
especially in year 2010 onwards. BHR (+1, +36) of bidders that acquired FCT is also higher 
for the period of 2002 to 2005.  
Figure 2.4: Line Plot of Mean of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for event 
window (-3, 0) – M&A Involving Financial Constrained Targets and Non-Financial 
Constrained Targets 
 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from CRSP 
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Figure 2.5: Line Plot for Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHR) for event window (+1, +36) – 
M&A Involving Financial Constrained Targets and Non-Financial Constrained Targets 
 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from CRSP 
Table 2.4: Univariate analysis of CARs, BHRs, ROAs and Discount/Premium of FCTs versus 
healthy acquisitions  
  N Mean Median 
Panel A: The Effects of Financial Health of Target on CARs (-2,0) of Bidders  
4th Quartile versus 1st Quartile    
Bidder of FCTs (4th Quartile) 1,101 0.005** 0.002 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 1,085 -0.001 0.002*** 
Difference   0.005 -0.000 
t-stat/Wilcoxon   1.680* -0.060 
     
3rd and 4th Quartiles versus 1st Quartile    
Bidder of FCTs (3rd and 4th Quartiles) 2,205 0.007*** 0.002*** 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 1,085 -0.001 0.002*** 
Difference   0.008 0.000 
t-stat/Wilcoxon   2.800*** 1.395 
     
Panel B: The Effects of Financial Health of Target on CARs (-3,0) of Bidders  
4th Quartile versus 1st Quartile    
Bidder of FCTs (4th Quartile) 1,101 0.007*** -0.001 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 1,085 -0.003 -0.001 
Difference   0.010 0.000 
t-stat/Wilcoxon   2.580*** 1.889* 
     
3rd and 4th Quartiles versus 1st Quartile    
Bidder of FCTs (3rd and 4th Quartiles) 2,205 0.008*** 0.000 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 1,085 -0.003 -0.001 
Difference   0.011 0.001 
t-stat/Wilcoxon   3.290*** 2.416** 
     
Panel C – The Effects of Financial Health of Target on BHRs (+1,+36) of Bidders 
4th Quartile versus 1st Quartile    
Bidder of FCTs (4th Quartile) 1,101 0.359*** 0.049 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 1,085 0.426*** 0.071*** 
Difference   -0.067 -2.140 
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t-stat/Wilcoxon   -0.980 -1.089 
     
3rd and 4th Quartiles versus 1st Quartile    
Bidder of FCTs (3rd and 4th Quartiles) 2,205 0.353*** 0.061*** 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 1,085 0.426*** 0.071*** 
Difference   -0.73 -0.010 
t-stat/Wilcoxon   -1.290 -0.760 
 
Panel D - The Effects of Financial Health of Target on Median Industry-Adjusted ROAs of Bidders 
Industry Median Adjusted 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑦𝑡+1 
4th Quartile versus 1st Quartile    
Bidder of FCTs (4th Quartile) 1,005 -0.020** 0.015*** 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 986 0.013 0.047*** 
Difference   -0.033 -0.032 
t-stat/Wilcoxon   -2.50** -9.024*** 
 
3rd and 4th Quartiles versus 1st Quartile    
Bidder of FCTs (3rd and 4th Quartiles) 2,030 -0.007 0.019*** 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 986 0.013 0.047*** 
Difference   -0.020 -0.028 
t-stat/Wilcoxon   -1.920* -9.270*** 
Industry Median Adjusted 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑦𝑡+2 
Bidder of FCTs (4th Quartile) 919 -0.036 -0.036 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 914 0.016*** 0.046*** 
Difference   -0.053 -0.082 
t-stat/Wilcoxon   -1.260 -8.334*** 
 
3rd and 4th Quartiles versus 1st Quartile    
Bidder of FCTs (3rd and 4th Quartiles) 1,856 -0.014 0.021*** 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 914 0.016 0.046*** 
Difference   -0.030 -0.025 
t-stat/Wilcoxon   -1.020 -8.444*** 
Industry Median Adjusted 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑦𝑡+3 
Bidder of FCTs (4th Quartile) 903 -0.017** 0.015*** 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 890 0.018* 0.042*** 
Difference   -0.035 -0.027 
t-stat/Wilcoxon   -2.770*** -7.634*** 
     
3rd and 4th Quartiles versus 1st Quartile    
Bidder of FCTs (3rd and 4th Quartiles) 1,824 -0.013* 0.017*** 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 890 0.018* 0.042*** 
Difference   -0.030 -0.025 
t-stat/Wilcoxon   -2.580*** -7.830*** 
Panel E- The Effects of Financial Health of Target on Discount/ Premium on the Deal 
4th Quartile versus 1st Quartile    
Bidder of FCTs (4th Quartile) 977 4.3698* -1.503*** 
Bidder of non-FCTs 
(1st Quartile) 
 1,016 38.937 -1.711*** 
Difference   -34.567 -0.792 
t-stat/Wilcoxon   -0.930 -2.181** 
    
3rd and 4th Quartiles versus 1st Quartile    
Bidder of FCTs (3rd and 4th Quartiles) 1,977 3.502** -1.662*** 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 1,016 38.937 -1.711*** 
Difference  -35.434 0.049 
t-stat/Wilcoxon  -1.350 1.511 
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% 
level. 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP 
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The univariate tests of the comparison between the two classes of targets based on 
the KZ-Index shows significant difference at the 10% level between the two classes for 
event windows, except for window (-2,0). The results show that the bidders of FCTs earn 
more than bidders that acquired healthy targets. There is no significant difference 
between BHRs for (+1, +36), but the figures are positive. In comparing the ROA between 
bidders that acquired FCTs and healthy targets, a significant difference is shown 
between the two groups. The difference between the ROA from t+1 to t+3 shows a 
positive and significant result at the 1% level.  
When comparing between the industry median adjusted ROA, our results show a 
different pattern. The ROA of bidders that acquired FCTs earn less based on t-test results 
for the ROA one year after the announcement. However, the t-test result shows a 
positive and significant result at the 5% level for year t+3. The Wilcoxon-test of the 
median shows a negative and significant result at the 1% level. This means that bidders 
that acquired FCTs earn less than bidders that acquired healthy targets post-acquisition. 
From Table 2.4, we can see that the FCTs received a premium instead of a discount on 
the deal. The difference is positive and significant at the 1% level. 
Before we examine the effect of financial constraints in targets on the wealth 
creation and discount in deals, we examine the characteristics of targets and bidders on 
the M&A involving the FCTs. We present a Pearson correlation matrix among the 
independent variables in probit regression (first-stage) (please refer to Appendix 2, on 
page 206). The results indicate all the independent variables are low and moderately 
correlated which confirms multicollinearity is not a problem. The correlations are low to 
moderate, between -0.02 and 0.69. We are therefore confident that the variables 
provide sufficient independent information and that multicollinearity is not an issue 
(Cohen and Cohen, 1983). To assess for severity of multicollinearity in the regressions, 
we compute variance inflation factors (VIF). VIF measures the extent to which the 
variance of the estimated coefficients is inflated due to collinearity among independent 
variables in the regression. Appendix 3 presents the VIFs of the estimated coefficient in 
each of regressions of probit regression (probability of FCTs being acquired) on the 
determinants of FCTs being acquired. The average VIF for the probit regression (first-
stage) is 1.6, and the VIFs for individual variable range from 1.01 to 3.21, and the 
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tolerance values range from 0.31 to 0.99. Moreover, the variance inflation factors (VIF) 
for selected independent variables that are reported in Appendix 3 are very low, 
suggesting that no multicollinearity problems. All of the VIFs are below 5 so that 
multicollinearity does not appear to be an issue. Multicollinearity is low when the 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) are below a rule-of-thumb threshold value of 10 and the 
tolerances larger than 0.1 (see for example Kennedy 1992, and Chatterjee and Hadi 
2012). Therefore, we do not find any evidence of multicollinearity in our sample.  
Results from applying our probit model from the first-stage of the HSM to the sample 
are presented in Table 2.5. We conduct the Heckman 2-stage regression to treat for the 
presence of endogeneity in our specification models. The calculation of an Inverse Mills 
ratio (IMR) can mitigate the endogeneity issue. In the first stage of HSM, we estimate 
the likelihood of FCTs being acquired over healthy targets. The coefficients of ICR are 
negative and significant at the 1% level for most of the models. This implies that the 
higher the interest coverage of the bidder the lower the possibility of the acquirer 
acquiring FCTs. 
This could suggest that acquirers with a stable financial condition are more prone to 
acquire healthy firms. The coefficient of SIZE and SIZETARGET are positive and significant 
at the 1% level for all models. This implies that the bigger firms have more tendency of 
acquiring financially constrained targets. Smaller targets are preferable to be acquired 
if the target is considered as a financially constrained target. The coefficients of Aca are 
positive and significant at the 5% and 1% levels. 
Acquirers that acquire FCTs are more likely to acquire only certain assets of the 
target only. One surprising result is the coefficient of ALLCASH. Our result shows the 
coefficient of ALLCASH is significantly negative. This suggests that acquirers who acquire 
financially constrained targets have a tendency of paying with less than 100% cash for 
the M&A transaction. The coefficients for both TECHTARGET and TECHBIDDER are 
significantly positive for all the models. In terms of an economics interpretation of these 
two coefficients, this suggests that when it comes to M&A involving financially 
constrained targets, acquirers that are operating their business in high technology 
industries are more likely to acquire financially constrained targets. Targets that are in 
high technology industries are more likely to be chosen in the case of M&A involving 
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FCTs. We have chosen to apply the HSM in our study to serve the research objectives 
simultaneously. The first result of our first research question has been presented above. 
In the next section, we present the results from the second stage of the HSM.  
Table 2.5: Results from Heckman Selection Model of Multiple Regression of Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Bidder* (Panel A) 
Panel A – CAR (-2,0) 
Variables CAR (-2,0) 
Q1 and Q4 Q1 and Q3, Q4 
Selection Model 1 Model 2 Selection Model 1 Model 2 
FCT  0.026*   0.020  
PREMIUM  0.000   0.000  
FCT*PREMIUM   0.000   0.000 
DEBTRATIO -0.006 0.000 0.000 -0.006 0.000 0.000 
ICR -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 0.059*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.067*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
RELATED 0.112 -0.005 -0.009 0.054 -0.002 -0.003 
CRISIS -0.022 -0.013 -0.010 0.111 -0.011 -0.008 
SOX 0.318 0.014 0.010 -0.159 0.018** 0.007 
ALLCASH -0.326*** 0.014*** 0.013*** -0.188*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 
FRIENDLY 0.120 -0.009 -0.004 -0.015 -0.009* -0.010** 
AACOUNT -0.042 0.006** 0.007** -0.040 0.005** 0.005** 
SIZETARGET -0.110*** 0.000 0.000 -0.068*** -0.001 -0.001 
ACA 0.259** 0.000 0.006 0.208** 0.002 0.002 
TENDEROFFER -0.021 0.004 0.000 -0.008 0.000 0.001 
ROEBIDDER  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
TECHBUBBLE  -0.004 0.007  -0.014 0.016** 
MULTIPLEBID 0.406***   0.327**   
MAACTIVITY -0.483   0.276   
TACOUNT 0.130*   0.120*   
COMPLETION 0.000   0.000   
TECHTARGET 0.416***   0.380***   
TECHBIDDER 0.446***   0.433***   
IMR  -0.011 -0.007*  -0.006 -0.012* 
Constant 4.591 0.002 0.018 0.012 -3.964 0.035*** 
       
Observations 1654 1654 1654 2568 2568 2568 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi- squared 234.120 175.340  207.920 175.940  
Pseudo R-squared 0.102   0.066   
Adj R-squared   0.045   0.042 
* [*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1] 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from COMPUSTAT, Thomson One Banker, CRSP, and 
statista.com 
2.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
We now examine the effects of financial constraints in target firms on cumulative 
abnormal returns, buy-and-hold returns, operating performance, and discounts. The 
advantage of the multivariate analysis is that it allows us to draw a ceteris paribus 
conclusion, which a simple t-test of means or Wilcoxon-test of medians cannot do 
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(Khatami et al., 2015). The results from the multivariate regression of the second stage 
HSM are presented in Table 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9.  
We provide a Pearson correlation matrix among the independent variables in our 
multiple regression (please refer to Appendix 4 on page 210). The results indicate all the 
independent variables and the control variables are low and moderately correlated, 
between -0.05 and 0.69 which confirms multicollinearity is not a problem. We are 
therefore confident that the variables provide sufficient independent information and 
that multicollinearity is not an issue (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). We also compute 
variance inflation factors (VIF). Appendix 5 presents the VIFs of the estimated coefficient 
in each of multiple regressions (dependent variables) on the firm’s characteristics. The 
average VIF for the multiple regression (second-stage) is 1.86, and the VIFs for individual 
variable range from 1.01 to 5.03, and the tolerance values range from 0.19 to 0.99. All 
of the VIFs are below 10 so that multicollinearity does not appear to be an issue. 
Multicollinearity is low when the variance inflation factors (VIFs) are below a rule-of-
thumb threshold value of 10 and the tolerances larger than 0.1 (see for example 
Kennedy 1992, and Chatterjee and Hadi 2012). Therefore, we do not find any evidence 
of multicollinearity in our sample. 
In the second stage, we compute the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) and include it as an 
explanatory variable in each of the CARs, BHRs, ROAs, and DISCOUNT/PREMIUM 
regressions. The IMR is insignificant for CARs regression and one of the 
Discount/Premium regressions. Thus, our findings do not suffer from self-selection bias 
(see e.g., Table 2.6).  
However, the remaining IMR are significant in the BHRs, ROA and Model 1 of the 
Discount/Premium regressions. This suggests that the results should be interpreted 
cautiously. The likelihood ratio test of the correlation between the two error terms of 
the selection (first stage) and outcome equations (second stage) provides a strongly 
significant result. This indicates that unobservable firm characteristics and deal 
characteristics determining the decision to acquire financial constraint targets also 
influence the performance and the discount/premium in the deal. 
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Table 2.6: Results from Heckman Selection Model of Multiple Regression of Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Bidder* (Panel B) 
Panel B – CAR (-3,0) 
Variables CAR (-3,0) 
Q1 and Q4 Q1 and Q3, Q4 
Selection Model 1 Model 2 Selection Model 1 Model 2 
FCT  0.040**   0.0318**  
PREMIUM  0.000   0.000  
FCT*PREMIUM   0.000   0.000 
DEBTRATIO -0.006 0.0004* 0.000 -0.006 0.000 0.000 
ICR -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 0.0592*** -0.003** -0.003*** 0.067*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
RELATED 0.112 -0.014*** -0.015*** 0.054 -0.011** -0.012*** 
CRISIS -0.022 -0.009 -0.010 0.111 -0.012 -0.010 
SOX 0.318 0.014 0.004 -0.159 0.020** 0.005 
ALLCASH -0.326*** 0.012** 0.012** -0.188*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
FRIENDLY 0.120 -0.004 -0.003 -0.015 -0.005 -0.007 
AACOUNT -0.042 0.003 0.002 -0.040 0.003 0.004 
SIZETARGET -0.110*** 0.000 0.000 -0.068*** -0.001 0.000 
ACA 0.259** 0.011 0.011* 0.208** 0.009* 0.008 
TENDEROFFER -0.021 0.004 0.005 -0.008 -0.001 0.000 
ROEBIDDER  0.000 0.001  0.000 0.001 
TECHBUBBLE  -0.011 -0.004  -0.017 0.013 
MULTIPLEBID 0.406***   0.327**   
MAACTIVITY -0.483   0.276   
TACOUNT 0.130*   0.120*   
COMPLETION 0.000   0.000   
TECHTARGET 0.416***   0.380***   
TECHBIDDER 0.446***   0.433***   
IMR  -0.016 -0.022**  -0.011 -0.019** 
Constant 4.591 0.000 0.038*** -3.964 0.011 0.046*** 
       
Observations 1654 1654 1654 2568 2568 2568 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi- squared 234.120 161.490  207.920 167.320  
Pseudo R-
squared 0.102  
 0.066   
Adj R-squared   0.014   0.025 
* [*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1] 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from COMPUSTAT, Thomson One Banker, CRSP, and 
statista.com 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.6 show the results of CARs of bidders with the financially 
constrained targets together with all control variables used. We use the same three-day 
and four-day event window of (-2, 0) and (-3, 0) of CARs of bidders. Column 3 of Table 
2.6 represents the CARs of two groups of targets, namely financial constraint targets and 
healthy targets. We classify between those targets that fall in both extreme quartiles of 
the KZ-Index. Column 5 of Table 2.6 represents the multivariate regression of CARs of 
acquirers between the first quartile, and the third and fourth quartiles. The first quartile 
is the extreme healthy targets, and the third and fourth quartiles are M&A involving 
firms that are considered as financial constraint targets. The application of the 
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classification is the same for the remaining columns as for Model 1, where we compare 
the most extreme quartiles, and Model 2 is where we test the FCT and premium 
variables as an interaction variable. 
Our H1a states that bidders that acquire bankrupt/FCT have a positive market 
reaction surrounding the announcement day. This is consistent with the costly signalling 
theory that suggests that if the cost of the signal is higher for the bad type than it is for 
the good type, then it is hard for other firms to copy, and so the signal can be regarded 
as being credible. We posit that when bidders make an announcement to acquire 
bankrupt or financially constrained targets, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
surrounding the announcement could be positive. This creates the perception that the 
bidder is stable and willing to take the risk of acquiring problematic targets. 
When we examined the effect of CARs between the bidders that acquired FCTs and 
healthy targets (Model 1), the coefficient of our main variable, FCT, is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. Statistically, the coefficient in Model 1 of both panel A and B 
of Table 2.6 show positive and significant coefficients for FCT that fall into the two 
extreme groups of first and the fourth quartiles. The results are consistent for four-day 
event window CARs (-3, 0). However, we only find positive and significant coefficient at 
5 percent significant level for the FCT that fall under first quartile and the third and 
fourth quartiles. Economically, this implies that bidders that acquire FCTs earn more 
CARs compared with bidders that acquire healthy targets. Even though it is indirectly 
costly for bidder in terms of future uncertainty, but it will benefit the bidder indirectly 
by establishing a more positive reputation for them. Practically, this could result in a 
positive wealth creation to bidders surrounding the announcement date; as such 
announcements are positive signals to competitors and investors. 
Other control variables also show significant results. The results show that the 
coefficient of SIZE is negatively significant at the 1% level. This implies that the bigger 
the size of the bidder, the lower the CARs surrounding the day of the announcement. If 
we compare the results from the probit regression, we can see that big acquirers have 
a greater tendency of acquiring FCTs. However, the results from the regression of CARs 
show that big acquirers do not earn more CARs compared with small acquirers. The 
coefficient of SOX is positive and significant at the 10% and 1% levels for Model 1 and 
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Model 2 respectively. This suggests that the acquisitions involving financial constraint 
targets after the introduction of SOX yield more CARs for acquirers. Transactions 
involving only cash for the transaction yield more CARs for the acquirers. This can be 
seen from the positive and significant coefficient of the ALLCASH variable at the 1% level. 
The coefficient of ACCOUNT is positive and significant at the 10% and 5% levels. This 
indicates that the higher the number the acquirer advisors, the more CARs that they 
earn. The coefficient of TECHBUBBLE is only significant at the 10% level for Model 2 of 
CARs. 
Our H1b states that bidders that acquire FCT have lower buy-and-hold returns 
compared with bidders that acquire healthy firms. To prove the hypothesis, we conduct 
a HSM with BHRs of bidders for the event window (+1, +36). Columns 3, 4, 6 and 7 of 
Table 2.7 presents the BHRs of bidders for the event window (+1, +36). The interesting 
results here are that the BHRs of acquirers are negative and significant at the 5% and 1% 
level for Models 1 of both types of samples (i.e., 1) Q1 and Q4 and 2) Q1 and Q3, Q4). 
This implies that acquirers who acquired financial constraint targets earn less BHRs than 
those who acquired healthy targets. The coefficient of our main variable, FCT, shows 
negative and significant results with BHRs of bidders. This suggests that the positive 
figure and significance of the t-test and Wilcoxon test that we have conducted can be 
explained by other factors, but not the financial health of the targets. These factors 
include the period or year of the announcement made and the friendly type of M&A 
among the factors that affect the level of BHRs of the bidders. Theoretically, M&A 
involving bankrupt targets or FCT gives an avenue to the bidder to identify any possible 
signs, and may give them more time to have in-depth and due diligence in analysing the 
true future value of a firm (Howson, 2003). Once the bidder really understands the 
reason a firm is financially constrained, then it is more realistic for the bidder to 
structure the best profitability improvement plan for both the bidder and target. If 
bidders experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement periods, it will 
also posit to be positive in the long run if the decision to acquire the targets is projected 
to be the most profitable investment. If the top management only acquire so as to create 
a reputation, then it will be shown that the bidders will not be able to create wealth in 
the long-term. Our finding supports the Rent-Seeking Hypothesis, where the BHRs of 
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bidders are negative and significant at the 5% and 1% level. This theory explains that 
Rent-Seeking behaviour is the attempt of individuals or groups to increase their welfare 
while making a negative contribution to net society welfare: focussing on short-term 
goals leading executives to take excessive risks or involve in non-value-added activities. 
Bidders of FCT fail to create wealth in the long-term due to management behaviour and 
it could be just a ‘game’ that top management play for the sake of rent-seeking 
behaviour and to make their profiles active.  
Table 2.7: Results from Heckman Selection Model of Multiple Regression of Buy-and-Hold 
Returns (BHRs) of Bidder* 
Variables BHRs (+1,+36) 
Q1 and Q4 Q1 and Q3, Q4 
Selection Model 1 Model 2 Selection Model 1 Model 2 
FCT  -0.833**   -0.796***  
PREMIUM  0.000   0.000  
FCT*PREMIUM   0.001   0.000 
DEBTRATIO -0.006 -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.006 -0.013*** -0.013*** 
ICR -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 0.059*** 0.038 0.036 0.067*** 0.035* 0.032 
RELATED 0.112 0.244** 0.242** 0.054 0.191** 0.204** 
CRISIS -0.022 0.521 0.721* 0.111 0.748*** 0.797*** 
SOX 0.318 -0.595** -0.644** -0.159 -0.623*** -0.569*** 
ALLCASH -0.326*** -0.232** -0.194* -0.188*** -0.153* -0.157* 
FRIENDLY 0.120 -0.365** -0.376*** -0.015 -0.248** -0.226** 
AACOUNT -0.042 -0.057 -0.055 -0.040 -0.021 -0.021 
SIZETARGET -0.110*** -0.100*** -0.096*** -0.068*** -0.089*** -0.092*** 
ACA 0.259** -0.126 -0.140 0.208** 0.054 0.045 
TENDEROFFER -0.021 0.092 0.066 -0.008 -0.029 -0.051 
ROEBIDDER  0.020 0.019  0.013 0.012 
TECHBUBBLE  0.586* 0.261  0.645*** -0.044 
MULITPLEBID 0.406***   0.327**   
MAACTIVITY -0.483   0.276   
TACOUNT 0.130*   0.120*   
COMPLETION 0.000   0.000   
TECHTARGET 0.416***   0.380***   
TECHBIDDER 0.446***   0.433***   
IMR  0.465** 0.360*  0.443** 0.294* 
Constant 4.591 1.430*** 0.714*** -3.964 1.341*** 0.589*** 
       
Observations 1654 1654 1654 2,568 2,568 2,568 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi- squared 190.090 234.120  181.410 207.920  
Pseudo R-
squared 0.102  
 0.066   
Adj R-squared   0.053   0.044 
* [*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1] 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from COMPUSTAT, Thomson One Banker, CRSP, and 
statista.com 
Other independent variables used in this study show significant results in BHRs 
regression. We find that the coefficient of the financial crisis variable is positive and 
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significant at the 10% and 1% levels for Models 1 and 2 respectively. This means that 
bidders that merged or acquired targets during the financial crisis earned more BHRs 
compared with bidders that acquired targets during other periods. This might be due to 
the lower bargaining power of targets during the financial crisis. The coefficient of the 
tech bubble is positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of SOX is negative 
and significant at the 1% level. This implies that that M&A after the introduction of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 yield lower BHRs to bidders. The coefficient of Friendly is 
negative and significant at the 1% level. We extend our analysis on the ROAs of the 
bidders to examine the long-term effect of M&A involving FCTs. 
The coefficients for the control variable that are significant are almost the same 
when we run with the median adjusted ROA for three years’ post-acquisition. From the 
t-test and Wilcoxon test results, we use the Heckman Two-Stage procedure to see the 
factors that could explain the significant differences in univariate analysis in more detail. 
As most of the t-tests did not give us any significant differences for the groups that we 
want to analyse, we decided to winsorize the ROAs of bidders to exclude any outliers in 
the sample. This is because most of the Wilcoxon tests show significant difference, 
especially for the industry mean and median adjusted ROAs. We present the three years 
post-M&A announcement bidders’ medians industry-adjusted ROA in Column 6 and 7 
of Table 2.8. As we can see, the FC variable shows negative and significant results. The 
coefficient of FC is negative and significant at the 1% level on the ROA for both groups 
and models that we present in the table. However, the coefficient of lambda or the 
Inverse Mills Ratios is positive and significant at the 1% level. This implies that there is 
sample selection bias. The difference in the univariate test cannot be explained by all 
the variables that we have in our models. 
The results for the ROAs are also consistent with the findings that we have with the 
BHRs of bidders. We find a negative and significant co-efficient for the event window 
(+1, +36). The results reflect the theories that we put forward in this study; that this 
finding supports the rent-seeking theory where management takes the decision to 
merge and acquire financially constrained targets for short-term purposes. This is so as 
the announcement of the M&A involving financially constrained targets creates short-
term wealth creation for the bidders, but not necessarily in the long-term. This support 
53 
 
 
 
our third hypothesis H1c that states that bidders that acquire FCT have lower operating 
performance compared with bidders that acquire healthy targets.  
Table 2.8: Results from Heckman Selection Model of Multiple Regression of Median Industry 
Adjusted ROA of Bidder* 
Variables Medians Industry-Adjusted ROA 
Q1 and Q4 Q1 and Q3, Q4 
Selection Model 1 Model 2 Selection Model 1 Model 2 
FCT  -0.092***   -0.085***  
PREMIUM  0.000   0.000  
FCT*PREMIUM   0.000   0.000 
DEBTRATIO -0.008** -0.000* 0.000 -0.010*** -0.000* 0.000 
ICR -0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 0.064*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.074*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 
RELATED 0.104** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.030 0.026*** 0.026*** 
CRISIS -0.131 0.050 0.019 0.075 0.050** -0.022 
SOX 0.518* -0.056*** -0.018 0.051 -0.060*** 0.014 
ALLCASH -0.307*** 0.018** 0.030*** -0.192*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 
FRIENDLY 0.172** -0.034*** -0.043*** 0.013 -0.028*** -0.029*** 
AACOUNT -0.041 -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.044 -0.012*** -0.011*** 
SIZETARGET -0.118*** -0.008*** -0.004** -0.078*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
ACA 0.247*** -0.002 -0.010 0.195*** -0.003 -0.005 
TENDEROFFER -0.065 0.015* 0.015* -0.048 0.003 0.002 
ROEBIDDER  0.008*** 0.007***  0.005*** 0.005*** 
TECHBUBBLE  0.094*** -0.019  0.077*** -0.015 
MULITPLEBID 0.375***   0.322***   
MAACTIVITY -0.809   0.085   
TACOUNT 0.089*   0.085**   
COMPLETION 0.000   -0.000*   
TECHTARGET 0.337***   0.329***   
TECHBIDDER 0.530***   0.501***   
IMR  0.047*** 0.000  0.039*** 0.028*** 
Constant 8.450 -0.062*** -0.120*** -1.762 -0.043** -0.117*** 
       
Observations 4,338 4,338 4,338 6,738 6,738 6,738 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chi- squared 873.880 641.990  924.740 584.030  
Pseudo R-squared 0.107   0.070   
Adj R-squared   0.122   0.100 
* [*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1] 
* Median Industry Adjusted ROA have been winsorized. 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from COMPUSTAT, Thomson One Banker, CRSP, and 
statista.com 
Columns 8 and 9 of Table 2.9 present the analysis of the regression on 
discount/premium in the deal value. We choose the percentage of the deal value divided 
by the market value of the target four weeks before the announcement. The application 
of the Heckman Two-Stage procedure is applied using the same procedure with our 
other dependent variables. The coefficient of FC is negative and significant at the 10% 
level for the first group, and at the 5% level for the second group. The first group of 
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M&A, where we compare the extreme healthy targets and the extreme FCTs, shows that 
bidders that acquire financially constrained targets pay the percentage of the deal value 
divided by the market value of the targets lower by 34.036%, compared with bidders 
that acquire healthy targets. This is consistent with our hypothesis that M&A involving 
FCTs are normally paying at discount to FCTs. There is a fire-sales transaction when it 
comes to the M&A involving FCTs. We also present the results for the M&A involving 
bankrupt targets as a comparison with the M&A involving financially constrained 
targets. The next section gives the results for the robustness test. We put forward the 
comparison of the M&A involving bankrupt targets as the robustness test of our results.  
Table 2.9: Results from Heckman Selection Model of Multiple Regression of Discount/ 
Premium in Deal* 
Variables DISCOUNT/ PREMIUM 
Q1 and Q4 Q1 and Q3, Q4 
Selection Model 1 Selection Model 1 
FCT  -405.100**  -367.300*** 
DEBTRATIO -0.006 -0.738 -0.006 -0.626 
ICR -0.001*** -0.062 -0.000 -0.005 
SIZE 0.059*** 18.140 0.067*** 12.030 
RELATED 0.112 36.350 0.054 14.220 
CRISIS -0.022 -29.450 0.111 5.453 
SOX 0.318 -34.960 -0.159 -50.420 
AALLCASH -0.326*** -35.770 -0.188*** -17.310 
FRIENDLY 0.12 -5.586 -0.015 -16.700 
AACOUNT -0.042 -24.340 -0.040 -15.120 
SIZETARGET -0.110*** 4.381 -0.068*** 6.730 
ACA 0.259** 9.984 0.208** 1.391 
TENDEROFFER -0.021 0.605 -0.008 2.549 
RROEBIDDER  1.740  0.821 
TECHBUBBLE  51.440  43.51 
MULTIPLEBID 0.406***  0.327**  
MAACTIVITY -0.483  0.276  
TACOUNT 0.130*  0.120*  
COMPLETION -0.000  -0.000  
TECHTARGET 0.416***  0.380***  
TECHBIDDER 0.446***  0.433***  
IMR  232.300*  199.200** 
Constant 4.591 72.660 -3.964 156.900 
     
Observations 1,654 1,654 2,568 2,568 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chi- squared 234.120 123.780 207.920 90.550 
Pseudo R-squared 0.102  0.066  
* [*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1] 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from COMPUSTAT, Thomson One Banker, CRSP, and 
statista.com 
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2.4.2.1 Wealth effect comparison between the bidders that acquired FCTs versus 
bankrupt targets 
We present the results of CARs of bidders that acquired bankrupt targets in Table 2.10. 
The second and the third columns of Table 2.10 present the results for regression on 
CARs of bidders. We chose the same event window (-2, 0) as the financial constraint data 
set. The results are consistent with the financially constrained datasets. The coefficient 
of bankruptcy is positive and significant at the 10% level on CARs of the bidders. This 
result is not only consistent with the coefficient of FC on CARs, but is also consistent with 
the past findings by Jory and Madura (2009) and Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998). 
Table 2.10: Heckman Two-Stage Procedure- CARs and BHARs* 
Variables CAR (-2,0) CAR(-3,0) BHAR(+1,+12) BHAR(+1,+36) 
 
Selection Model 1 Selection Model 2 Selection Model 1 Selection Model 2 
BANKRUPTCY  0.059*  0.072*  -0.299  0.381 
SIZE  -0.006**  -0.006*  -0.084**  0.002 
TOBIN’S Q 
 
-
0.005*** 
 -
0.005*** 
 -
0.073*** 
 -
0.089*** 
MULTIPLEBID  -0.002  -0.009  0.159  0.204 
ACA -
1.045*** 0.014 
-
1.045*** 
0.017 -
1.054*** 
-0.171 -
1.037*** 
0.091 
RELATED 0.252*** -0.004 0.252*** -0.002 0.190** -0.048 0.207** -0.064 
FRIENDLY 0.840*** -0.018 0.840*** -0.023 0.806*** 0.030 0.814*** -0.116 
ALLCASH  0.009  0.007  -0.009  0.076 
TARGET-
ADVISOR  -0.007 
 -0.005  -0.144*  -0.053 
CRISIS  -0.001  0.002  0.077  0.219 
TECHBUBBLE  0.003  0.002  0.173**  0.247** 
AACOUNT -
0.255***  
-
0.255*** 
 -0.243**  -0.242**  
TACOUNT -0.047  -0.047  -0.046  -0.046  
COMPLETION 0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  
IMR  -0.034  -0.045*  0.156  -0.296 
Constant -
0.854*** 0.030 
-
0.854*** 
0.034 -
0.812*** 
0.540* -
0.828*** 
0.222 
         
Observations 703 703 766 766 784 784 784 784 
Prob > Chi-
squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chi- squared 92.930 85.710 92.930 82.360 91.000 86.520 89.340 79.680 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.088  0.088  0.084  0.082  
* [*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1] 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from COMPUSTAT, Thomson One Banker, CRSP, and 
statista.com 
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.10 show the Heckman Two-Stage procedure results on 
BHARs of bidders of bankrupt targets. We chose the same event window of (+1, +12) to 
analyse in more detail. The coefficient of the bankruptcy variable is negative, but not 
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significant. This finding is consistent with the finding with the BHRs of bidders that 
acquired financially constrained targets.  
We present the results of regression on ROAs of bidders that acquired bankrupt 
targets in Table 2.11. We break down the analysis into three: (1) the ROAs industry mean 
adjusted one year after the year of announcement; (2) ROA of year two after the year 
of announcement industry mean adjusted; and (3) the two-year ROAs industry mean-
adjusted. 
Table 2.11: Heckman Two-Stage Procedure- Operating Performance of bidders that acquired 
bankrupt targets* 
 M&A Involving bankrupt 
targets 
ROAs one year after M&A 
M&A Involving bankrupt 
targets 
ROAs two years after M&A 
M&A Involving bankrupt 
targets 
ROAs three years after 
M&A 
BANKRUPTCY  0.034  -0.002  -0.015 
SIZE  0.027***  0.029***  0.051*** 
TOBIN’S Q  0.003  0.007*  0.020*** 
BIDCOUNT  0.040  -0.013  -0.018 
ACA -1.040*** 0.022 -1.082*** -0.011 -1.150*** 0.029 
RELATED 0.222** -0.012 0.220** 0.001 0.209** 0.009 
FRIENDLY 0.934*** -0.029 0.895*** -0.059 0.846*** -0.007 
ALLCASH  0.018  -0.006  -0.005 
TARGETADVISOR  -0.024  -0.013  -0.009 
CRISIS  0.005  0.004  0.028 
TECHBUBBLE  -0.010  -0.020  -0.024 
AACOUNT -0.231**  -0.225**  -0.258***  
TACOUNT -0.047  -0.043  -0.035  
COMPLETION 0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  
IMR  -0.035  -0.005  0.014 
Constant -0.935*** -0.104 -0.906*** -0.014 -0.841*** -0.152** 
       
Observations 775 775 769 769 749 749 
Prob > Chi-
squared 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chi- squared 96.140 82.800 96.110 86.500 96.790  
Pseudo R-
squared 0.090  0.090  0.093  
*[*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1] 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from COMPUSTAT, Thomson One Banker, CRSP, and 
statista.com 
We chose to present ROA into these three groups, as the results from the t-test and 
Wilcoxon test only show a significant coefficient for the ROAs industry mean adjusted 
figures for the first and the second year after the year of the announcement. To be 
consistent with the findings of the ROAs of the bidders that acquire financially 
constrained targets, we use panel data analysis to analyse the differences in the 
univariate test that we have conducted with the ROAs variables of bidders that acquired 
57 
 
 
 
financially constrained targets. Since the two-year figures are significant, we run the 
panel analysis for the ROAs industry mean adjusted of bidders that acquired bankrupt 
targets. The coefficient of the bankruptcy variable is not significant on ROAs, whether 
we use yearly industry mean adjusted ROAs, or panel analysis for the two consecutive 
years of ROAs of the bidders that acquired bankrupt targets.  
2.5 Conclusions 
Using two datasets of M&A involving 1) financial constraint targets, and 2) bankrupt 
targets gives us a certain consistency in our results. We analyse the post-acquisition 
wealth creation of bidders using CARs, BHRs, and ROA, as well as analyse of M&A 
premium when M&A involve financial constraint targets. The main contribution of this 
study is the analysis of the financial health of targets using the KZ-index, and the 
comparison of the findings with the bankrupt targets. We analyse two set of samples: 1) 
FCTs vs. HTs, and 2) bankrupt targets vs. non-bankrupt targets. 
We find that the CARs for the three-day event window of (-2,0) for acquirers that 
acquired financial constraint or bankrupt targets is more compared with those acquirers 
that acquired healthy targets. Our finding is consistent with our H1a. Our H1a states that 
bidders that acquire bankrupt/FCT have a positive market reaction surrounding the 
announcement day. This is consistent with the costly signalling theory that suggests that 
if the cost of the signal is higher for the bad type than it is for the good type, then it is 
hard for other firms to copy, and so the signal can be regarded as being credible. We 
posit that when bidders make an announcement to acquire bankrupt or financially 
constrained targets, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) surrounding the 
announcement could be positive. This creates the perception that the bidder is stable 
and willing to take the risk of acquiring problematic targets. 
Our findings on BHRs and ROA also consistent with our H1b on BHRs and H1c on 
ROAs. Our H1b states that bidders that acquire FCT have lower buy-and-hold returns 
compared with bidders that acquire healthy firms. Our H1c states that bidders that 
acquire FCT have lower operating performance compared with bidders that acquire 
healthy targets.  The coefficient of FCT on BHRs regression is negative and significant. 
This implies that acquirers who acquired financial constraint targets earn less BHRs than 
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those who acquired healthy targets. We find a negative and significant co-efficient for 
the event window (+1, +36). The results reflect the theories that we put forward in this 
study; that this finding supports the rent-seeking theory where management takes the 
decision to merge and acquire financially constrained targets for short-term purposes. 
This is so as the announcement of the M&A involving financially constrained targets 
creates short-term wealth creation for the bidders, but not necessarily in the long-term. 
Theoretically, M&A involving bankrupt targets or FCT gives an avenue to the bidder to 
identify any possible signs, and may give them more time to have in-depth and due 
diligence in analysing the true future value of a firm (Howson, 2003). Once the bidder 
really understands the reason a firm is financially constrained, then it is more realistic 
for the bidder to structure the best profitability improvement plan for both the bidder 
and target. If bidders experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement 
periods, it will also posit to be positive in the long run if the decision to acquire the 
targets is projected to be the most profitable investment. If the top management only 
acquire so as to create a reputation, then it will be shown that the bidders will not be 
able to create wealth in the long-term. Our finding supports the Rent-Seeking 
Hypothesis, where the BHRs of bidders are negative and significant at the 5% and 1% 
level. This theory explains that Rent-Seeking behaviour is the attempt of individuals or 
groups to increase their welfare while making a negative contribution to net society 
welfare: focussing on short-term goals leading executives to take excessive risks or 
involve in non-value-added activities. Bidders of FCT fail to create wealth in the long-
term due to management behaviour and it could be just a ‘game’ that top management 
play for the sake of rent-seeking behaviour and to make their profiles active. 
We also find that bidders pay discounts to FCTs rather than a premium. Our last 
hypothesis, i.e., H2 states that the M&A premium is inversely related to a target’s degree 
of financial constraints. We choose the percentage of the deal value divided by the 
market value of the target four weeks before the announcement. The application of the 
Heckman Two-Stage procedure is applied using the same procedure with our other 
dependent variables. The coefficient of FCT is negative and significant at the 10% level 
for the first group (Q1 and Q4), and at the 5% level for the second group (Q1 and Q3, 
Q$). The first group of M&A, where we compare the extreme healthy targets and the 
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extreme FCTs, shows that bidders that acquire financially constrained targets pay the 
percentage of the deal value divided by the market value of the targets lower by 
34.036%, compared with bidders that acquire healthy targets. This is consistent with our 
hypothesis that M&A premium is inversely related to the degree of financial constraints 
of the target. Valuation premium tend to be inversely related to the degree of 
information asymmetry between the acquirers and targets (Agrawal et al., 2016). This 
will be so in a situation where market participants are liquidity-constrained (Dow and 
Han, 2016) as well as if the target industry is financially constrained (Oh, 2014). This is 
because of the due diligence processes or steps taken by bidders prior to the M&A. 
There is no issue of overpayment to targets. This can be improved when an acquisition 
target is a financially constrained firm.  
To our knowledge this paper is the first paper that makes a comparison between 
the two types of financial conditions of targets, i.e., financial constraints (using KZ-Index) 
and bankrupt targets, in one study. Our study examines the factors that contribute to 
the choice of the bidders to acquire FCT and bankrupt targets, by applying the HSM. The 
findings of this study are contrary to the previous finding by Khatami et al. (2015). They 
claim that financial constraints of target companies significantly increase acquisition 
premiums for targets, but in our analysis, we find that financially constrained targets are 
acquired at discounts.  
From a practical perspective, our results highlight the usefulness of acquisition 
strategy focused on the acquisition of financial constraint targets. While we have seen 
there are potential benefits that derive from acquiring healthy targets, our results 
suggest that acquirers may benefit more from acquiring financial constraint targets in 
the short-run rather than in the long-run. Devising this kind of acquisition strategy could 
be useful especially for bidders that have the intention to improve their stock 
performance in the short-term. Our results also provide a practical implication for 
investors in making decisions. Our results show that the bidders’ cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) surrounding the announcement could be positive for bidders that acquired 
financial constraint targets. This creates the perception that the bidder is stable and 
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willing to take the risk of acquiring problematic targets. Investors must be more cautious 
in investing in those firms as we find adverse performance results in the long run.  
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Chapter 3 
Accrual-based EM and Real EM Activities Around Corporate 
Reorganization and Restructuring 
3.1 Introduction 
It is widely known that earnings are the single most important figures of financial 
information (Dichev et al., 2016). The need for quality of earnings continues to garner a 
lot of public attention; furthermore, the efficiency of the stock market is a direct 
consequence of the quality of the accounting information published. This paper 
considers the effects of earnings management (hereafter EM) by firms engaged in 
corporate restructuring and reorganization, namely through carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-
offs, and other divestitures. We examine US parent targets of a total of 10,495 firms 
involved in restructuring through carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and divestitures in the 
US from 1985 to 2012. We analyse both types of EM that are considered in this paper, 
i.e., accruals-based earnings management (AM) and real activities manipulations (RM). 
The main objective of this study is to examine the existence of the EM activities in the 
year prior to restructuring by parent targets. We also analyse the EM activities and 
impact of managers’ engagement in EM activities on firms’ performance and stock 
volatility. We extend our study by examining the factors that contribute to the choice of 
RM over AM. 
Prior research has documented that restructuring is associated with EM activities 
and subsequent declines in firm operating performance (e.g., Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 
1998a; Eddey and Taylor, 1999; Shivakumar, 2000; Balatbat and Lim, 2003;Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2016). Several studies examine the association between 
AM by firms that engage in seasoned equity offerings (SEO) and its effects on the firm’s 
operating performance (see e.g., (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a; Teoh et al., 1998b). 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al., (2016) examine the effect of both elements 
of EM, i.e., accrual-based and real earnings manipulation activities on operating 
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performance of firms that involved in SEO. Past literatures have documented the 
association between the EM activities by firms that engage in Initial Public Offerings 
(IPO) and the subsequence effects on firms ‘performance (see e.g., (Chen et al., 2013; 
Gao et al., 2017; Gounopoulos and Pham, 2017; Lo et al., 2017). However, studies on 
specific types of restructuring such as carve-out, spin-off, sell-off, and divestitures are 
limited.  
Carve-outs are a specialized form of IPO where the parent firm typically retains a 
controlling portion of equity in the unit (Madura and Nixon, 2002). The only study by 
Balatbat and Lim (2003) on carve-outs has only analysed accrual-based EM activity. 
However, we refer to several studies on IPO for comparison (see e.g., (Chen et al., 2013; 
Gao et al., 2017; Gounopoulos and Pham, 2017; Lo et al., 2017). There is a need to 
analyse both types of EM activities by firms that are involved in restructuring. The 
analysis of both types of EM activities, i.e., AM and RM, provides better understanding 
of the impact of each type of EM activity on firms’ future performance. RM is more 
severe as it affects cash flows (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). It is important to examine the 
EM activities of restructuring firms as the decision to restructure affects firm’s future 
performance. In addition, restructuring is associated with multiple events as carve-outs, 
sell-offs, spin-offs, and other divestitures, and are also considered as subsequent events 
to other major events such as M&A, IPO and SEO (see e.g., Otsubo, 2009).  
The need to analyse the elements of RM activities in the year prior of restructuring 
is important because any restructuring announcements are important events. In 
addition, the introduction of SFAS 146 made it significantly more difficult for managers 
involved in sell-offs to manipulate firms’ accounting figures using accrual-based EM 
activities. Thus, managers of restructuring firms might switch to real EM activities 
instead of accrual-based EM, and thus make it more difficult for auditors to trace any 
aggressive EM activities by the firm. SFAS 146 Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit 
or Disposal Activities (SFAS 146) was issued by the Financial Accounting Standards 
Boards (FASB) in June of 2002. SFAS 146 requires companies to recognize costs 
associated with exit or disposal activities at the time they are incurred and not as a 
liability at the date of a commitment to a restructuring plan. 
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The existence of EM activities among restructuring firms M&A 4 , initial public 
offerings5 (IPO), seasonal equity offerings6 (SEO) and carve-outs, consequently affect 
the firm’s operating performance; the introduction of SFAS 146 raised several research 
questions. Do parent targets engage in earning management activities in the years prior 
to corporate restructuring in carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other divestitures7? If 
so, what is the impact of EM activities on firm performance? Do the firms that have an 
EM index above the median industry-year EM index have less stock volatility? Finally, 
what are the factors that could explain the choice of accrual-based versus real earnings 
management activities among firms that are involved in restructuring? It is important to 
address these questions in the context of these restructuring firms as they are unique in 
that they combine characteristics of both restructuring and financial transactions. 
Motivated by the scarcity of empirical evidence on the EM activities involving 
restructuring firms, we address these research questions and revisit the EM activities in 
carve-out, M&A, IPO, and SEO by examining the relationship between EM activities and 
firm performance of parent targets that are involved in carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, 
and divestitures. We investigate both the accrual-based and real EM activities of firms 
involved in restructuring in the United States (US), in terms of nature (accruals-based 
earnings management (AM) and real activities manipulations (RM)), direction (income-
decreasing or income increasing EM), and consequences on firm performance of targets 
that are involved in the restructuring. In terms of the nature of EM activities, we analyse 
both types of EM i.e., accrual-based and real EM activities. We analyse the EM patterns 
both pre- and post-restructuring. We analyse targets that have both time and 
motivation to engage in EM activities. We examine EM activity by firms that are involved 
in reorganization and restructuring, specifically through carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, 
                                                     
 
 
4 See e.g., Eddey and Taylor (1999), Ben‐Amar and Missonier‐Piera (2008), Anilowski et al. (2009), and 
Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2015). 
5 See e.g., Lo (2008), Eriksson (2015), Kalgo et al., (2015), and Aktas et al., (2016). 
6 See e.g.,  Teoh et al. (1998), Shivakumar (2000), and Cohen and Zarowin (2010). 
7  We use the term restructuring interchangeably with carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other 
divestitures in this study 
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and other divestitures. Past literature on carve-out, M&A, IPO and SEO serves as the 
motivation for our study; this is because they present EM activities in firms engaging in 
restructuring. Due to the scarce literature in EM (to the best of our knowledge there is 
only one paper by Balatbat and Lim (2003) related to carve-outs), we refer to SEO, M&A, 
and IPO literature to form our research framework. This study also investigates the 
existence of EM by firms that engage in restructuring, and explores the association 
between EM and the firms’ performance and stock volatility. We use various methods 
of measuring firms’ performance, namely the changes in the return on assets (hereafter 
ROA), cumulative abnormal returns (hereafter CARs), and buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (hereafter BHARs). In addition to this, we include the analysis of post-
restructuring risk. As explained earlier, the introduction of SFAS 146 has forced 
managers to trade-off the use of accruals-based earnings management (AM) and real 
activities manipulations (RM); it has also made it more difficult for auditors to trace the 
aggressiveness of real EM as managers can always justify the reasons for any 
transactions. The use of AM manipulation activities has no direct cash flow 
consequences, but RM activities affect cash flows. 
We find solid support for our interpretations. We find that parent targets manage 
earnings downward by adopting income-decreasing EM activities a year before 
restructuring, and continue even after restructuring. Our results show that the EM index 
three years pre- and post-restructuring is negative. Parent targets become involved in 
restructuring to reorganize their operation and to get external or internal financing. By 
adopting income-decreasing EM activities a year before the restructuring gives them 
ample time to engage in EM that normally happens at the end of any accounting period.  
As claimed by Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2015), downward EM negativity 
affects the probability of firms seeking buyers to close deals within a reasonable amount 
of time, as is in the case of M&A. They use various measures to analyse accrual-based 
EM activity. They also examine EM activity two years before any announcements. EM 
activities are associated with lower operating performance and stock performance.  
The effect is economically significant; we estimate that targets of carve-outs that 
engage aggressively in EM activities are associated with an average 149% reduction in 
ROA (carve-out), an average 0.43% to 0.62% reduction in targets’ CARs (carve-out and 
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divestitures), an average 3.07% reduction in one-year BHAR after restructuring (carve-
out), and an average reduction of 0.43% in post-restructuring risks (carve-out). These 
findings lead to the conclusion that equity investors seem to penalize parent targets that 
engage in real earnings manipulations (RM).  
Our empirical results show that there is a significantly negative association between 
RM and subsequent stock returns and operating performance. These figures are very 
important to investors as they cannot benefit if a firm’s assets decrease in value, 
resulting from possible loss of competitive advantages or retraction in its economic 
activity or due to EM activities. Additionally, we provide an explanation on the choices 
of accrual-based versus real EM activities. We find that the decision by targets to 
manage earnings by real EM versus accrual-based EM is associated with audit tenure, 
litigation probability, post-SOX, accrual management flexibility (as captured by net 
operating assets (hereafter NOA)). 
We investigate the factors that influence firms’ decisions to manage earnings, and, 
if so, what is the impact of the engagement on the firm performance. We also analyse 
which method that normally firms use either AM or RM and the factors that contribute 
to the choice of the preferable method. To address the first issue related to the factors 
influencing firm’s decision, we follow Cohen and Zarowin (2010) to account for the 
endogenous selection issue by employing the econometrics model of Heckman (1979) 
model. There is an issue on self-selection bias when we have data generated by 
individuals or firms making choices of belonging to one group or another (Maddala, 
1983). To account for this issue, we estimate a two- stage model using the Heckman 
(1979) method to control for firms’ self-selection to manage reported earnings.  
Heckman Selection Model (hereafter HSM) requires the estimation of a selection model 
that accounts for factor influencing firms’ choice to manage earnings. In the first stage, 
we estimate a selection model to explain firms’ overall decisions to engage in earnings 
management or not. It is important to select variables which are correlated with the 
choices to manage earnings in the selection model but not directly explain firms’ 
performance in the outcome model.  
We also estimate another HSM for the issue related to the choices made by firms 
either to engage in AM or RM and the factors that contribute to the choice of the 
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preferable method whether to engage in AM or RM. The process is the same where for 
the first-stage Heckman Selection Model, we control for the self-selection bias. Next, 
conditional on this first stage analysis, in the second stage we analyse the factors 
determining the preference for real earnings management strategies as compared to 
accruals based ones.  
Our study is related to the work of Rangan (1998), Teoh et al. (1998a), Balatbat and 
Lim (2003), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), and Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2015) who 
empirically examine the relationship between EM activities and restructuring. We 
update their works and examine EM activities by targets that engage in restructuring. 
Our study is related to those studies as some of the EM measures that we use are similar, 
and the context of the study is also related to restructuring firms. Contrary to studies by 
Rangan (1998), Teoh et al. (1998a), and Balatbat and Lim (2003), their studies focused 
exclusively on accrual-based (AM) activities while, we examine both types of EM i.e., AM 
and real earnings (RM) activities. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) for example, use both types 
of EM activities by seasonal equity offerings (SEO) firms but we extend their work by 
analysing each type of EM activity separately, and the impact of those activities on firm’s 
performance.  
It is important to examine EM activities that engage in restructuring as these types 
of restructuring are not only involved with external and internal financing, but are also 
associated with different degrees of subsequent control retained by the parent. 
Furthermore, carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other divestitures are unique in that 
they combine characteristics of both restructuring and financing transactions. Sell-offs 
are involved with the SFAS 146, where there is a need for parent targets to recognize 
the restructuring costs in the year of restructuring that motivates managers to switch to 
RM activity. We extend the work by Balatbat and Lim (2003) by using a comprehensive 
sample of public parent targets, as well as examining the real EM activities, and offer 
new evidence on the choice made by targets between the accruals-based earnings 
management (AM) and real activities manipulations (RM).  
The rest of the Chapter 3 is organized as follows. We review the existing literature 
and develop our hypotheses in Section 3.2, and present our data and methods in Section 
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3.3. We present and discuss our findings in Section 3.4, and conclude the paper in 
Section 3.5.  
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1 Earnings management and motivation of targets to manage earnings: Carve-out, 
Sell-off, Spin-off and Divestitures 
Earnings management (EM) is comprised of various forms of “window-dressing” (SEC 
(Securities and Exchange Commission), 1999, p. 84) to cover a firm’s financial 
underperformance. There are two types of EM, i.e accrual-based (AM) and real 
manipulation activities (RM). AM involves the selection of accounting procedures and 
estimates that conform to generally accepted accounting procedures (GAAP). Past 
research proposes that non-fraudulent AM that benefits shareholders has been 
described as less detrimental to existing shareholders and does not impair a firm’s cash 
flows (Kothari et al., 2016; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Roychowdhury, 2006). However, 
aggressive accruals-based earnings management (AM) can be costly because it 
adversely affects shareholders’ trust in managers and, ultimately, shareholders’ 
willingness to invest in a firm (Hewitt et al., 2016).  
On the other hand, real activities manipulations (RM) is defined as management 
actions that deviate from the normal course of business, undertaken with the primary 
objective of meeting certain earnings targets (Roychowdhury, 2006). RM occurs when 
managers alter operating activities to achieve a financial reporting objective (e.g., Chan 
et al., 2015). No clear framework for real operations exists. Due to the increased scrutiny 
of AM after the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (SOX), and the introduction of 
SFAS 146 Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal Activities (SFAS 146)8, a 
growing empirical research provides evidence that RM has become more common 
                                                     
 
 
8 SFAS 146 Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal Activities (SFAS 146) has 
been issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) in June of 2002. 
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among managers (e.g., Bartov and Cohen, 2009; Cohen et al., 2008a; Graham et al., 
2005). In addition, the introduction of SFAS 146 made it significantly more difficult for 
managers to manipulate firms’ accounting figures using AM. Thus, managers of 
restructuring firms might switch to RM activities instead of AM. 
Managers engage in income-increasing EM to show an improvement in firms’ 
performance. Income-increasing EM is when managers engage in accrual management, 
and increase their spending on selling, general and administrative expenses. Income-
increasing accruals involve making opportunistic estimates and judgements, such as 
reducing the allowance for bad debts, reporting fictitious sales, capitalizing expenses, 
avoiding write-offs, etc. (Nagar and Sen, 2016). Managers can also engage in real 
activities manipulations (RM) income-increasing by giving excessive sales discounts to 
increase sales at the end of the year to recognize gains. Firms would engage in income-
increasing EM when they are in financial distress (e.g., Nagar and Sen, 2016).  
Firms could also use income-increasing EM activities by acquiring firms via mergers 
and acquisitions (hereafter M&A), where the external financing events could motivate 
managers to manage earnings, especially in stock-for-stock mergers (e.g., Erickson and 
Wang, 1999). In addition, in the case of initial public offerings (hereafter IPO) and 
seasonal equity offerings (hereafter SEO), EM can be used to influence investors at the 
time of the offering and consequently overvalue the new stock issues (e.g., Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al, 1998a), for IPO to influence the initial offer 
prices (Balatbat and Lim, 2003).  
Managers can also be involved in income-decreasing EM to show firms’ 
underperformance. Firms engage in income-decreasing EM to improve their odds of 
being acquired (Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2015), or to portray a less favourable 
picture of the firm and therefore to reduce the acquisition price (Ben-Amar and 
Missonier‐Piera, 2008). It could be used to guide analysts’ forecasts to improve their 
firms' chances of meeting or beating that forecast when earnings are announced 
(Matsumoto, 2002), or to reverse the previous EM transaction (Chen et al. 2013; Cohen 
and Zarowin 2010). Generally, firms manage earnings downwards to avoid a high tax 
burden (e.g., Eldenburg et al., 2011). 
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In this study, we seek to add to the literature that states that firms that are involved 
in restructuring engage in EM activities in the year prior to announcement. Concisely, 
there is a probability of EM activities’ manipulation in firms that are involved in 
restructuring and reorganization, and it is likely to be associated with meeting certain 
earnings targets or goals. Past literature on EM activities by restructuring firms shows 
that firms that are involved in carve-outs engage in AM activities (Balatbat and Lim, 
2003). This is insufficient as after the introduction of SOX and SFAS 146, managers are 
switching to RM activity. There is a need to examine RM involving targets in 
restructuring.  
Restructuring is an event that could be characterized by high information 
asymmetries. Accounting information is the best element for insiders to deliver the 
information about the financial condition of firms. However, performance-based 
compensation, reputation or other self-interested motivations may encourage 
managers to take advantage of discrepancy in information to inflate earnings and 
influence stock prices (Fields et al., 2001). 
Firms that are in the process of restructuring constitute a setting with motivation 
to engage in EM activities to achieve their corporate goals (Balatbat and Lim, 2003; 
Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2015; Anilowski et al., 2009). We have highlighted 
some possible motives for parent targets to engage in EM. First, as pointed out by 
Anilowski et al. (2009) and supported by Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2015), targets 
that are seeking buyers could have an incentive to ‘window dress’ their financial 
statements to attract buyers. Second, previous studies on firms seeking buyers in M&As, 
show motivation where targets have economic motives for downward EM; this is so it 
facilitates the completion of future deals. Studies by Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos 
(2015), Easterwood (1998), Eddey and Taylor (1999), and Ben‐Amar and Missonier‐Piera 
(2008) provide evidence of income-decreasing EM (downward EM) by M&A target firms.  
Restructuring is a corporate event that is a vital aspect of finance with regard to 
wealth creation and corporate ownership restructuring. A distinctive element of US 
corporate activity during the past decade has been the dominance of restructuring that 
relocates the resources on the core businesses (Slovin et al., 1995). Generally, the 
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restructuring could refer specifically to a parent firm divesting an operating unit, or it 
could refer to equity carve-outs, spin-offs, and asset sell-offs. Brigham and Houston 
(2015, p. 727) explain the four types of divestitures9 as:  
“(1) Selling an operating unit to another firm, (2) setting up the business to be 
divested as a separate corporation and then “spinning it off to the divesting 
firm’s stockholders, (3) following the steps for a spin-off but selling only some of 
the shares, and (4) liquidating assets outright”. 
Slovin et al. (1995, p. 90) have described the comparison between carve-outs, sell-offs, 
and spin-offs as follows: 
“In an equity carve-out, the parent typically retains a controlling interest in the 
subsidiary and raises funds through the public sale of unseasoned equity claims 
on the subsidiary’s operations. In a spin-off, the parent transfers its ownership of 
the subsidiary to existing shareholders without any element of external 
financing. In an asset sell-off, a parent privately negotiates the sale of a 
subsidiary to a third party, thereby transferring control of the relevant assets to 
another firm and raising cash for the parent without any issuance of public 
securities.” 
Different types of restructuring that firms choose have difference intrinsic motives 
and needs. It is beneficial to examine the relationship between the different types of 
restructuring with the factors that motivate managers to behave in a certain way. One 
valuable benefit of a carve-out is that the new subsidiary that has now become a public 
firm can be used to improve managerial incentive contracts, as has been highlighted by 
Schipper and Smith (1986) and Holmström and Tirole (1993). Sell-offs, spin-offs and 
other divestitures are firm restructuring where there is a transfer of the control of 
resources to acquiring firms. Slovin et al. (1995) claim that an asset sell-off is a 
restructuring mechanism that allows a parent firm to use private transactions. Hite et 
al. (1987) report that announcements of asset sell-offs generate returns for targets.  
                                                     
 
 
9  We use the terms restructuring and ‘carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other divestitures’ 
interchangeably in our discussion. 
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Each type of restructuring involves different features in term of the magnitude and 
form of external financing involved and the degree of subsequent control retained by a 
parent over the relevant assets or subsidiaries. These factors can provide greater 
understanding about parent firms’ motives for selecting a specific restructuring method. 
The differences and various factors that contribute to the choice of the mechanism could 
also be examined to see the pattern of the EM activities manipulation involving firms 
that engage in restructuring. Generally, literature on divestitures can be divided into 
finance literature and strategic literature (see Feldman and McGrath, 2016). The two 
contradictory focusses on both literature and theories behind previous studies may not 
jeopardize the preferences and the motive of the managers to engage in EM activities.  
The theoretical underpinning of this study is the Agency Theory. Nevertheless, we 
would put forward other supporting theories, i.e., Prospect Theory and Opportunistic 
Management Theory to support our hypothesis in this study. Based on the Agency 
Theory, information asymmetry occurs when there is a separation between the 
management interest and the benefits to owners of the firms (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). The relationship between the executive and the shareholder was first modelled 
as Theory X by organizational psychologists (McGregor, 1960). This is where there is a 
conflict of interest between the principal (e.g., shareholders) and the agent (e.g., 
company executives) that arises when information asymmetry exists between the two 
parties (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The issues that normally arise from this agency 
problem are moral hazards and adverse selection by managers. In reality, adverse 
selection is the main driver for choosing certain options to reduce the risk of earnings 
management detection (Hansen, 2001). Agency costs could either lead to the 
opportunistic behaviour of managers in managing earnings in an aggressive manner to 
benefit their own goals, or improve the communication of private information that is 
seen as beneficial to shareholders (Chen et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2008a; Jiraporn et al., 
2008; Subramanyam, 1996). Managers exercise their discretion to improve the ability of 
earnings to reflect fundamental values (Subramanyam, 1996) and, therefore, enhance 
the information value of earnings to shareholders. 
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We would like to borrow an economic theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), the Prospect Theory, to explain the relationship between EM activities, 
restructuring, and their performance in addition to the said theories. This theory 
explains the way people choose between probabilistic alternatives that involve risk. 
People are aware of risks and benefits of certain actions and the choices they make. 
People are normally prone to choosing options that benefit them and allows for gain, 
even though the gain is half of the costs of choosing that action. As suggested by Rangan 
(1998, p. 103): 
“Restructuring firms can raise capital of more favourable terms than if earnings 
were not managed but the benefit of EM is partially offset by its expected costs 
to issuing firms and their managers if EM were discovered…. Additionally, the 
discovery of EM could reduce the credibility of issuing firms’ financial statements 
and hence impair their subsequent.” 
The above statement clearly explains the prospect theory by elaborating on the 
choices and risks faced by target firms when engaging in EM activities before 
restructuring. Even though Rangan (1998) does not mention this theory to explain his 
research, we find his explanation to be in line with the prospect theory that we 
borrowed to explain the relationship between the EM activities and the factors and, 
consequently, the firm performance. To us, this theory complements the opportunistic 
behaviours of managers that are involved in restructuring firms. This considers the 
opportunity as well as the best decision when it comes to the decision to engage in EM 
activities. 
As being reviewed by Feldman and McGrath (2016), finance literature views 
divestitures as a solution to the internal and external problems created by rent-seeking 
managers of diversified firms, while the strategy literature treats divestitures as a 
proactive tool that value-maximizing managers can use to improve the internal 
functioning and external perceptions of their firms. Interestingly, in finance literature, 
the discussion is on the use of divestiture to resolve the agency problems. However, 
neither literature could preclude managers of parent targets from potentially having 
negative consequences of involvement in EM activities. Due to limited past literature 
that have studied each of the divestitures and the relationship with EM activities in-
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depth, it is very challenging for us to predict the direction of the outcomes of our analysis 
for each of the four types of restructuring.  
A paper by Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2015) serves as the key paper for us 
to develop our hypotheses in terms of the relationship between the EM activities and 
the restructuring announcement. They study the EM in US firms that sought buyers 
between 1990 and 2012. They provide evidence of downward EM with a sample of 
target firms that they classify as ‘seeking a buyer’, and that have both time and motive 
to engage in such actions. They find that ‘seeking a buyer’ firms engage in 
overrepresentation of downward EM in the years surrounding the year of 
announcement. Furthermore, they find that the downward EM is negatively associated 
with the possibility of being acquired in a reasonable time period. They claim that there 
is an indication of efficient diligence by buyers that prefer to acquire firms that show 
low performance and growth. 
Powers (2003) highlights the financial rationale of subsidiaries with regard to 
restructuring by carve-outs. In line with this motive, we attempt to link these carve-out 
activities as one of the factors that could be the variable behind parent firms’ managing 
earnings around the restructuring announcement events. A carve-out is the most 
effective financing method available to parent firms with regard to generating cash 
(Powers, 2003). We suggest that parent companies have both motive and time to 
manage their earnings to attract investors. Carve-outs differ from IPO in that the parent 
firm continues to hold a substantial fraction of equity of the carved-out subsidiary. IPOs 
are firms that transform their status from a privately held to a public company. IPO firms 
have a tendency to engage in income-increasing to influence the initial offer prices (see 
e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a). In addition, IPOs are involved in substantial organizational 
operational transformations and fundamental changes in operational structures (see 
e.g., Jain and Kini, 2008). 
IPO firms typically exhibit high information asymmetry and the involvement in EM 
activities is for opportunistic purposes (Chen et al., 2013). IPO engage in EM to window 
dress their financial reporting and boost their IPO initial selling price (Gao et al., 2017). 
Several past literature examine the relationship between the institutional investors and 
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the engagement of IPO in EM activities (see e.g., Gao et al., 2017; and Lo et al., 2017). 
Gounopoulos and Pham (2017) examine the impact of firms having credit rating on EM 
by IPO and find that rating existence is negatively associated with income-increasing AM 
and RM in the offering year. 
Gao et al. (2017) examine both elements of EM i.e., AM and RM activities of IPO 
firms in China and analyse how institutional investors react to the issuing firm’s pre-IPO 
EM. Taking a sample comprises of 472 IPO firms, they find that institutional investors 
bid’s prices are negatively correlated with pre-IPO EM. The results are more pronounced 
for AB than RM. They also suggest that the long-run IPO performance is unrelated to 
EM.  
Lo et al. (2017) examine US IPO firms from 1990 to 2013 and analyse the roles of 
institutional investors in EM activities during IPO issuance and the effect on post-IPO 
performance.  They suggest that institutional investors have incentives to 
opportunistically maximize their wealth by manipulating earnings when firms engage in 
IPOs.  
Research on EM around IPO mainly focused on the firms’ engagement in AM 
activities around the IPO offering year (Teoh et al., 1998a; Lo e al., 2017). Evidence on 
RM by IPO issuers is less documented. Gao et al. (2017) claim that the engagement in 
AM activities is more pronounced in AM rather than in RM.   
However, we suggest that to rely on IPOs empirical evidence to predict carve-outs’ 
managers behaviour and motive is very judgemental and misleading. Furthermore, an 
equity carve-out, also known as a partial sell-off (Madura and Nixon, 2002).  
In addition to the above discussion on IPO, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find the 
evidence of RM around SEO, and document a greater decrease in post-SEO operating 
performance due to RM rather than AM. 
We predict that parent targets that are involved in carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, 
and other divestitures have a tendency to engage in income-decreasing EM activities to 
increase the chances of being acquired. 
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Building on the above foundation, we seek to examine whether EM activities are 
used as EM activities surrounding restructuring announcement events. Therefore, in 
alternative form, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: Target firms that engage in corporate reorganization and restructuring 
(carve-out, sell-off, spin-off and divestiture) have a tendency of engaging in 
earnings management activities (AM and RM activities). 
3.2.2 The Effect of Earnings Management (EM) on Firm’s Performance 
It becomes an evolving area in the related literature in EM to examine consequent 
effects of earnings management (EM) manipulation activities on firm future 
performance. Despite the large amount of literature on EM activities of firms involved 
in restructuring and acquisitions, there are a very limited number of papers that examine 
the link between EM and the firms’ performance and stock volatility, especially for firms 
that are involved in carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and divestitures.  
We examine EM with regard to the restructuring events because, as Lo (2008) 
suggests, EM activities are also crime cases that require both motive and opportunity. It 
is clear that parent targets do have motive and opportunity as they are in the process of 
restructuring, as well as generating assets for their operations. We analyse the EM 
activities and relate them to firm operating and stock performance. Previous literature 
agrees that management intervention in reporting accounting data could affect firms’ 
returns and stock prices.  
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that the use of discretionary accrual to 
manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced at firms where the CEO’s potential 
total compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings. Hewitt 
et al. (2016) use an experiment to examine the differential effects of the methods of 
both accrual-based and real EM on shareholders’ assessments of a firm’s cash flows and 
trust in the firm’s managers, and ultimately shareholders’ investment decisions. They 
find that accruals-based EM is costly because it adversely affects shareholders’ trust in 
managers and ultimately their willingness to invest in a firm while real EM does not. 
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Previous studies have focussed on the effects of these decisions on the parent firm, 
and have found positive returns in response to each type of announcement (i.e., carve-
out, sell-off, spin-off and divestitures). Prior research argues that the positive returns to 
parent firms reflect potential improvement in public understanding of subsidiary value, 
especially regarding carve-outs and spin-offs. Assets sell-offs also improve the firm 
parent value by transferring the ownership and control of a subsidiary to firms that can 
better utilize those assets. To the best extent to our knowledge, there is only one study 
that studies the relationship between EM activity and firms’ performance. Balatbat and 
Lim (2003) examine the accrual-based EM manipulation activity of target parent 
companies and relationship with buy-and-hold abnormal returns: they examine 326 
carve-out offerings during 1982-1997. They find that firms that aggressively manage 
their earnings using accrual-based EM activity have poor performance after the 
announcements. The difference between carve-outs and other types of restructuring is 
the reduction in the ownership of the parent firms. With spin-offs, sell-offs and 
divestitures, the parent firms eliminate their involvement in the subsidiary (Slovin et al., 
1995). 
Corporate restructuring, especially divestiture, has been an identified as an 
important strategic action as it has a positive impact on firm performance (see also 
Bergh, 1995; Feldman, 2014; Kolev, 2016). Berry (2010) shows that divestiture is not 
only a choice that managers make when dealing with a poor or struggling operation, but 
it is also a response to better opportunities, it plays an important role in firm growth, 
creates more efficient uses of firm resources, and develops better prospects for firm 
growth. There is an relationship between EM and subsequent declines in firm 
performance (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; DuCharme et al., 2004; Rangan, 1998; 
Shivakumar, 2000; Teoh et al., 1998b). 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) analyse both accrual-based and real EM activities 
manipulation around the seasonal equity offering (SEO) based on a sample of 1,511 
completed US offers between 1987 and 2006. They find that SEO firms have a greater 
tendency to be involved in real EM activities rather than in accrual-based EM. The effect 
on post-SEO performance is more severe for those firms engaging in real activities’ 
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manipulation. This research is essential to our study as it acts as a basis on which we can 
examine earning management activities to other types of restructuring.  
Dechow et al. (2011) have developed a financial mis-statement database to analyse 
the financial characteristics of mis-stating firms. In this regard, they have developed a 
model to predict mis-statements. The output of their research is a scaled probability (F-
score). They use this method as a red flag, or signal, of the likelihood of EM or mis-
statement. They use the accrual-based EM as part of the model to predict the mis-
statements. 
Past studies claim that the stock market responds positively to divestiture 
announcements (see Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Daley et al., 1997; Desai and Jain, 
1999; John and Ofek, 1995; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999). Kothari et al. (2016) 
examine the role of accrual-based (AM) and real manipulation (RM) in inducing 
overvaluation at the time of the SEO. Taking the SEO sample for a period between 1970 
to 2012, they analyse the stock performance of SEO and non-SEO firms: their findings 
are consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010). They find that EM via both AM and RM 
activities is associated with poor future earnings performance. However, post-SEO stock 
market underperformance is more predictable when it is driven by RM activity.  
Our second objective is to investigate whether a relationship exists between the 
post-announcement performance and the EM activities’ manipulation. We explore the 
cross-sectional determining factor of the choices firms make; this is between those firms 
that have managed their earnings above earnings management (AEM) proxy and those 
that have managed their earnings below earnings management (BEM) proxy. This 
analysis is important to comprehend why certain firms choose a specific way of 
managing earnings around the year of the restructuring announcements. We focus on 
both the AM and RM as the proxies for EM activities. We also examine the relationship 
between the various factors of the post-restructuring performance of the target parents 
with the specific type of EM activities. 
EM activities are unlike fraud. They involve the selection of accounting procedures 
and estimates that conform to generally accepted accounting procedures (GAAP). The 
manifestation of target EM activities would be within the bounds of accepted accounting 
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procedures. Because this is true, the acquiring firms cannot prevent accounting 
procedure manipulation by the parent targets involved in restructuring. 
Carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and divestitures are unique. To understand the 
effects of EM activities of parent targets on firms’ performance, we based our prediction 
using our joint hypothesis. Restructuring is used to generate cash flow to parent targets 
and divest a subsidiary that is undervalued. 
We examine the immediate stock market response to restructuring 
announcements, which can be calculated using an event study (Anand and Singh, 1997). 
On one hand, Gao et al. (2017) suggest that the long-run IPO performance is unrelated 
to EM. On the other hand, Lo et al. (2017) provide an evidence that institutional 
investors facilitate AM before IPO but restrain EM after their issuance. They also find 
that firms with high institutional investors experience higher post-IPO stock return and 
operating performance. To be consistent with the previous study on EM, we study the 
subsequent operating performance and stock performance as a function of the EM 
method used around the restructuring announcement events. Therefore, our second 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: The post-restructuring performance of firms is related to the factors that 
contribute to the choices made by the firms with regard to managing their 
earnings.  
3.2.3 The Effect of Earnings Management (EM) on Firm’s Stock volatility  
Our third objective is to examine the relationship between EM activities and the stock 
volatility of target parents. Previous studies suggest that EM activities could affect stock 
returns. Based on the agency theory, firms that manage earnings above earnings 
management (AEM) index have a higher tendency to have information asymmetry, as 
measured by the volatility of the stock returns. The stock volatility can also be used as 
the proxy of information asymmetry (e.g. Linck et al., 2008). A previous study suggests 
that most of the motivations for EM are aimed at sustaining a positive perception of the 
firm in the market and to avoid a decline in share price (Campa and Hajbaba, 2016). The 
analysis of the stock volatility is very important because it might at least partly capture 
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the cash flow risk of a firm (Harford et al., 2014). Furthermore, Cyert et al. (1997) find 
that CEO compensation is higher at firms with greater stock return volatility. In line with 
that finding, executives understand that the expected value of a stock option increases 
with the volatility of the stock price and that executives tend to respond to stock option 
awards by investing in riskier projects (Larcker et al., 2014). This could be also be true in 
the case where parent targets engage in divestitures in order to focus more on the core 
business and to invest in other more profitable projects. 
Many studies try to explain why carve-outs enhance the wealth of shareholders. 
Based on the rationale efficiency theory explained by Powers (2003), and consistent with 
the argument by Slovin et al. (1995), Slovin and Sushka (1997), and Nanda (1991), they 
argue that carve-outs are a means of improving access to both over and undervalued 
stock markets. The argument is that there is information asymmetry between the 
manager of the parent company and the investors. By raising cash through carve-outs, 
the stock markets perceive the stock of the subsidiary as overvalued, and the parent 
stock as undervalued. This idea is supported by Gleason et al. (2006); they find that there 
is a positive reaction to stock prices of both parents and subsidiaries in response to the 
announcement of a reacquisition after a carve-out. This is due to the belief that the 
subsidiary shares are undervalued. Furthermore, Schipper and Smith (1986) suggest that 
the separation of financial information between the parent company and their 
subsidiary could enhance the level of information from which investors benefit.  
Otsubo (2009) examines the stock price of parent firms around the carve-out 
announcements. He studies the wealth effect associated with the combination of four 
subsequent events: merger and acquisition activity, secondary offering, spin-offs, and 
reacquisitions. Taking 201 carve-outs conducted by nonfinancial firms in the US, the 
study finds that the stock market reacts positively toward the stock of a parent company 
when they preserve the parent-subsidiary relationship after a carve-out. The main 
finding is that the parent company stock price does not react positively to M&As in the 
first event. The market expects secondary events when firms announce carve-outs, and 
evaluate the combination of events on the announcement of the carve-out.  
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Firms that engage in restructuring might be involved in EM activities as they have 
the motive and opportunity to do so. This could be true for firms for which executive 
compensation is highly related with the firm’s performance. Therefore, our third 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: Target firms that engage in EM activities have a tendency of having high 
stock return volatility. 
3.2.4 Substitution between real and accrual-based EM  
Finally, our objective is to examine whether there is any substitution or 
complementarity between the choice of the type of earnings management activities 
between real (RM) and accrual-based (AM) activities among the firms that are involved 
in restructuring. The introduction of SFAS 146 in 2002, make it more difficult for 
managers to manipulate firms accounting figures (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005). 
Managers can manipulate their reported earnings through real activities’ manipulation 
by giving excessive sales discounts to increase sales at the end of the year, or by timing 
the sale of assets to recognize gains in a distress period (Nagar and Sen, 2016). Real 
earnings manipulation (RM) has adverse future performance implications for the 
bidders and targets. The literature on RM is limited as compared to that on AM.  
It is difficult for auditors and regulators to detect real earnings’ manipulation 
activities as managers can always justify the level of spending or production (Ewert and 
Wagenhofer, 2005). This is what Cohen et al. (2008a) claimed; real earnings’ 
management activities seem to have increased post-SOX. Due to the agency problem 
and prospect theory, managers seem to opt for the best ways to carry out their duties, 
while at the same time try to reduce the risk that gives major impact on their 
performance and reputation. The blame should not only lie with the managers’ side. The 
engagement on EM manipulation activities could be related to the industry where the 
firm operated. Other factors such as the reputation of auditors, the level of liquidity of 
the firms as well as the accruals earnings management flexibility could affect the 
behaviour of managers between the two types of EM.  
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In our study, we explore the cross-sectional determinants of the selections 
restructuring firms make between different earnings manipulation activities a year 
before the restructuring to understand why firms choose a certain type of EM activity a 
year before the restructuring year. We follow Cohen and Zarowin (2010) for the final 
hypothesis: 
H4: The decision by firms that are involved in restructuring to manage earnings 
by real activities manipulation versus accruals-based manipulation is related 
with auditor characteristics, litigation probability, and accruals management 
flexibility (as captured by net operating assets). 
In the following section, we discuss the empirical methodology employed to test all 
hypotheses discussed above. 
3.3 Empirical Methodology 
3.3.1 Data and Sample Description 
To test whether firms that are involved in restructuring their organizations engage in EM 
activities, we construct a sample firm for empirical tests by merging the Mergers and 
Acquisitions Database and Equity Database, from Thomson One Database, with the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)/COMPUSTAT Merged Database, for the 
period from 1985 to 2015. The CRSP returns cover NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. We 
exclude financial firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 
and 6999 because they usually hold substantial inventories of marketable securities; 
these are included in the net operating assets measures. We also exclude transportation 
and public utility firms with SIC codes between 4000 and 4999 because cash holdings of 
these firms are subject to regulatory supervision. Accounting and financial data are 
obtained from COMPUSTAT. All databases are accessed via Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS). To compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs), and standard deviation of monthly stock returns (SDARs) we 
used the Eventus database. We only consider firms with exchange codes of 11, 12 and 
14 in Compustat. We collect the financial information, and other relevant data, for the 
sample. We use the financial data for 𝑡 − 5 to 𝑡 + 3 for our study. We ensure that each 
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firm-year observation has the data for us to calculate the accrual-based and real EM 
metrics that we use in our study. We provide the description of all variables used in this 
study in Appendix 6. 
Firms involved in sell-offs have higher book-to-market ratios, averaging at around 
0.45 (please refer to Appendix 7). From an economics viewpoint, the figure could explain 
the reason why parent firms sell off their assets. The subsidiary of a parent that is 
involved in a carve-out tends to have low book-to-market ratios, averaging at around 
0.40. This is consistent with the previous study of SEOs that engage in EM activities; this 
states that firms with high market valuations have more tendency to issue equity (see 
Teoh et al., 1998a; Rangan, 1998; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). In 2003, following the 
introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (hereafter SOX), the number of 
restructuring announcements made was the highest, at around 14.54%, equivalent to 
203 carve-out announcements. The highest number of announcements made for sell-
offs, spin-offs and divestitures were in the years before 2002. For example, the highest 
number of announcements for sell-offs, spin-offs and divestitures were in 1996, 2000 
and 1998 respectively. The second highest number of announcements for spin-offs was 
in 1999, 25 out of a total of 385 announcements. This scenario is not surprising as the 
stock market thundered during the period from 1991 to 1999 (Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010). For a major comprehension, we present the line plot of the sample distribution 
in Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1: Line Plot for the Frequency of Carve-Out, Sell-Off, Spin-Off, and 
Divestiture 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Thomson One Banker 
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3.3.2 EM Metrics 
To calculate accrual-based and real EM proxies, we apply cross-sectional models, 
following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), where for each year we estimate the EM models 
for every industry classified by its 2-digit SIC code. Using this method allows us to control 
partially for any changes in economic conditions that relatively affect total accrual-based 
and real EM manipulation activities. The results need to be interpreted cautiously as 
they are probably reflecting the changes in a firm’s economic circumstances rather than 
the EM manipulation activities (Kasznik, 1999; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010). Finally, the TOTAL EM is calculated based on whether a firm is classified 
as an earnings management firm year observation or not. It is an indicator variable that 
gets the value of one if either of the real earnings management activities aggregate 
proxies either (RM_1 or RM_2), or discretionary accruals are above the industry year 
median following the method by Cohen and Zarowin (2010). A detailed explanation of 
the metrics is given in the following section. 
3.3.2.1 Accrual-based Model 
Our method of calculating the discretionary accruals is based on the following cross-
sectional model, estimated for each two digits SIC-year grouping using Jones’ (1991) 
model. This is as follows: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
 = 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2  
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
 (3.1) 
  
where for year t and firm i, TA represents the total accruals defined as: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  = 𝐸𝐵𝑋𝐼𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡  
 (3.2) 
 
where EBXI is the earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
(Compustat data item #123), and OCF is the operating cash flows (from continuing 
operations) taken from the statement of cash flows (Compustat data item #308 minus 
Compustat data item #124). We follow closely the methods used by Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010). 
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𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1  represents total assets (Compustat data item #6). △ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡  is the 
change in revenues (Compustat data item #12) from the preceding year, and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is 
the gross value of property, plant and equipment (Compustat data item #7). 
The coefficient estimates from equation (3.1) are used to estimate the firm-specific 
normal accruals (𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡) for our sample firms. The firm-specific normal accruals 𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is 
estimated using the following formula: 
𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡  = ?̂?1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ?̂?2  
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ?̂?3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
 
 
 (3.3) 
 
where the discretionary accruals (𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡) is the difference between total accruals and the 
fitted normal accruals, defined as: 
𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡  = (
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
) −  𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
 
 (3.4) 
  
3.2.2.2 Real Earnings Management 
We follow the real earnings management model by Roychowdhury (2006) to calculate 
the real earnings management proxies in this study. 
Abnormal cash from operations are estimated as the deviations from the predicted 
values from the following industry year regression: 
𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
 = 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2  
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘3
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 (3.5) 
 
where OCF is cash flow from operations (Compustat data item #308 minus Compustat 
data item #124); SALES are annual sales revenues (Compustat data item #12) and Assets 
are total assets (Compustat data item #6). Abnormal production costs are estimated as 
the deviations from the predicted values from the following industry year regression: 
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𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
 = 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2  
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘3
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘4
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 (3.6) 
 
where PROD are production costs, defined as the sum of costs of goods sold (Compustat 
data item #41) and change in inventory during the year (Compustat data item #3). 
Abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated as the deviations from the predicted 
values from the following industry-year regression: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
 = 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2  
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 (3.7) 
 
where DISX are discretionary expenses during the year, and are defined as the sum of 
advertizing expenses (Compustat data item #45), R&D expenses (Compustat data item 
#46) and SG&A (Compustat data item #189). 
Following the method by Zang (2012) and Cohen and Zarawin (2010), we break down 
the element of real earnings management into RM_1 and RM_2. The formula to 
calculate them is as follows:  
𝑅𝑀_1 =  𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑋 (−1) 
+  𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
 
  (3.8) 
 
𝑅𝑀2 =  𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑋 (−1)
+  𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑋 (−1) 
 
 (3.9) 
 
RM_1 takes the value of 1 if the figure is lower than the industry year median RM_1 and 
0 if otherwise. RM_2 takes the value of 1 if the figure is lower than the industry year 
median RM_2 and 0 if otherwise.  
The next section is the explanation regarding the regression on EM with other 
variables in this study. The higher RM_1, the more likely that firms will increase their 
production and cut discretionary expenditures to manipulate earnings upward. Also, the 
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higher RM_2, the more likely that firms manipulate sales and reduce discretionary 
expenditures to report higher earnings. 
3.3.3 Multiple Regression 
3.3.3.1 Regression on EM 
We run the 2-stage HSM to explain the determinants of EM activities and the effect of 
those activities to the firm performance and stock volatility. The first stage model to 
explain the decision to manage earnings: 
Our first stage explains a firm’s decision to manage reported earnings. We interpret 
the results based on the factors that contribute to the choices made by the firm as 
whether to manage earnings aggressively above the industry year median EM index 
(hereafter AEM), or aggressively manage their earnings below the industry year median 
EM index (hereafter BEM). The following is the function of EM that we use for the first 
stage regression following the model by Cohen and Zarowin, (2010). From the first 
regression, we will calculate the inverse mills ratio (hereafter IMR) to correct the 
selection bias in our analysis.  
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵_𝑀𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐻𝐴𝐵_𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀 
 
 
 
 
(3.10) 
 
Where 𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 is the earnings management index calculated using Jones’ (1991) model 
and coded as 1 if the index of the firm i, is AEM index and 0 if the index is BEM index. 
The index is measured taking the year t-1 data. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 is the return on assets and is 
defined as income before extraordinary items divided by beginning of period total assets 
less the industry year median for the year t+1. 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 represents the Black-Scholes 
value of option compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the 
CEO and the CFO of a firm i. 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡  is the average bonus compensation as a 
proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and the CFO of a firm. 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 
is the weighted average number of common shares outstanding at the beginning of the 
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year, before the restructuring. 𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is market value of equity and is calculated 
as the closing price at fiscal year-end multiplied by the number of shares outstanding at 
fiscal year-end. 𝐵_𝑀𝑖,𝑡 is the book-to-market ratio, where the book value of common 
equity is divided by market value of equity. 𝐻𝐴𝐵_𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡  is the frequency of 
meeting/beating analysts’ earnings forecasts in the past four quarters of the 
announcement. 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is the number of analysts following the firm. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
is the sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by average total assets.  
Finance literature on EM has studied the variable of ROA and the association with 
EM activities (see Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2016; Nagar and Sen, 2016; 
Rahman et al., 2016; Zang, 2012). We include both managerial and capital market 
incentives to manage earnings in our estimation to model the determinants of a firm’s 
decision to manage earnings. For managerial incentives, OPTION and BONUS are 
included as recent research suggests that excess compensation is associated with EM 
activities. It is claimed that stock-based compensation and management ownership 
could motivate managers to trigger them to engage in EM activities and, consequently, 
build up the stock prices (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Cheng and Warfield, 
2005; Coffee Jr, 2003; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Fuller and Jensen, 2002; Greenspan, 
2002, among others). OPTION and BONUS are included as variables in our estimation. It 
is believed that these two variables could induce opportunistic behaviour in managers 
to manage earnings (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). We retrieve compensation data from 
the EXECUCOMP database; these are only available from 1992 onwards. The merged 
samples of all four types of divestitures or restructuring are for the period 1990 to 2012.  
We also include the variable HAB_BEAT and ANALYST as variables to estimate the 
likelihood of the firm to manage earnings. These variables are the proxies for capital 
incentives in our estimations. Past literature documents that meeting or beating 
analyst’s earnings forecast enjoys higher returns (Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznik and 
Mcnichols, 2002). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) confirm the importance of HAB_BEAT as 
they find that firms that constantly meet or beat analyst’s earnings forecast have a 
stronger incentive to manage earnings, and to keep meeting or beating those targets to 
avoid adverse stock price if they fail to do so. The variable ANALYST serves as a 
determinant of a firm to engage in EM activities. In addition to the role of ANALYST as 
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the monitoring role over firms’ activities, it might be an incentive for firms to engage in 
EM activities as they try to meet or beat analysts’ forecast targets. 
Finally, we also include variables such as MKT_CAP, LEVERAGE, and B_M, based on 
the evidence discussed in the EM literature (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Fields et al., 
2001; Healy and Wahlen, 1999) to control for variations in size, capital structure and 
growth respectively, that might include measurement errors that are correlated with 
firm characteristics. The following section gives an explanation on the performance 
proxies that we use in this study. 
3.3.3.2 Performance Proxies 
3.3.3.2.1 Performance- ROA-industry median adjusted 
For comparison purposes with the previous study, we follow Cohen and Zarowin (2010). 
We defined our ROA as industry year adjusted return on assets, where the return on 
assets is defined as income before extraordinary items divided by beginning of period 
total assets less the industry year median. We use the changes in ROA (ΔROA) as the 
measurement for the changes in performance for the univariate test and the HSM. 
We regress the Δ ROA on the measures of EM, control variables and the IMR 
calculated from the first-stage regression. To test the effect of EM on ΔROA and other 
control variables, we estimate the following regression equation:  
𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐻𝐴𝐵_𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝑀_𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽14𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀 
 
 
 
(3.11) 
where 𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the change in return on assets and is defined as the average difference 
in income before extraordinary items, divided by beginning of period total assets, less 
the industry year median for the year post-restructuring and pre-restructuring, 𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 
earnings management index, calculated using Jones’ (1991) model and coded as 1 if the 
index of the firm i, is AEM index and 0 if the index is BEM index. We include control 
variables in Equation (3.11) as suggested by prior EM literature. Definitions of all 
variables are presented in Appendix 7.We include the variable SOX. The detection of 
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these real manipulation activities (RM) by auditors and regulators is very difficult as 
managers can always justify the level of spending or production (Nagar & Sen, 
2016).Cohen et al. (2008) also document changes in managerial choices of EM methods 
towards more RM after the passage of SOX. Hence, we include this variable in our 
estimation on the changes in ROA. We also include SHARES and HAB_BEAT variable in 
our regression on the changes in ROA. The justification of including these two variables 
are almost the same. We add the variables of SHARES as what has been highlighted by 
Zang (2012) that SHARES are correlated with the EM activities that could also be 
correlated to the changes in ROA. We account for several firm characteristics that may 
determine the changes in ROA in the year after the issuance. We include MKT_CAP, 
LEVERAGE, and B_M, based on the evidence discussed in the EM literature (e.g., Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2010; Fields et al., 2001; Healy and Wahlen, 1999) to control for variations 
in size, capital structure and growth respectively, that might include measurement 
errors that are correlated with firm characteristics. The variable, ANALYSTS is also 
included in the estimation on the changes in ROA. Firms that meet or beat analysts’ 
earnings expectations, enjoy a higher return over the year/ quarter than firms with 
similar yearly/ quarterly earnings forecast errors that fail to meet these expectations 
(Bartov et al., 2002; Comprix et al., 2006). 
Following Aktas et al. (2016), we include the target industry characteristics, such as 
INDUSTRY CONC, INDUSTRY LEVERAGE, INDUSTRY ROA, and INDUSTRY M_B as 
one of the control variables in our estimation in the above regression. Most of the 
variables used to estimate the likelihood of the firm’s engagement in EM activities, are 
also used in our estimation of the association between the firm performance and the 
engagement of firms in EM activities.  
3.3.3.2.2 Short-Term Performance – Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
We calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the announcing firms in the three-
day event window (−2, 0), (-1, +1), and (0, +3) around the announcement day. Normal 
returns are estimated using the classical market model and the value-weighted CRSP 
index as a proxy for the market portfolio. We also use the Fama-French three-factor and 
Momentum Model for the estimation. The parameters of the market model and Fama-
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French three-factor and Momentum Model are estimated over a 255-day event window 
(−255, −46), around the announcement day. To test the effect of EM on CARs, we 
estimate the following regression: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐻𝐴𝐵_𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝑀_𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽14𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀 
 
 
 
(3.12) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡is the cumulative abnormal return (CARs) for 3-day event window (-2,0) 
and (-1, +1). Our main independent variable is 𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 .  𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 is the earnings 
management index calculated using Jones’ (1991) model and coded as 1 if the index of 
the firm i, is AEM index and 0, if the index is BEM index. The index is measured taking 
the year t-1 data. We include control variables in Equation (3.12) as suggested by prior 
studies (see Chen et al., 2010; Zang, 2012; Chen et al., 2013; Aktas et al., 2016). 
Definitions of all variables are presented in Appendix 6.  
We account for several firm characteristics in our equation. We include MKT_CAP, 
LEVERAGE, and B_M, based on the evidence discussed in the EM and restructuring 
literature (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Fields et al., 2001; Healy and Wahlen, 1999) 
to control for variations in size, capital structure and growth respectively, that might 
include measurement errors that are correlated with firm characteristics. We include 
the target industry characteristics, such as INDUSTRY CONC, INDUSTRY LEVERAGE, 
INDUSTRY ROA, and INDUSTRY M_B as one of the control variables in our estimation in 
the above regression. We also examine the effect of EM activities on the firm’s stock 
volatility in this study. The following section will explain the stock volatility methodology 
that we used in this study. 
3.3.3.2.3 Long-Term Performance - Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) 
Barber and Lyon (1997) highlight the benefit of Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) 
for measuring the investor’s involvement in the long-run, because the use of cumulative 
returns does not adequately measure the returns obtained by an investor who holds 
stock for a long period. Given that there is no consensus about which approach is the 
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best between CARs and BHARs, and in order to give robustness to the results, both the 
CAR and BHAR approach was used. Our main analysis utilises Buy-and-Hold Abnormal 
Returns (BHARs), but we also report Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHRs). BHRs of firms are 
used to calculate the BHARs of firms in the sample. We calculate both BHAR and BHR for 
the announcing firms in 12, 24 and 36-month event windows (1, +12), (1, +24), and (1, 
+36) after the announcement day (see eg.,(Agrawal & Jaffe, 1999; Jory & Madura, 2009, 
2010; Jory et al., 2012; Li, Qiu, & Shen, 2014; Oh, 2014) . The BHARs are the difference 
between the BHRs of the market model and the Fama-French three-factor (FF) and 
Momentum Model (MM) for the same event window period. According to Barber and 
Lyon (1997), estimating long-run abnormal returns in response to events could 
potentially report biases. They suggest that the biases can be corrected by measuring 
the buy-and-hold share returns of the sample firms in comparison to their benchmarks 
( see e.g., (Blay, Bryan, & Reynolds, 2009; Gleason et al., 2006; Jory & Madura, 
2009)Normal returns are estimated using the classical market model and Fama-French 
three-factor and Momentum Model, and the value-weighted CRSP index as a proxy for 
the market portfolio. We retrieve the BHRs data from the Eventus using Monthly Fama-
French Basic Event Study query. The parameters of the market model and Fama-French 
three-factor (FF) and Momentum Model (MM) are estimated over a 36-month event 
window (−7, +36), around the announcement day. To test the effect of EM on BHARs, 
we estimate the following regression: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐻𝐴𝐵_𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝑀_𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽14𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀 
 
 
 
(3.13) 
Where 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for the event window (1, +12), 
(1,+24), and (1,+36). 𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 is the main variable of interest that is equals to 1 if the index 
of the firm i is AEM index, and 0 if the index is BEM index. The index is measured taking 
the year t-1 data.  
We include the control variables in the Equation (3.13) following past studies (Chen 
et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2013; Aktas et al., 2016). Definitions of all the variables are 
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presented in Appendix 6. We include time-varying industry characteristics such as 
MKT_CAP, LEVERAGE, and B_M (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Fields et al., 2001; Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999). We examine the effect of EM activities on the firm’s stock volatility 
in this study. The following section will explain the stock volatility methodology that we 
used in this study. 
3.3.3.3 Stock Volatility 
We collect the monthly stock return for 72 months, which ranges from 36 months before 
the announcement to 36 months after the announcement. We retrieve the monthly 
stock returns from the CRSP database using the Eventus software. We calculate the 
standard deviation of the monthly stock returns. We also calculate the standard 
deviation for the year t-1 and t-2 for the sample. 
We use the standard deviation of monthly stock returns (SDARs)10 to measure the 
volatility of the stock returns of the firms. We calculate the SDARs for the duration of 
the pre and post announcement, as well as the period t-1 and t-2 of the announcement, 
where t=0 is the year of the announcement. Measures based on stock returns standard 
deviations are used in volatility measures, and indices traded on the market are market-
based. The stock returns volatility also serves as a proxy for information asymmetry (e.g. 
(Linck et al., 2008) and uncertainty (e.g., Lee et al. 2008).  
The following is the second-stage of regression that could explain the association 
between EM and SDARs: 
𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐻𝐴𝐵_𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝑀_𝐵𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽14𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀 
 
 
 
 
 (3.14) 
                                                     
 
 
10 Previous study by Core et al. (1999), Low (2009), Cheng et al. (2015), Lee et al. (2008) among others, 
use the standard deviation of either daily stock returns or monthly stock returns as a proxy for risk or 
stock volatility in their study. 
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where 𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the standard deviation of monthly annual return of firms for t+1 to +3. 
𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡−1  is our main independent variable of interest. 𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡−1  is the earnings 
management index calculated using Jones’ (1991) model and coded as 1 if the index of 
the firm i is AEM index and 0 if the index is BEM index. The index is measured taking the 
year t-1 data. We include the control variables following past literature (Aktas et al., 
2016; Ali, Klasa, & Yeung, 2009; Madura & Murdock, 2012). Definitions of all variables 
are presented in Appendix 6. The next section will discuss the findings from our analysis 
in more detail. We start our discussion by presenting the descriptive statistics of the 
samples in our study. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Empirical Evidence on Real and Accrual EM around Carve-Out, Sell-Off, Spin-Off 
and Divestiture 
To understand the EM activities around firm restructuring and organization, we present 
the mean discretionary accruals and real earnings management proxies in Appendix 8. 
All variables are scaled by beginning year total assets for years t-3 to t+3 about the year 
of the restructuring. We winsorized the variables for all EM proxies at 1% and 99%, and 
reported the median of the proxies. Hypothesis H1 proposes that firms that engage in 
corporate reorganization and restructuring exhibit evidence of accrual-based and real 
EM activities. The results support hypothesis H1 and, interestingly, our results are 
inconsistent with previous findings of Rangan (1998), Teoh et al. (1998a), Shivakumar 
(2000), DuCharme et al. (2004); Cohen and Zarowin (2010) where they find significant 
and positive abnormal accruals in the year of the restructuring that exhibit the earnings 
enhancing practises. Our results find that there are significant and negative abnormal 
discretionary accruals in the year of restructuring, as well as the year before and after 
the carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other divestitures. Thus, our sample reveals the 
opposite situation, i.e., earnings-reducing accruals management among managers of 
firms that engage in restructuring such as carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other 
divestitures.  
However, we find significant evidence of positive abnormal production costs and 
discretionary expenses, and negative abnormal cash flows from operations. The only 
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consistent results that we have with previous study in SEO i.e., by Cohen and Zarowin, 
(2010) are the positive abnormal production costs. Our finding for abnormal production 
costs is inconsistent with IPO literature, e.g., Gounopoulos and Pham (2017) and Gao et 
al. (2017) where they find negative abnormal production costs. However, our finding on 
abnormal cash flows from operation is consistent with Gounopoulos and Pham (2017) 
and Gao et al. (2017). For discretionary expenses, our finding is consistent with (Gao et 
al., 2017). The patterns are almost the same for all four types of restructuring in this 
study. The patterns are not in the year of restructuring only, but have happened three 
years before and after the restructuring. This could imply that firms are involved in EM 
activities not only in the year of restructuring but also long before and after restructuring. 
Interestingly, the abnormal production costs median in the year of restructuring is very 
high and significant. The magnitude of the activities is very high in the year of 
restructuring as compared to the other years. 
From an economics point of view, these findings suggest that targets could probably 
try to increase the chances of completing the whole process of restructuring during a 
reasonable time frame as has been claimed by Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2015). 
Downward EM negatively affects the probability of firms that are seeking buyers to close 
deals within a reasonable amount of time (Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2015). We 
show the evidence that firms involved in carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other 
divestitures, have a tendency towards a downward EM to increase the probability of 
completing the whole process of restructuring during a reasonable period. The 
application of EM manipulation activities is not only in the year of the restructuring but 
also for a few years before the restructuring and continue after the restructuring year. 
Hence, our first hypothesis, which states that firms that engage in corporate and 
restructuring exhibit evidence of accrual-based and real EM activities, is met based on 
the findings that we present in Appendix 8. 
We report the univariate test for the two groups that we have classified based on 
the EM proxy that we calculated using the Jones’ (1991) model and Roychowdhury (2006) 
(please refer to Appendix 9). In H2, the research intended to study the factors associated 
with the effect on the post-restructuring performance. We classify the sample into two 
groups based on the industry-year medians, since the means of our sample show that 
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most of the parent targets manage their earnings downward pre-announcement, during 
the year of the announcement, and continue even after the announcement. We classify 
into (1) parent targets that manage earnings below the industry year median EM index 
(hereafter BEM) and being coded as 0 and, (2) parent targets that manage earnings 
above the industry year median EM index (hereafter AEM) and being coded as 111. We 
believe that different industries have different normal practices, and by taking the 
industry year median EM index, we reduce the biases by comparing targets in different 
industries and years.  
We show the changes in the ROA post- and pre-restructuring events. We compare 
the mean and median of the changes in return on assets (ΔROA) in the years 
immediately preceding the carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other divestitures, where 
ΔROA is defined as the average difference in income before extraordinary items, divided 
by beginning of period total assets for post- and pre-restructuring.  
We use the EM proxy of year t-1 as the base for our analysis. Based on the means of 
EM proxy, the firms engage in carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other divestitures 
manage earnings prior to the year of carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other 
divestitures, and continue to manage earnings following the announcement year.  
There is a significant difference between the two groups of targets that manage their 
earnings for sell-offs: there is no significant finding for other types of restructuring. The 
changes in ROA is more for firms that manage their earnings AEM index. This finding 
implies that firms having an EM index more than the industry year index have more 
changes in ROA. From a business perspective, this implies that targets that engage in 
sell-off types of restructuring could have a greater tendency of managing their earnings 
high and have more increment in their operating performance.  
                                                     
 
 
11 To retain the number of samples used in this study, we consider the AEM and BEM as the two extreme 
practices of EM groups. Other studies use the extreme quartile of the accrual-based and real earnings 
management index (see e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a; Teoh et al., 1998b; He, 2016) or extreme deciles (see e.g. 
Cotten, 2005). 
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This is very important evidence as the good performance of targets that are involved 
in sell-offs could be due to the EM activities and not really the positive outcomes of the 
restructuring. This implies that there is a need for us to examine the impact of the EM 
on the changes in operating performance in more detail. Considering the ‘total’ impact 
of EM for both accrual-based and real EM activities on the changes in performance does 
not serve justice here. We extend our analysis to examine the determinants of EM 
activities for both firms, i.e., AEM and BEM in our regression estimation, and the effect 
of the changes in the operating performance. We will discuss the analysis that 
corresponds with the findings to support H2 in a later section in detail. 
We use the other proxy for firm performance, i.e., CARs. We present the univariate 
test between the EM activities and the stock performance of the targets (please refer to 
Appendix 12). We measure the stock performance using the CARs. There is a consistent 
result between the changes in ROA and CARs results, but with different samples. The 
pattern is almost the same, where the firms that manage earnings AEM index have more 
CARs using the market model for the event window (-2, 0). We find negative and 
significant results for carve-out and divestiture, but not the other types of restructuring. 
Using CARs as the proxy for stock performance is very challenging as it only measures 
the stock performance for a short period. To cater for this issue, we use the BHARs to 
examine stock for long-term performance. We show the Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHRs) 
as well as the BHARs of two groups, i.e., AEM and BEM (please refer to Appendix 13). 
We only find negative and significant results for carve-outs, and positive and significant 
for spin-offs; nothing was found for the remaining two groups. From an economics point 
of view, we can say that the firms having BEM have more BHRs and BHARs for carve-
outs. However, the results are opposite for spin-offs as firms having AEM earn more 
BHRs and BHARs. 
As we can see from the univariate analysis, generally the firms that manage earnings 
BEM index have more changes in ROA and CARs. According to Teoh et al. (1998b), 
previous EM literature documented that post-restructuring stock return 
underperformance of parent targets is accompanied by unusually poor earnings 
performance.  
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The initial analysis of our univariate analysis shows that there are active EM activities 
in the year prior to restructuring announcements, the year of announcement, and the 
engagement continues even after the announcements. As the median EM proxies show 
negative and significant for all our samples for discretionary accruals, and positive and 
significant results for abnormal production costs, we analyse the samples into AEM and 
BEM.  
The tendency of management to be optimistically reporting bias earning decreases 
with the extent to which net assets are already being overstated on the balance sheet 
in the previous period (Barton and Simko, 2002). This could be the reason in our time-
series EM index that all four of our samples show negative figures, as normally 
divestiture or restructuring announcements could be a sequence event of other events 
prior to the announcements.  
Barton and Simko (2002) document a positive and significant relationship between 
the three-day CARs around the earnings surprises. Brown (2001) and Matsumoto (2002) 
also reported that the frequency of firms meeting or beating the analysts’ forecast 
targets are increasing from year to year. These findings are consistent with our initial 
analysis that the firms that manage earnings AEM index have more tendency of earning 
more CARs. From an economics point of view, we can suggest that the motive to engage 
in EM activities is clear to firms that are involved in restructuring. The engagement in 
EM activities is intended to stabilize the stock prices as the consequences of failing to 
do would be costly to the firms.  
Before we answer H2, we test for the factors that could explain the differences or 
tendencies behind why such firms choose to manage their earnings AEM index, and the 
impact of the choices on the changes in operating performance. The next section will 
explain the analysis from the regression. 
3.4.2 Cross-Sectional Determinants EM Strategies for Restructuring Firms 
Table 3.1 reports that firms engaging in corporate restructuring have abnormal accruals 
and real earnings management activities. We interpret that firms engaging in corporate 
restructuring tend to engage in both accrual-based and real earnings management 
activities. We present the results for HSM for the carve-out sample in Table 3.1. In Table 
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3.1, Columns 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10, we present the first stage of the HSM for carve-out 
samples, and only the Leverage coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% level. 
The dependent variable is 1 for firms that manage their earnings AEM, and 0 for firms 
that manage earnings BEM. The coefficient of Leverage is negatively significant at the 
10% level; this finding implies that the firms that manage earnings aggressively AEM 
have the tendency to have a low leverage ratio. In economics, this implies that there is 
a possible motive of the firms to choose to aggressively manage their earnings as the 
financial condition of the firms are riskier and probably using more debts to finance their 
assets.  
Table 3.1: Results from Heckman Selection Model of Multiple Regression of Changes in ROAs, 
CARs, BHARs and SDARs for Carve-out 
 ΔROA CARs (-2,0) CARs (-1, +1) BHAR (+1, +12) Post-SDARs 
 EM ΔROA EM CARs  
(-2,0) 
EM CARs 
 (-1, +1) 
EM BHAR 
(+1 
,+12) 
EM Post-
SDARs 
TOTAL EM  -1.492*  -0.434*  -0.445*  -3.067*  -0.432* 
ROA -0.018  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.005  
SOX  -0.061  0.006  0.004  -0.060  -0.034** 
OPTION 0.021 -0.005* 0.026 0.001 0.026 0.001 0.026 -0.002 0.026 0.002* 
BONUS -0.426  -0.478  -0.478  -0.479  -0.476  
SHARES 0.197 0.163* 0.079 -0.025 0.079 -0.033 0.080 0.155 0.081 0.0623*
* 
MKT_CAP -0.309 -0.137 -0.145 0.021 -0.145 0.029 -0.144 0.078 -0.145 -
0.116**
* 
BM 0.488 0.027 0.333 0.006 0.333 0.010 0.334 0.156 0.337 0.004 
HAB_BEAT 0.000 -0.005 -0.027 -0.006 -0.027 -0.003 -0.027 0.000 -0.026 0.000 
ANALYST 0.155 -0.001 0.040 0.011 0.040 0.023 0.037 -0.263 0.038 0.023 
LEVERAGE -0.576 0.276** -0.823* -
0.123*
* 
-0.823* -
0.124*
* 
-0.817* -0.043 -0.814* -
0.141**
* 
INDUSTRY 
CONC 
 15.94*  0.356  0.378  -6.179  -0.184 
INDUSTRY 
LEVERAGE 
 0.092  0.011  0.012  0.225  -0.006 
INDUSTRY 
ROA 
 0.317**
* 
 0.008  -0.002  0.234*
* 
 0.006 
IMDUSTRY 
MB 
 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
IMR  0.703*  0.221*  0.231*  1.552*  0.216* 
Constant 1.961*
* 
1.489* 1.908**
* 
0.386 1.908**
* 
0.366 1.901**
* 
2.326 1.896**
* 
0.871**
* 
           
Observatio
n 
354 354 421 421 421 421 420 420 420 420 
Chi- 
squared 
8.940 74.090 9.240 18.160 9.240 19.78 9.170 24.560 9.170 50.84 
Prob > chi-
squared 
0.443 0.000 0.416 0.578 0.416 0.472 0.422 0.219 0.422 0.000 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.047  0.038  0.038  0.038  0.038  
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% 
level. 
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Notes to Table 3.1: This table presents the results of two-stage Heckman Selection Model. It reports the cross-
sectional maximum likelihood regressions. In columns 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10, the dependent variable (Total EM) takes the 
value of 1 if the earnings management proxy, i.e. discretionary accruals calculated based on Jones’ (1991) Model in 
year t-1, and/or the aggregate proxies of real earnings management are below the industry year median, and 0 
otherwise; these are calculated following Cohen and Zarowin (2010). In column 3 the dependent variable is the 
average change in return on assets (ΔROA) calculated as the average change in the difference in ROA after and before 
the restructuring year (t=0). ROA is return on assets and is defined as income before extraordinary items, divided by 
beginning of period total assets; SOX is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the observation is after 2002; OPTION 
represents the Black-Scholes value of option compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the 
CEO and the CFO of a firm; BONUS is the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received 
by the CEO and the CFO of a firm; SHARES is the weighted average number of common shares outstanding at the 
beginning of the year, prior to the restructuring; MKT_CAP is market value of equity and is calculated as the closing 
price at fiscal year-end multiplied by the number of shares outstanding at fiscal year end; B_M is the book-to-market 
ratio, where the book value of common equity is divided by market value of equity; HAB_BEAT is the frequency of 
meeting/beating analysts’ earnings forecasts in the past four quarters of the announcement; ANALYST is the number 
of analysts following the firm; LEVERAGE is the sum of short- and long-term debt divided by average total assets; 
INDUSTRY CONC is the sum of the largest four sales divided by the sum of sales in a given industry; INDUSTRY 
LEVERAGE is the average leverage ratio in the firms industry; INDUSTRY ROA is the average return on assets; INDUSTRY 
M_B is the average market-to-book in the firms industry; IMR is the inverse mills ratio calculated from the Probit 
regression in the first-stage of Heckman Selection Regression. 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat and Thomson One Database 
Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 of Table 3.2 show the first regression results of the sell-
offs sample in our study. We find positive and significant for coefficient of Hab_Beat is 
positive and significant at the 5% level for the sell-offs. We interpret that firms that 
choose to manage their earnings AEM have the tendency to beat the analyst forecast. 
We also find positive and significant at the 1% and 5% levels for the coefficient of 
Leverage. The coefficients of B_M and Analyst are positive and significant at 1% and 5% 
respectively.  
 
Table 3.2: Results from Heckman Selection Model of Multiple Regression of Changes in ROAs, 
CARs, BHARs and SDARs for Sell-off 
 ΔROA CARs (-2,0) CARs (-1,+1) BHAR (+1,+12) Post-SDARs 
 EM ΔROA EM CARs  
(-2,0) 
EM CARs 
 (-1,+1) 
EM BHAR 
(+1,+12
) 
EM Post-
SDARs 
TOTAL EM  0.486  -0.026  0.035  0.082  -0.020 
ROA -0.066  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
SOX  0.027  0.001  0.006  -0.007  -0.007* 
OPTION 0.008 -0.001 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.007 -0.003 0.004 0.000 
BONUS -0.508  -0.259  -0.259  -0.284  -0.151  
SHARES -0.095 0.105 -0.161 -
0.031**
* 
-0.161 -
0.037**
* 
-0.164 -0.040 -0.215 0.040**
* 
MKT_CAP -0.100 -
0.0979* 
-0.041 0.037**
* 
-0.041 0.040**
* 
-0.039 0.121**
* 
0.018 -
0.073**
* 
BM 0.089 -
0.112**
* 
0.598**
* 
0.006 0.598**
* 
-0.006 0.596**
* 
0.008 0.161 0.000 
HAB_BEAT 0.076** -0.014 0.103** 0.001 0.103** 0.000 0.101** -0.006 0.054 0.003** 
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ANALYST 0.294 0.051 0.197 -
0.019** 
0.197 -0.011 0.199 -
0.140** 
0.392** 0.040**
* 
LEVERAGE 0.923**
* 
-0.132 0.184 -0.009 0.184 -0.015 0.180 -
0.193**
* 
0.576** -
0.029** 
INDUSTRY 
CONC 
 -1.717  0.062  -0.145  4.006*  -0.336 
INDUSTRY 
LEVERAGE 
 0.024  0.000  0.010*  0.071*  0.016**
* 
INDUSTRY ROA  0.075  0.022**
* 
 0.021**
* 
 0.014  0.005 
IMDUSTRY MB  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
IMR  -0.240  0.019  -0.013  -0.024  0.009 
Constant 1.412**
* 
-0.274 1.433**
* 
-0.034 1.433**
* 
-0.092 1.439**
* 
-0.343 1.227**
* 
0.292**
* 
           
Observation 1,677 1,677 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,067 1,067 1,882 1,882 
Chi- squared 17.170 30.590 22.130 88.86 22.130 103.280 21.790 82.890 21.79 49.240 
Prob > chi-
squared 
0.046 0.061 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.021  0.048  0.048  0.048  0.048  
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% level. 
Notes to Table 3.2: This table presents the results of two-stage Heckman Selection Model. It reports the cross-sectional 
maximum likelihood regressions. In columns 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10, the dependent variable (Total EM) takes the value of 1 
if the earnings management proxy, i.e. discretionary accruals calculated based on Jones’ (1991) Model in year t-1, 
and/or the aggregate proxies of real earnings management are below the industry year median, and 0 otherwise; 
these are calculated following Cohen and Zarowin (2010). In column 3 the dependent variable is the average change 
in return on assets (ΔROA) calculated as the average change in the difference in ROA after and before the restructuring 
year (t=0). ROA is return on assets and is defined as income before extraordinary items, divided by beginning of period 
total assets; SOX is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the observation is after 2002; OPTION represents the 
Black-Scholes value of option compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and the CFO 
of a firm; BONUS is the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and 
the CFO of a firm; SHARES is the weighted average number of common shares outstanding at the beginning of the 
year, prior to the restructuring; MKT_CAP is market value of equity and is calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-
end multiplied by the number of shares outstanding at fiscal year end; B_M is the book-to-market ratio, where the 
book value of common equity is divided by market value of equity; HAB_BEAT is the frequency of meeting/beating 
analysts’ earnings forecasts in the past four quarters of the announcement; ANALYST is the number of analysts 
following the firm; LEVERAGE is the sum of short- and long-term debt divided by average total assets; INDUSTRY CONC 
is the sum of the largest four sales divided by the sum of sales in a given industry; INDUSTRY LEVERAGE is the average 
leverage ratio in the firms industry; INDUSTRY ROA is the average return on assets; INDUSTRY M_B is the average 
market-to-book in the firms industry; IMR is the inverse mills ratio calculated from the Probit regression in the first-
stage of Heckman Selection Regression. 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat and Thomson One Database 
Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the first regression results of 
the spin-offs and divestiture respectively. We do not get any significant coefficient for 
all the independent variables. Most of the variables are not in the regression due to a 
multicollinearity issue for the spin-offs sample.  
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Table 3.3: Results from Heckman Selection Model of Multiple Regression of Changes in ROAs, 
CARs, BHARs and SDARs for Spin-off 
 ΔROA CARs (-2,0) CARs (-1,+1) BHAR (+1,+12) Post-SDARs 
 EM ΔROA EM CARs  
(-2,0) 
EM CARs 
 (-1,+1) 
EM BHAR 
(+1,+12) 
EM Post-
SDARs 
TOTAL EM  
-
1.310  0.463  -0.185  0.767  0.192 
ROA 0.012  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.009  
SHARES 0.803 0.308 0.140 -0.019 0.140 -0.004 0.073 -0.576 0.399 0.011 
MKT_CAP -0.644 
-
0.251 0.117 -0.020 0.117 0.013 0.149 0.291 
-
0.254 -0.031 
HAB_BEAT 0.054 0.015 0.024 -0.008 0.024 -0.005 0.024 0.036 0.006 -0.006 
INDUSTRY 
LEVERAGE  
-
0.019  -0.003  -0.015  -0.012  0.001 
IMDUSTRY 
M_B  0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.005  0.000 
IMR  0.701  -0.249  0.105  -0.582  -0.107 
Constant 1.723** 1.390 0.465 -0.288 0.465 0.156 0.463 -0.561 1.234 0.056 
           
Observations 102 102 55 55 55 55 54 54 95 95 
Chi- squared 1.180 1.97 0.810 1.440 0.81 2.73 0.66 4.10 0.26 4.84 
Prob > chi-
squared 
0.881 0.992 0.937 0.998 0.937 0.974 0.956 0.905 0.992 0.848 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.015  0.018  0.018  0.015  0.003  
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% level. 
Notes to Table 3.3: This table presents the results of two-stage Heckman Selection Model. It reports the cross-
sectional maximum likelihood regressions. In column 2,4,6, 8 and 10 the dependent variable (Total EM) takes the 
value of 1 if the earnings management proxy i.e discretionary accruals calculated based on Jones (1991) Model in year 
t-1 and/ or the aggregate proxies of real earnings management are below the industry-year median and 0 otherwise 
calculated following Cohen and Zarowin (2010). In columns 3 the dependent variable is the average change in return 
on assets (ΔROA) calculated as the average change in the different in ROA after and before the restructuring year 
(t=0). ROA is return on assets and is defined as income before extraordinary items divided by beginning of period total 
assets; SHARES is the weighted average number of common shares outstanding at the beginning of the year, prior to 
the restructuring; MKT_CAP is market value of equity and is calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the 
number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end; HAB_BEAT is the frequency of meeting/beating analysts’ earnings 
forecasts in the past four quarters of the announcement; INDUSTRY LEVERAGE is the average leverage ratio in the 
firms industry; INDUSTRY M_B is the average market-to-book in the firms industry; IMR is the inverse mills ratio 
calculated from the Probit regression in the first-stage of Heckman Selection Regression 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat and Thomson One Database 
The second stage model explains the association between the EM activities patterns 
and the firms’ performance and stock volatility. We begin our discussion with the post-
restructuring performance.  
3.4.3 EM Activities and Post-Restructuring Performance – Changes in ROA 
The main variable for the second regression is the TOTAL EM and changes in ROA. We 
investigate the association between the EM activities of the parent targets and the 
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changes in ROA after and before the announcement. Our H2 predicts that the post-
restructuring performance of restructuring firms is associated with the factors that 
contribute to the choices made by the firms to managing their earnings. We run the 
second stage regression following the HSM procedure to analyse the association 
between the TOTAL EM and changes in ROA.  
In column 3 of Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 we present the multivariate regression 
results for the changes in ROA for carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other divestitures 
respectively. The dependent variable is the changes in ROA. TOTAL EMis our measure of 
whether a firm is classified as an EM firm year (hereafter EMF) observation or not. It 
takes the value of 1 if either the discretionary accruals calculated based on Jones’ (1991) 
Model in year t-1, and/or the aggregate proxies of real earnings management are above 
the industry year median, and 0 otherwise, calculated following Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010). We find negative and significant at the 10% level results for the coefficient of 
TOTAL EM.  
Table 3.4: Results from Heckman Selection Model of Multiple Regression of Changes in ROAs, 
CARs, BHARs and SDARs for Divestiture 
 ΔROA CARs (-2,0) CARs (-1, +1) BHAR (+1, 
+12) 
Post-SDARs 
 EM ΔROA EM CARs  
(-2,0) 
EM CARs 
 (-1, 
+1) 
EM BHAR 
(+1, 
+12) 
EM Post-
SDARs 
TOTAL EM  0.249  -
0.579*
* 
 -
0.619*
* 
 -
0.754 
 -0.125 
ROA -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
SOX  -
0.046**
* 
 -0.005  0.001  -
0.092 
 -0.006 
OPTION -0.024 0.012* -0.071 -0.008 -0.071 -0.005 -0.069 -
0.046
* 
-0.009 0.004 
BONUS -0.148  -0.141  -0.141  -0.162  -0.054  
SHARES -0.585 0.098** 0.636 -0.036 0.636 -0.033 0.633 0.011 -0.485 0.052** 
MKT_CAP 0.263 -0.038 -0.294 0.047 -0.294 0.044 -0.295 0.128 0.236 -
0.066**
* 
B_M -0.067 0.040* -0.478 -0.014 -0.478 -0.018 -0.477 -
0.018 
-0.194 0.003 
HAB_BEAT -0.046 -0.002 0.027 0.000 0.027 -0.001 0.028 -
0.017 
-0.045 0.004 
ANALYST 0.371 -0.069* -0.600 -0.047 -0.600 -0.046 -0.601 -
0.235
* 
0.145 -0.014 
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LEVERAGE 0.625 -
0.095** 
0.040 0.014 0.040 0.036 0.035 0.086 0.600 -0.035* 
INDUSTRY 
CONC 
 -0.811  -0.231  -0.330  -
2.266 
 -0.316 
INDUSTRY 
LEVERAGE 
 -0.017  0.004  0.023  -
0.004 
 0.016 
INDUSTRY 
ROA 
 0.097**
* 
 -0.012  0.001  0.007  0.017* 
INDUSTRY 
M_B 
 0.000  -0.003  -0.002  0.003  0.000 
IMR  -0.138  0.241*
* 
 0.254*
* 
 0.269  0.072 
Constant 1.381*
* 
-0.192 2.172*
* 
0.529*
* 
2.172*
* 
0.551*
* 
2.181*
* 
0.580 1.560**
* 
0.385** 
           
Observati
on 
396 396 301 301 301 301 300 300 451 451 
Chi- 
squared 
4.800 64.48 3.840 17.51 3.84 15.81 3.81 16.64
0 
4.960 65.56 
Prob > chi-
squared 
0.851 0.000 0.922 0.619 0.922 0.728 0.923 0.676 0.838 0.000 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.021  0.034  0.034  0.034  0.021  
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% level. 
Notes to Table 3.4: This table presents the results of two-stage Heckman Selection Model. It reports the cross-
sectional maximum likelihood regressions. In column 2,4,6, 8 and 10 the dependent variable (Total EM) takes the 
value of 1 if the earnings management proxy i.e., discretionary accruals calculated based on Jones (1991) Model in 
year t-1 and/ or the aggregate proxies of real earnings management are below the industry-year median and 0 
otherwise calculated following Cohen and Zarowin (2010). In columns 3 the dependent variable is the average change 
in return on assets (ΔROA) calculated as the average change in the different in ROA after and before the restructuring 
year (t=0). ROA is return on assets and is defined as income before extraordinary items divided by beginning of period 
total assets; SOX is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the observation is after 2002; OPTION represents the 
Black-Scholes value of option compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and the CFO 
of a firm; BONUS is the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the CEO and 
the CFO of a firm; SHARES is the weighted average number of common shares outstanding at the beginning of the 
year, prior to the restructuring; MKT_CAP is market value of equity and is calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-
end multiplied by the number of shares outstanding at fiscal year end; B_M is the book-to-market ratio, where the 
book value of common equity is divided by market value of equity; HAB_BEAT is the frequency of meeting/beating 
analysts’ earnings forecasts in the past four quarters of the announcement; ANALYST is the number of analysts 
following the firm; LEVERAGE is the sum of short- and long-term debt divided by average total assets; INDUSTRY CONC 
is the sum of the largest four sales divided by the sum of sales in a given industry; INDUSTRY LEVERAGE is the average 
leverage ratio in the firms industry; INDUSTRY ROA is the average return on assets; INDUSTRY M_B is the average 
market-to-book in the firms industry; IMR is the inverse mills ratio calculated from the Probit regression in the first-
stage of Heckman Selection Regression. 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat and Thomson One Database 
Only the coefficients of TOTAL EM of the changes in ROA regression for carve-out 
have negative and significant results at the 1% significant level. We do not find any 
significant results for the other types of restructuring. Statistically, this implies that the 
firms that manage aggressively above the EM industry index in the year prior to the 
restructuring year have a greater tendency to have fewer or lower changes in ROA in 
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the year after and before the announcement. From an economics perspective, firms that 
engage in upwards EM activities show a tendency to have a reduction in the average 
changes in ROA post- and pre-restructuring. This could be due to the possibility of 
reversing the transactions in post-restructuring years.  
Our H2 predicts that the performance of the firms that are involved in carve-outs, 
sell-offs, spin-offs, and other divestitures, depends on the decision taken by the 
management to manage their earnings. The behaviour of the managers of target parents 
impacts the future performance of the target parents. This finding is consistent with 
agency theory and prospect theory, which explain the consequences of decisions made 
by management before the restructuring. There is a negative relationship between the 
firm value and the extent of EM. Our finding is inconsistent with the justification of the 
application of the agency theory by Jiraporn et al. (2008) that there is a negative 
relationship between EM and agency costs. We believe that managers manage earnings 
by assessing the benefits and risks involved while applying accounting discretion. 
Moreover, the existence of agency problems makes the decision detrimental to the firm 
value. This can be seen from the negative relationship between the TOTAL EM and the 
changes in ROA from our analysis. 
The coefficients of the control variables that show significant results are OPTION, 
SHARE, LEVERAGE, INDUSTRY CONC, INDUSTRY ROA, MKT_CAP and B_M. We find 
positive and significant coefficient for SHARE, LEVERAGE, INDUSTRY CONC, INDUSTRY 
ROA (carve-out) and negative and significant at the 10% level for OPTION (carve-out), 
MKT_CAP and B_M (sell-off). Given this evidence, we can interpret this finding as firms 
that have a greater number of outstanding shares have an increment in ROA in the year 
after the announcements for carve-outs.  
Zang (2012) suggests that a higher threshold induces the need for the target firms 
to manage earnings to achieve their goals. A higher number of outstanding shares 
requires an active EM activity to make sure that the firm achieves a certain level of 
earnings per share (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010).  
The results also confirm the importance of managerial and capital market incentives 
as these variables have large effects on firm performance. The leverage level of a firm is 
also correlated with the changes in ROA. High leverage could bring along strong outside 
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scrutiny, making it necessary for firms to use both forms of EM in order to achieve 
earnings targets (Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2013). At the industry level, literally 
from the results, the externalities from related industry contributes to the firm 
performance of restructuring firms (Aktas et al., 2016) together with the decision-
making behaviour of firms in certain industries (Roychowdhury, 2006). The industry 
characteristics affect firms’ conduct, strategy (Kolev, 2016) and the security of potential 
earnings (Yalçın, 2010) in which they operate. Industry profitability and performance will 
influence firm diversification and consequently, firm performance as profitable industry 
impacts the opportunities available in the market context (Berry, 2010). The coefficient 
of B_M shows negative and significant at the 10% level; this could imply that the parent 
target is still undervalued event after the restructuring. This could justify why firms could 
have subsequent events even after restructuring.  
We have discussed the association of the changes in ROA and the EM activities 
among firms that involved in carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other divestitures. Next, 
we extend our analysis to examine the relationship between the 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐸𝑀 and the 
CARs.  
3.4.4 EM Activities and Post-Restructuring Stock Performance – CARs- Target 
Abnormal Returns 
We define abnormal returns as market-adjusted returns, using the return on the CRSP 
value-weighted market index as the market return. Columns 5, and 7 of Tables 3.1, 3.2, 
3.3 and 3.4 represent the regression results for TOTAL EM and CARs for window event 
(-2,0) and (-1, +1). The dependent variable for the multiple regression is the CARs for the 
event window (-2, 0) and (-1, +1), where 0 is the year of the announcement. We 
document the univariate analysis between firms that manage their earnings AEM index 
and BEM in the earlier section. The CARs of the firms that engage in EM activities AEM 
index have more CARs compared with firms that have BEM index. However, univariate 
comparisons could be misleading, as the results do not take into consideration any joints 
or other effects. We run the second-stage of HSM regression to examine the factors that 
could explain the differences in the CARs of both groups.  
Nevertheless, our multivariate regression results show that there is a negative 
association between the TOTAL EM and CARs. The coefficients of TOTAL EM for carve-
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outs and divestitures show negative and significant at the 10% and 1% level respectively. 
This finding supports the second hypothesis that the post- restructuring performance of 
firms is associated with the choices made by the firms with regard to managing their 
earnings. Empirically, our results show that target firms with higher level of earnings 
management activities i.e., above the median market EM index are associated with 
significantly lower CARs. Our empirical findings are consistent with the findings by 
Anilowski et al. (2009) where they find that target firms with higher levels of 
discretionary accruals are associated with significantly lower CARs. Our result indicates 
that the market does appear to penalize firms for the use of EM. There is a possible 
indication of the ability of investors to see through EM activities.  
We do not find any significant results except for the sell-off and spin-off samples. 
Statistically, firms having AEM experience negative CARs around the announcement 
days. EM activities are not the only factor that contributes to the differences in CARs. 
Prior studies document positive CARs for parent firms when asset sell-offs are 
announced (e.g., Alexander et al., 1984; Jain, 1985; Hite et al., 1987; Lang et al., 1995). 
As shown in our prediction, based on the agency costs and prospect hypothesis, 
managers make their own best judgement based on personal benefits, restructuring 
events, and the costs of engaging in EM activities.  
The coefficient for control variables that are negative and significant are Leverage 
(carve-outs and divestitures), Shares and Analyst (sell-outs). The coefficient for 
MKT_CAP, INDUSTRY LEVERAGE, and INDUSTRY ROA are positive and significant (sell-
outs). The industry control variable is consistent with the previous studies that have a 
negative association with CARs (Slovin et al., 1995; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 
1999). We discuss the analysis of EM and BHARs in the following section. 
3.4.5 EM Activities and Long-Term Post-Restructuring Stock Performance – BHARs 
Target Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
Column 9 of Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 show the multivariate regression for BHARs for 
carve-out, sell-off, spin-off and other divestitures respectively. The dependent variable 
that we use in the second-stage HSM is the BHARs of the target firms for event window 
(0, +12). The coefficient for BHARs is negative and significant at the 10% significant level 
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for carve-outs. We do not find any significant results for the BHARs coefficient for other 
types of restructuring.  
The empirical finding from our analysis shows that there is an association between 
EM activities a year before restructuring announcements and post-restructuring 
underperformance of targets that are involved in carve-outs. The results support our H2 
that the post-restructuring performance is related to the extent of a year income-
increasing EM activities by targets. Our finding is consistent with Yang et al. (2016) and 
Balatbat and Lim (2003), who claim that aggressive EM groups perform worse than the 
conservative EM groups for firms engaging in SEO. Balatbat and Lim (2003) find that 
BHARs of firms that manage earnings using accrual-based EM activity consistently 
perform poorly 1-3 years after carve-outs. Furthermore, BHARs of units are weaker for 
units that were carved out of distressed parents to improve their financial condition 
(Madura and Nixon, 2002). The engagement in EM activities could be the reason for 
managers trying to manipulate financial statements to conceal distressed conditions. 
Our findings indicate that managers manage the earnings of the carve-out firm upwards 
to influence initial offer price. However, we conclude that more investigation is 
necessary to understand the incentives of the parent firms in doing so. From an 
economics perspective, firms that manage earnings AEM index have performed poorly 
compared with firms that manage earnings BEM index. We extend our analysis by 
analysing the impact of EM activities with firms’ risks. We discuss the analysis of EM and 
SDARs in the following section. 
3.4.6 EM Activities and Stock Volatility – SDARs  
Column 11 of Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 report the results of the multivariate 
regression between standard deviation of monthly stock returns (SDARs) and TOTAL EM. 
The coefficient of TOTAL EM is negative and significant at a 10% level for carve-outs. We 
do not find any significant results for other types of restructuring for the TOTAL EM. 
The increase in risk following restructuring is generally higher for carve-outs than for 
asset sell-offs; this is because parents have great control over the decisions when it 
comes to restructuring (Madura and Murdock, 2012). Our empirical results show that 
firms involved in EM activities AEM index, experience a reduction in risk following a 
108 
 
 
 
restructuring year. Jiraporn et al. (2008) suggest that firms with high levels of EM index 
suffer fewer agency costs. Furthermore, stock price volatility is associated with the level 
of information asymmetry (Cyert et al., 1997). Our finding is consistent with these two 
previous findings. However, there is a need for us to examine the accrual-based and real 
EM activities separately; this is because managers may engage in real EM to meet 
benchmarks in an effort to maintain reputation as a way to signal superior future 
earnings (Gunny, 2010). Moreover, most of the motivations for EM are aimed at 
avoiding a decline in share price (Campa and Hajbaba, 2016). In our initial analysis, we 
consider both the accrual-based and real EM activities as one joint variable. We will 
provide a discussion in the robustness check section when we discuss the analysis taking 
both types of EM activities separately. 
OPTION and SHARES can encourage risk-taking behaviour because increases in stock 
return volatility increase the value of the options (Haugen and Senbet, 1981; Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Cyert et al., 1997). Our results show that there is a positive association 
between the SDARs, Option and Shares.  
A previous study suggests that the finding on the SDARs is very important because it 
might at least partly capture cash flow risk (Harford et al., 2014), uncertainty (Lee et al., 
2008), or a measure of information asymmetry (Linck et al., 2008). 
3.4.7 Second- Stage Model to Explain the Use of Real Accrual Versus Earnings 
Management 
Table 3.5 shows the cross-sectional determinants of earnings management strategies in 
the year before the restructuring for carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other 
divestitures. Column 2 of Panel A of Table 3.5 shows the first-stage of the HSM just to 
obtain the IMR for the control variable for the second-stage regression of the probit 
regression. This is to examine the determinants of the choices between the three 
elements of real EM activities. The first-stage of the probit regression could also explain 
the determinants of the EM activities among the target firms. However, we have already 
explained the determinants in the earlier section (Section 3.4.2). 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.5, show the probit regression of the probability of firms 
choosing to become involved in either the combination of manipulating the cash flows 
and discretionary expenditure, or the combination of production costs and discretionary 
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expenditure. The dependent variable for the probit regression in column 3 is the variable 
RM_1; this takes the value of 1 if the figure is lower than the industry year median RM_1, 
and 0 if otherwise. RM_2 takes the value of 1 if the figure is lower than the industry year 
median RM_2, and 0 if otherwise. The coefficient of LITIGATION and SOX are negative 
and significant at the 5% and 10% significant level for the probit regression of RM_1. The 
coefficient of LITIGATION and SOX are also negative and significant at the 5% and 1% 
significant level respectively for the probit regression of RM_2. The variable of SOX is 
added, as following Cohen et al. (2008a), that during the post-SOX period, managers are 
more aware and try to avoid detection of accrual-based earnings management and, 
consequently, encouraging managers to change from AM to RM activities.  
Table 3.5: Cross-sectional determinants of earnings management strategies in the year before 
the restructuring 
Panel A Carve-Out 
 Determinants of 
overall earnings 
management activities 
(First stage) 
Determinants of real earnings management 
activities (Second stage) 
  Prob (RM_1>median) Prob (RM_2>median) 
HAB_BEAT -0.034   
SHARES 0.222   
ANALYST -0.284   
BONUS -1.172*   
OPTION 0.042   
ROA -0.001   
MKT_CAP -0.075   
B_M -0.048   
LEVERAGE -0.573*   
BIG8  -0.279 -0.148 
AUDIT TENURE  0.129 0.054 
LITIGATION  -0.258** -0.266** 
NOA  0.000 0.000 
SOX  -0.260* -0.410*** 
IMR  -4.265* -1.353 
Constant 1.873*** 0.565* 0.517 
    
Observations 570 516 516 
Chi- squared 7.84 15.12 12.08 
Prob > chi-squared 0.551 0.019 0.060 
Pseudo R-squared 0.026 0.021 0.017 
 
Panel B Sell-Off 
 Determinants of overall 
earnings management 
activities (First stage) 
Determinants of real earnings management 
activities (Second stage) 
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  Prob (RM_1>median) Prob 
(RM_2>median) 
HAB_BEAT 0.018   
SHARES -0.099   
ANALYST 0.335**   
BONUS 0.188   
OPTION -0.002   
ROA 0.000   
MKT_CAP -0.018   
B_M 0.176**   
LEVERAGE 0.474**   
BIG8  -0.032 -0.286 
AUDIT TENURE  0.126** -0.034 
NOA  0.000 0.000 
SOX  0.115** -0.299*** 
IMR  0.521 -1.126 
Constant 1.235*** -0.108 0.605*** 
    
Observations 2,674 2,323 2,323 
Chi- squared 14.44 11.28 35.77 
Prob > chi-squared 0.108 0.046 0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.012 0.004 0.011 
 
Panel C Spin-Off 
 Determinants of overall 
earnings management 
activities (First stage) 
Determinants of real earnings management 
activities (Second stage) 
  Prob (RM_1>median) Prob 
(RM_2>median) 
HAB_BEAT 0.060   
SHARES 1.197   
ROA 0.013   
MKT_CAP -0.966*   
BIG8  1.010 0.518 
AUDIT TENURE  0.053 0.227 
NOA  0.000 0.000 
IMR  -3.523 -3.398 
Constant 2.193*** 0.106 -0.011 
    
Observations 141 68 68 
Chi- squared 3.37 6.68 6.82 
Prob > chi-squared 0.498 0.154 0.146 
Pseudo R-squared 0.037 0.075 0.072 
 
Panel D Divestiture 
 Determinants of overall 
earnings management 
activities (First stage) 
Determinants of real earnings management 
activities (Second stage) 
  Prob 
(RM_1>median) 
Prob (RM_2>median) 
HAB_BEAT -0.024   
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SHARES -0.337   
ANALYST -0.016   
BONUS -0.245   
OPTION 0.026   
ROA 0.000   
MKT_CAP 0.221   
B_M 0.005   
LEVERAGE 0.635   
BIG8  0.227 0.148 
AUDIT TENURE  0.187* -0.049 
LITIGATION  0.124 -0.053 
NOA  -0.000* 0.000 
SOX  -0.125 -0.050 
IMR  1.775 -0.986 
Constant 1.281*** -0.563 0.043 
    
Observations 629 541 541 
Chi- squared 4.24 9.45 1.45 
Prob > chi-squared 0.895 0.150 0.963 
Pseudo R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.002 
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% level. 
Notes to Table 3.5: This table presents the results of two-stage Heckman Selection Model. It reports the cross-
sectional maximum likelihood regressions. In column 2, dependent variable (Total EM) takes the value of 1 if the 
earnings management proxy i.e discretionary accruals calculated based on Jones (1991) Model in year t-1 and/ or the 
aggregate proxies of real earnings management are below the industry-year median and 0 otherwise calculated 
following Cohen and Zarowin (2010). In column 3, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if RM_1 is higher than 
the industry-year median and 0 otherwise. In column 4 the dependent variable takes the takes the value of 1 if RM_2 
is higher than the industry-year median and 0 otherwise. HAB_BEAT is the frequency of meeting/beating analysts’ 
earnings forecasts in the past four quarters of the announcement; SHARES is the weighted average number of 
common shares outstanding at the beginning of the year, prior to the restructuring; ANALYST is the number of analysts 
following the firm; BONUS is the average bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation received by the 
CEO and the CFO of a firm; OPTION represents the Black-Scholes value of option compensation as a proportion of 
total compensation received by the CEO and the CFO of a firm; ROA is return on assets and is defined as income before 
extraordinary items divided by beginning of period total assets; MKT_CAP is market value of equity and is calculated 
as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end; B_M is the book-to-
market ratio, where the book value of common equity is divided by market value of equity; Leverage is the sum of 
short term and long term debt divided by average total assets; SOX is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
observation is after 2002; BIG 8 is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm’s auditor belongs to the Big 8 auditors 
and 0 otherwise; AUDIT TENURE is the log of the number of years the auditor has been with the firm; LITIGATION is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm’s SIC code is 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 7371-7379, 3570-3577, 3600-3674 and 0 
otherwise; NOA is net operating assets, which is calculated as the sum of shareholders’ equity less cash and 
marketable securities plus total debt at the beginning of the year, deflated by total sales from the previous year; SOX 
is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the observation is after 2002; IMR is the inverse mills ratio calculated from 
the Probit regression in the first-stage of Heckman Selection Regression. 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat and Thomson One Database 
Panel B of Table 3.5 shows the results for the sell-off sample. The coefficient for 
Audit Tenure and SOX are positive and significant at the 5% significant level for RM_1 
probit regression. However, we find a contradictory result for the coefficient of SOX for 
the probit regression of RM_2. The coefficient of SOX is negative and significant at the 
1% significant level. This is consistent with the explanation in the earlier paragraph. We 
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also find the same result for the coefficient of Audit Tenure for the divestiture sample in 
Panel D of Table 3.5. From an economics perspective, this implies that the longer the 
audit tenure the higher the probability of the firms to engage in RM activities.  
There is much more to be explored in the future to understand the pattern of the 
relationship and the factors that contribute to such findings. 
3.4.8 Robustness Test 
First, we conduct a robustness control for the existence of multicollinearity in equation 
3.10. We have four samples for the study; the spin-off and divestitures sample need 
some modifications in terms of the variables used in the analysis as we have a 
multicollinearity issue. We do provide the correlation matrix to show there is no 
multicollinearity issue between one variable and another variable for every sample (see 
Appendix 10). The correlations are low to moderate, between -0.03 and 0.55 for all four 
samples after removing highly correlated variables. We remove variable BONUS and 
SHARES as the variable BONUS is highly correlated with variable OPTION and SHARES is 
highly correlated with variable MRK_CAP for the divestitures sample. Any correlation 
coefficient between independent variables that is greater than 0.80 may indicate a 
problem of multicollinearity (Gujarati & Porter, 2003). We are therefore confident that 
the variables that we choose in our model provide sufficient independent information 
and that multicollinearity is not an issue (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). We also do check the 
severity of multicollinearity in the regression analysis using variance inflation factor (VIF). 
VIF measures how much the variance of an estimated coefficient is increased because 
of collinearity among the independent variables in a regression. Most of the index shows 
less than 7; i.e. below 10 indicating low multicollinearity among independent variables 
in the regression (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996) (please refer 
Appendix 11). All the VIFs are below 7 so that multicollinearity does not appear to be an 
issue. Therefore, we do not find any evidence of multicollinearity in our samples.  
Using the dichotomous variables as the measure of the EM in our study leads to the 
selection bias and limited econometrics methods to be applied. In our previous analysis, 
we use the EM as the variable of 1 of the firm having either the accrual-based earnings 
management index, or any of the real earnings management proxies (RM_1 or RM_2) 
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AEM index, and 0 if otherwise. For the robustness check, we replace the EM variable 
with the EM industry year adjusted index and run the regression for each of the proxy, 
i.e., accrual based EM, RM_1 and RM_2 separately. We apply the ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS) as we do not suffer with any endogeneity issues, even when we replace 
the continuous variables for our EM proxy. The OLS is the best method to estimate the 
coefficient of our variables. The reason we do not have the endogeneity issue could be 
because the variables are already adjusted with the industry year index.  
It is very misleading if we add up all the index and measure the EM activity as one 
single measure. Furthermore, combining the two proxies of RM will result in double 
counting (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). We analyse each proxy 
separately with all the dependent variables (please refer to Appendix 14,15,16, and 17). 
The findings give us a more detailed understanding of the impact of the EM activity on 
the wealth effect of the firms that are involved in restructuring. We have consistent 
results when we run the regression with the changes in ROA for the carve-out sample. 
The coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% level. This implies that firms that 
have a lower EM index have a higher tendency towards having more average changes in 
ROA.  
What is more interesting is the finding with the EM proxy RM_2 where we find the 
opposite for the sell-off and divestiture samples. The coefficient is positive and 
significant at 1% and 10% respectively. This implies that firms that have a high index of 
RM_2 have a higher tendency of having more increments in ROA. The coefficient of 
accrual-based EM for the spin-off sample is negative and significant at the 10% level. 
From an economics perspective, we can interpret this as firms that manage their 
earnings upward using accrual-based EM activity have a greater tendency of having 
increments in ROA. 
The OLS for the dependent variable CARs shows a consistent result for the 
divestiture sample and the coefficient is however very small. What is interesting to know 
is that the coefficient for the accrual-based EM proxy is significant for carve-out and 
divestiture. From an economics perspective, we suggest that different types of 
restructuring show different patterns of managing earnings.  
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We do not find any significant results in the previous analysis when we test the 
association between the TOTAL EM and the BHARs of firms that are involved in 
restructuring, except for carve-outs. For a robustness check, we run the OLS with the 
EM index separately. We find that the coefficient of the EM index for RM_2 is significant 
at the 10% level. For economics, this implies that firms that have a higher industry year 
adjusted EM index have a greater tendency of having positive BHARs (+1, +12).  
The sell-off sample has the same pattern as the carve-out; this is because the 
coefficient of RM_1 is positive and significant at the 1% level. We do not find any 
significant result for the divestiture sample. However, our findings for the spin-off is 
opposite as we find the coefficients of RM_1 and RM_2 are negative and significant at 
the 1% level. Thus, firms that are involved in spin-off restructuring, that manage their 
earnings upwards using real EM activity, have a greater tendency of having more BHARs. 
From an economics perspective, the firms eventually suffer wealth reduction.  
Our final dependent variable is SDARs as we use this proxy to evaluate the stock 
volatility of firms that are involved in restructuring. We find different patterns when we 
replace the EM proxy with the index instead of the dummy variable. We do not find any 
significant result for the carve-out sample. We find positive and significant results for 
the sell-off and divestiture samples. However, the coefficient of accrual-based EM for 
the spin-off sample shows negative and significant at the 10% level. From an economics 
perspective, firms that are involved in restructuring that manage their earnings upwards 
will have a greater volatility of stock prices. This implies that the firms are riskier post-
restructuring. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Previous research has addressed the question of EM around other types of restructuring, 
i.e., M&A, IPO and SEO. This is the first paper to investigate restructuring types such as 
carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and other divestitures using accrual-based and real EM 
activities. We use accrual-based EM and real EM, and we use the cross-sectional Jones’ 
(1991) model (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996; Balatbat and Lim, 
2003; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), as well as the model for real earnings management 
following Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010). 
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We have made a contribution to the literature by documenting that firms use 
accrual-based EM and real EM activities around a specific corporate finance event 
restructuring. This research contributes to the literature in various ways. First, we 
extend the work of Balatbat and Lim (2003) and produce evidence on the relative effects 
of EM around corporate restructuring regarding a firm’s future performance. They find 
that targets that are involved in restructuring and engage in accrual-based earnings 
management (AM) activity have poor stock performance. We choose to examine both 
the changes in operating performance and stock performance. This is important in order 
to analyse whether the engagement of targets in EM activities lead to poor performance 
of targets that are involved in restructuring, even though the primary objective of 
restructuring is to generate cash and improve performance. We examine the effect of 
changes in ROA, CARs, BHARs and the volatility of the parent target companies.  
Second, we add to the literature by showing that targets that engage in restructuring 
through carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, and divestitures also engage in accrual-based 
and real earnings manipulation EM in the years surrounding the announcements. This 
study may assist regulators, auditors, and policymakers to curb EM patterns of those 
firms that are involved in restructuring. Managers have the tendency of switching from 
accruals-based earnings management (AM) and real activities manipulations (RM); 
policymakers, regulators, and auditors must be aware of this activity among parent 
targets. Our empirical findings support the fact that factors such as SOX, litigation, audit 
tenure and net operating assets (NOA) have significant correlation to the choice of RM 
over AM.  
Third, we analyse the factors that affect EM activities by firms that are involved in 
restructuring. By examining both types of AM and RM activities, we provide the evidence 
of trade-off between the two types of EM. We show that firms’ choices of RM versus 
AM activities a year prior to announcements vary predictably as a function of the firm’s 
ability to use AM, and the cost of doing so. We follow Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and 
use the two-stage HSM to account for restructuring firms’ differing preference of RM 
over AM. We find that audit tenure, SOX and litigation are correlated with RM activities. 
Firms with auditors that have longer audit tenure show a greater tendency to use RM 
activities over AM.  
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Lastly, we show the significance of specific items in financial statements, i.e., items 
correlated with accruals-based earnings management (AM) and real activities 
manipulations (RM) activities, instead of relying on overall earnings. For example, the 
level of net operating assets (NOA) reflects previous EM to some extent (Barton and 
Simko, 2002). A higher current NOA indicates greater RM. RM is positively related to 
NOA, because firms with higher NOA substitute away from AM: we provide the results 
in the restructuring firm context. Therefore, investors can evaluate items more precisely 
and in more depth. This could be useful to many interested parties, namely the investing 
public and regulators, as well as contributing to the EM literature on firm restructuring. 
There is abundant evidence on acquirers’ and targets’ EM before the acquisitions, 
IPO and SEO. The current literature is not clear about the role of the target firms in 
manipulating earnings before the restructuring announcements. The deals and the 
methods of financing through different types of restructuring can significantly impact 
the wealth of a target firm’s shareholders, and can serve as motivation for parent targets 
to manipulate their earnings. This aspect of EM in parent targets remains unexplored by 
the literature with regards to the EM activities and its relationship to the post-
announcement performance of the targets. We identify this gap in the literature, and 
examine the EM activities and the post-announcement performance of parent targets.  
We provide evidence that, on average, target companies manage earnings 
downward through accrual-based and real EM the year before the announcements, and 
continue after the announcements. We then classify our samples into firms that engage 
in EM activities that have AEM index, and firms that engage in EM activities BEM. We 
conducted univariate analysis for both groups of firms based on their EM index for 
changes in ROA and CARs, as well as BHARs. We find that only the sell-off sample shows 
significant difference in changes in ROA medians for both groups. We find that firms 
having AEM have more changes in ROA. This is very important evidence as the good 
performance of targets that are involved in sell-offs could be due to the EM activities 
and not really the positive outcomes of the restructuring. However, the univariate test 
for CARs shows a significant difference in means for both groups as the firms with AEM 
have more CARs than firms with BEM for carve-out and divestiture. For BHARs, we find 
mixed results. There is a significant difference in means for AEM and BEM for carve-out 
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and spin-off. Firms that have AEM earn more BHARs than firms having BEM for carve-
out, but we find the opposite for the spin-off sample.  
The univariate comparisons could be misleading as they do not take into 
consideration of any joint effects. We extend our analyses by conducting the HSM to 
examine the determinants of the engagement of firms that are involved in restructuring 
in EM activities, as well as to analyse whether the differences in means from our initial 
univariate test could be explained by our main dependent variables of firm performance, 
stock performance and stock volatility. 
The differences in changes in ROA, CARs, BHARs and SDARs between AEM and BEM 
groups are associated with EM activities. Our empirical findings show that there is a 
negative association between EM activities and firm performance, and a positive 
association with firms’ risks. We find that there is a negative relationship between the 
changes in ROA and the EM for carve-out. We do not find any significant coefficient of 
EM proxy for other samples. We believe that managers manage earnings by assessing 
the benefits and risks involved while applying accounting discretion. Moreover, the 
existence of agency problems makes the decision detrimental to the firm value. 
We find the coefficients of CARs for carve-out and divestiture are negative and 
significant at the 10% significant level. This implies that ` This indicates that the market 
appears to penalize firms for the use of EM. There is a possible indication of the ability 
of investors to see through EM activities. We extend our analysis by analysing the impact 
of EM activities with BHARs. We find that there is also a negative association between 
EM activities and BHARs. Our result is consistent with Balatbat and Lim (2003). They find 
that BHARs of firms that manage earnings using accrual-based EM activity consistently 
perform poorly 1-3 years after carve-outs. However, we analyse both accrual-based and 
real EM proxies in our analysis. Our analysis is more detailed and robust. From an 
economics perspective, our finding implies that managers choose to engage in EM 
activities. Balatbat and Lim (2003) claim that firms involve in carve-outs engage in 
accrual-based manipulation to influence the initial offer price. The market seems to see 
through management engagements in EM activities regardless whether AM or RM 
activities and penalizes firms for the use of EM activities.  
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However, we find a negative and significant difference at the 10% level between the 
post-SDARs for the period t+1 to t+3 of BEM and AEM for the carve-outs. This suggests 
that firms that manage earnings AEM index have lower stock volatility as compared to 
firms that manage earnings BEM. From an economics viewpoint, we can interpret this 
finding as a reduction in agency costs following the restructuring year, even though 
managers engage in EM activities.  
This study only analyses one event that happens at one time. There is no analysis on 
the subsequent events. Because the analysis of the EM activities is limited to the specific 
types of restructuring discussed here, the scope of the research is limited. Future studies 
can analyse the impact of the event, as well as determine information about the EM 
before the event. 
Our research not only contribute to a wide range of literature on restructuring and 
earnings management but also provides several practical implications for regulators in 
monitoring firms’ financial reporting that have restructured their operations and 
businesses, for investors in making investment decisions, and for firms in considering 
their restructuring their businesses. 
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Chapter 4 
The Effects of Pay Slice and Corporate Governance on Bank’s 
Efficiency and Risk-Taking Behaviour 
4.1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis that started in late 2008 led to issues of corporate financial 
distress, bankruptcy and resulted in many institutions including big financial institutions 
being rescued by the government. There is an ongoing debate whether the bankruptcy 
law (e.g., Chapters 11 and 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code) is efficient in rehabilitating 
economically efficient but financially distressed firms and liquidating economically 
inefficient firms (Senbet and Wang, 2012; Jory and Madura, 2010; Zhang, 2010; Faelten 
and Vitkova, 2014) as well as issues on government bailout practises for failures 
institutions in the US. We have discussed the common practise in the US on restructuring 
as a way of reorganizing operations and generating extra resources to resolve financial 
difficulty issue. Another common practice in the US, is the US government interventions 
and legislative fixes that can be too far more insidious corporate welfare (Ritholtz, 2009). 
The practice of bailing out American corporations by US government has started as early 
as 1970s. For example, the Penn Central Railroad in 1970 and Franklin National Bank in 
197412. Franklin National Bank’s failure that evidence emerged of corruption and shady 
business practices among the bank’s executives that has been bailout by the US 
government. Even though the bailout practices have been started in 1970s, the language 
and philosophy were very different from the 2008 Troubled Assets Relief Program 
(TARP) and there is a concern that many bailouts of 2008 and 2009 are creating moral 
                                                     
 
 
12  Source: History of U.S Government Bailouts, retrieved from 
https://www.propublica.org/special/government-bailouts.    
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hazard, encouraging more reckless behaviour among executives in the future (Ritholtz, 
2009).  
Bank’s pay structures were severely criticized in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis of 2008 (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2010; Yu and Van Luu, 2016). Bank executives’ pay 
was focused on achieving short-term - as opposed to long-term - targets, causing banks 
to take on more risk (Cheng et al., 2015). Due to the complexity of businesses and recent 
global financial crises, there is inconsistency in the association of rewards for Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) and management with the firm’s performance. To realign 
banks’ CEO pay with shareholder interests, the US government mandate that banks 
receiving funds from its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) should adopt 
shareholders’ say on pay arrangements. The “say on pay” and other related governance 
rules was incorporated into the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)(Huntington, 2010; Public Law, 2010). Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act which was passed into law in the United 
States on July 21, 2010 by the President, Barack Obama (Barack, 2010) . This legislation 
provides wide-ranging prescriptions aimed at correcting the causes of the 2008 financial 
crisis. It particularly focuses on the legislations related to the markets for financial 
products and credit ratings agencies. It allows the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) to curb problems at ailing institutions before they infect the financial system 
(Mintz, 2017). FSOC exercise a threefold mandate i.e., 1) identify risks to financial 
stability that could arise from financial distress or failure, 2) promote market discipline 
by eliminating expectations that the government will shield in the event of failure, and 
3) respond to emerging threat to the stability of the financial system. Dodd-Frank Act is 
believed to prevent the excessive risk-taking by management that led to the financial 
crisis. Following the passage of Dodd-Frank, investors now have access to data on CEO’s 
and top executive’s pay compared to the median pay of all their employees. 
The requirement to publish CEO pay is not without controversy. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) took five years to settle on an agreed set of pay ratios that 
companies will publish – although, there is no requirement until 2018. Companies will 
publish data on the compensation of the CEOs and their top four executives on an annual 
basis.  
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Research on the link between executive pay and bank performance continues to 
preoccupy public interest (Yu and Van Luu, 2016). Current research on pay and 
corporate performance tends to exclude financial companies such as banks, as they tend 
to be highly regulated. Our aim in this paper is to examine the link between CEO pay and 
bank efficiency. We specifically consider the disparity that exists between CEO's pay and 
that of their top five executives, and how this disparity affects the bank’s efficiency and 
risk measures. We define pay disparity between the CEO and the top five executives 
following Bebchuk et al. (2011), i.e., the CEO pay slice (hereafter CPS). CPS is the total 
CEO compensation divided by the total compensation of top five executives. 
Our empirical methodology includes the estimation of; (i) Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regressions in all our CPS variables, (ii) Two- stage least squares (2SLSL) regression 
models in which the CPS variables are instrumented, and (iii) simultaneous equation 
models in which the bank efficiency/ bank risk and CPS are simultaneously estimated 
using an instrumental variables approach. Using OLS approach in our first methodology 
does not eliminates issues related to endogeneity. To control for endogeneity issues, we 
use 2SLS, instrumental variable (IV) methodology. A suitable instrumental variable to be 
used in the 2SLS estimation should have two properties; it should be related to the 
variable it serves as an instrument for and unrelated to the error in the model (Elyasiani 
& Jia, 2008). We employ Number of VPs and CFO as VP as the joint instrumental variables 
for CEO Pay Slice (CPS) and Industry-median Efficiency as the instrumental variable for 
the bank’s efficiency.  We also use the Industry- median figure as the instrumental 
variable for bank insolvency risk and stock volatility variables. Under the 2SLS, IV 
approach, we first estimate the regression of the endogenous variable CPS on 
instrumental variables and exogenous variables to obtain the predicted values of CPS. 
In the second stage, I run the original regression (Equation 4.6) with the endogenous 
variable replaced by the predicted value from the first stage regression.  
This study contributes to the literature in banking and finance in several ways. 
Despite the public and media outcry around the pay cheques of the CEOs at the largest 
US financial institutions, there are very limited number of papers that examine the link 
between CEO pay and bank efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, the only study that 
directly addresses the topic is Matousek and Tzeremes (2016). The authors study the 
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effect of CEO compensation on bank’s technical efficiency using the non-parametric 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Their sample comprises 37 holding banks in the US 
from 2003 to 2012. They find a non-linear relationship between CEO compensation and 
bank efficiency, which is inconsistent with the findings based on parametric approaches. 
They find that lower salaries exert a negative effect on bank technological innovations. 
According to the authors, a minimum salary level exists below which, CEO compensation 
is negatively related to bank performance.  
Our study differs from Matousek and Tzeremes’ (2016) in a few important aspects. 
First, we use the parametric frontier Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) method. The DEA 
method, while it works well with limited samples, suffers from a deterministic nature 
and an inability to provide the statistical precision of efficiency estimates. This 
introduces bias (Emrouznejad et al., 2010; Moradi-Motlagh and Babacan, 2015). 
Additionally, Matousek and Tzeremes’ (2016) study is limited to 37 banks and covers the 
period up to 2012. Conversely, our sample includes 121 US banks and extends up to 
2014. Third, unlike Matousek and Tzemeres (2016), who study the effect of CEO salary 
and bonus payments, our study considers the relation between the CEO Pay Slice (CPS) 
(i.e. the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive team captured 
by the Chief Executive Officer) and the efficiency and risk of US banks. According to 
Bebchuk et al. (2011), the merits of using CPS in preference to monetary pay amounts 
are that CPS reflects both the relative importance of the CEO and the extent to which 
the CEO is able to extract rents. Fourth, given that a significant part of CEO compensation 
is contingent based (for instance, stock options), we examine the effects of the 
contingent portion of CEOs’ pay separately from their total pay. Additionally, we 
consider the effects of the Top Management Team (TMT) compensation. Finally, we 
consider both the stock market risk and the insolvency risk of the sampled banks. Thus, 
our paper offers a rich set of interactions between the various elements of CEO pay and 
bank efficiency. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We review the 
literature and develop our hypotheses in Section 2. We present our data and methods 
in Section 3. We present and discuss our findings in Section 4, and conclude the paper 
in the final section. 
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4.2 Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
4.2.1 CEO Pay Slice (CPS) 
A broad range of variables exist which are designed to measure the inequality between 
CEO and top management pay. Among them are the coefficient of variance, the Gini 
coefficient, the Theil index, relative mean deviation, standard deviation, and the 
logarithm of the pay gap. Except for standard deviation, Wei et al. (2015) find that the 
variables are closely related to each other and that interchanging them has little impact 
on their relation to the outcome variables. 
Bebchuk et al. (2011), using information from the Compustat’s ExecuComp database 
(1993 to 2004), examine the relationship between pay disparity, firm value, and 
performance, respectively. They define CEO pay slice (CPS) as ‘…the fraction of the 
aggregate compensation of the top-ﬁve executive team captured by the CEO’ (Bebchuk 
et al., 2011:199). They find an inverse relationship between pay disparity (i.e., higher 
values of CPS) and the industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. We define our pay disparity in a 
similar way to their terms, i.e., CEO pay slice (CPS). 
Similar to Siegel and Hambrick, 2005, Pissaris et al., 2010, Bebchuk et al., 2011, 
Wales et al., 2013, and Ridge et al., 2014, Al-Najjar, 2015 compute pay disparity as the 
percentage of CEO compensation divided by the compensation package of the top-five 
members of the executive team. We adopt the same measure in this paper since it 
meets the requirement of the SEC on the publication of pay measures. 
4.2.2 Bank Efficiency 
Tournament theory has been widely used to explain pay disparity between CEO and 
the rest of the top management team (Ridge et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2008; Carpenter and 
Sanders, 2002; Lin et al., 2013; Kini and Williams, 2012; Yu and Van Luu, 2016; Bebchuk 
et al., 2011; Connelly et al., 2014; Kale et al., 2009; Firth et al., 2015). Under tournament 
theory, pay disparity acts as an incentive for CEOs to work harder. The disparity leads 
the CEO to believe that her unique skills and inputs are highly prized and are fairly and 
rightly compensated (Lin et al., 2013). 
Conversely, Pissaris et al. (2010) posit that pay disparity can lead to agency conflict. 
Tournament theory also suggests that competition for high pay leads to top candidates 
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acting selfishly to preserve their own interests at the expense of the corporation’s 
(Siegel and Hambrick, 2005). Berri and Jewell (2004) claim that inequality in pay 
indicates that workers at the bottom of the firm’s hierarchy are competing in a 
tournament that is unfair since they are unable to share in the rewards of their hard 
labour.  
Pissaris et al. (2010) find that the ability of pay disparity to incentivize managers to 
perform better, as per the tournament theory, depends on, to a large degree, the firm’s 
governance characteristics. The authors find that among firms characterized by weaker 
monitoring and transparency, the predictions of tournament theory do not hold, i.e., 
their performance is inversely related to pay disparity. 
Armstrong et al. (2012) analysed 2,110 proxy statement disclosures of companies 
from the Russell 300 Index to examine the link between corporate governance practices 
and CEO pay levels. Firms that are weak in corporate governance hire consultants to 
assist with setting executive compensation. These firms end up paying the highest CEO 
compensation. 
Al-Najjar et al. (2016) studied UK listed firms’ CEO pay slices (CPS) and found them 
to be higher at better run companies (i.e. those that score highly on corporate 
governance and board independence and exhibit superior operating performance). 
Conversely, board size and CEO duality (i.e. the CEO is also the Chairperson of the Board) 
adversely affect CPS. Carpenter and Sanders (2002) found that top management team 
compensation is directly related to a firm’s Tobin’s Q and return on assets only when 
top management team pay is aligned with shareholder interests. This alignment ensures 
that agency conflicts are kept to a minimum.  
Ridge et al. (2015) define pay disparity as the difference in pay between the top four 
executives and the CEO. They use tournament theory and social comparison theory to 
explain the effects of pay disparity on firm performance. Social comparison theory 
suggests that the CEO exerts a significant influence in selecting members of the board 
who then determine the CEO’s pay. Furthermore, the members are themselves current 
or former CEOs and use their pay as a reference point in setting CEO pay (O’Reilly et al., 
1988). The authors find that social comparison processes are more relevant in setting 
CEO compensation. 
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Pissaris et al. (2010) analyse how corporate governance and executive pay disparity 
affect corporate performance. They define pay disparity as “…the dollar value difference 
between CEO total compensation and the average value of the four most highly paid top 
management team”. They find that pay disparity enhances firm performance. 
Zhang (2014) measures pay disparity as the logarithm of the dollar difference 
between the CEO’s overall remuneration and the median total pay of a non-CEO 
executive. Using Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance, Zhang finds pay disparity to be 
inversely related to performance despite the firm having strong corporate governance 
variables in place. 
Firth et al. (2015) examine relative pay in China and find wide pay differences 
between top management and the average worker in the firm. This pay disparity 
adversely affected the firm’s productivity and is more pronounced in labour-intensive 
firms. 
Pissaris et al. (2010) analyse how corporate governance and executive pay disparity 
affect corporate performance. They define pay disparity as “…the dollar value difference 
between CEO total compensation and the average value of the four most highly paid top 
management team”. They find that pay disparity enhances firm performance. 
Yu and Van Luu (2016) examine the applicability of the equity fairness theory –which 
advocates for small pay disparity and, therefore, better teamwork – in setting executive 
compensation. Using a hand-collected dataset of 63 banks from The Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and 29 banks from 
developing countries over the period 2004-2012, they found that executive-pay 
dispersion adversely affects bank performance (measured using the price-to-book ratio 
and the Tobin’s Q). 
Matousek and Tzeremes (2016) investigate the effect of CEO bonus and salary 
payments on banks’ technical efficiency levels. They use DEA to estimate the efficiency 
and use a sample of 37 US banks for the period from 2003 to 2012. They find that salary 
and bonus payments are not always aligned with higher technical efficiency levels.  
Tournament theory suggests that, at the firm level, executives will compete among 
themselves to move up the ladder until they reach the top job, i.e. becoming the firm’s 
CEO. In this setup, the pay disparity between the CEO and the rest acts as a signal that 
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the company rewards human talent and skills based on individuals’ contribution and 
performance. The pay disparity, therefore, acts as a powerful incentive for lower-level 
employees to compete for the top jobs. The ensuing competition should lead to a large 
pool of highly competitive, qualified, and skilled employees, which should improve 
operating performance. 
However, the empirical evidence does not consistently point to improved 
performance. Large pay disparities could be a sign of “excessive CEO hubris” (Hayward 
and Hambrick, 1997). The competition can result in brilliant individual performances but 
not necessarily a team performance. It can also lead to a lot of internal squabbling, which 
affects performance negatively. Should the internal tournaments lead to managers 
seeking to protect their own interests at the expense of the shareholders’, it will 
exacerbate agency conflicts. This focus on individual gains at the expense of the 
corporation is consistent with the rent-seeking theory, whereby top management is 
more interested in achieving short-term goals rather than improving the firm to ensure 
its long-term survival. Thus, under the rent-seeking theory, the firm efficiency is 
expected to decline. 
H1: High pay disparity adversely affects bank efficiency 
4.2.3 Bank Risk 
Wide pay disparities would seem to motivate employees to perform better in order to 
achieve high pay. However, it is unclear how this race to the top affects a bank's 
operations risk-wise. Does it promote or dampen risk-taking by the top management 
team (TMT)? Gilley et al. (2002) find that TMT risk taking has a strong positive influence 
on firm performance. 
We also examine the factors that affect this pay disparity and its relationship to 
bank efficiency and risk. On the subject of the determinants of CEO compensation, Core 
et al. (1999) measure board and ownership structures, and relate them to CEO 
compensation. They find that ineffective governance structures tend to favour high CEO 
pay, which subsequently affects the firm's operating and stock performances. Adhikari 
et al. (2015) find that the increase in the complexities brought about by Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) of 2002 has forced CEO pay up for older and more experienced CEOs since 
127 
 
 
 
they are more experienced with SOX. Filbeck et al. (2011) analyse the impact of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)-related announcements on bank holding companies. 
SOX was enacted in response to a number of high-profile financial reporting scams 
(Enron and WorldCom being the prominent ones) in the USA. The authors argue that 
despite SOX, banks were already heavily regulated and, thus, it should be easier for them 
to comply with SOX compared to firms that are less regulated. They find that the stock 
prices of banks increased significantly around the dates of SOX-related 
announcements.Kini and Williams (2012) measure pay disparity as the logarithm of the 
difference between CEO pay and the median pay of the rest of the management team. 
They find that pay disparity is directly linked to both firm performance and risk, and that 
firms exhibit behaviour consistent with tournament theory. 
However, given the scrutiny that CEOs are subject to, as well as the short-term 
tenure of their positions, these twin forces could force them (in their attempt to secure 
their pay) to adopt a risk-averse approach that would preserve the status quo. CEOs 
could favour short-run projects with quick returns rather than projects with slower but 
ultimately higher returns. Atrill (2015) argues that such myopic behaviours result from 
(i) the way CEO compensation are structured, which tends to promote the short- over 
the long-run, and (ii) the short-term management tenure and contracts. The author 
argues that CEOs would be keen to cut back on discretionary expenditures like R&D and 
advertising. The short-term focus and cuts in discretionary expenditure would affect the 
corporation's long-term value and consequently its stock price. 
According to Kupiec and O’Brien (1997) and Matousek and Tzeremes (2016), high 
levels of CEO bonuses are linked with banks that overinvest in risky loans and securities, 
which adversely affect banks’ technical efficiency. 
There is a large literature that surveys how convex compensation schemes - whereby 
the CEO’s expected wealth is an increasing function of the firm risk - have been 
established to tackle the aforementioned risk-related agency costs (see Cain and 
McKeon, 2016). They should lead to a higher preference for risk among CEOs. 
The analysis by Moradi-Motlagh and Babacan (2015) reveals that the global financial 
crisis had an adverse effect on the efficiency of Australian banks. Le and Jaeger (2015) 
examines the effects of CEO compensation on risk-taking in bank industry. Using a 
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database on CEO compensation of 46 European and 28 North American banks for the 
year 2003-2007, their analysis shows that CEO bonus may induce manager to take more 
risk, however it has no responsibility for the increase in all types of bank risk in the period 
2008-2011. Thus, we hypothesize that financial crisis measures moderate the effects of 
pay disparity on bank’s risk and efficiency measures. 
H2: High pay disparity positively affects the bank’s risk 
Inter-bank competition has led to banks becoming more efficient. Deregulation of 
branching and the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act resulted in intense competition 
among banks (Beck et al., 2013) and the pursuit of bank efficiency (Bertrand et al., 2007). 
To stay competitive, banks sought to attract the top candidates by offering high pay, 
which further acerbated the pay disparity between CEOs and the rest of the labour force. 
However, size brings along diseconomies of scale, which should adversely affect 
efficiency. Following the 2008 financial crisis, there were numerous calls for banks to be 
shrunk and simplified (Tett, 2012) with some banks unaware of the actions of their 
traders and the risk inherent in their derivatives book.  
Bank’s pay structures were severely criticized in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis of 2008 (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2010; Yu and Van Luu, 2016). Bank executives’ pay 
was focused on achieving short-term - as opposed to long-term - targets, causing banks 
to take on more risk (Cheng et al., 2015). Due to the complexity of businesses and recent 
global financial crises, there is inconsistency in the association of rewards for CEOs and 
management with the bank’s performance and risk.  
Pre-financial crisis, many of CEO or executives of big banks received large 
compensations, then bailed after they destroyed their banks (e.g., Lehman Brothers, 
Merrill Lynch, Countrywide Financial13). For example, Lehman Brothers Chairman and 
                                                     
 
 
13 Countrywide Financial is now owned by Bank of America. 
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CEO Richard Fuld Jr. sold his $490 million Lehman Brothers stock in the years before 
Lehman filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy (Ritholtz, 2011).  
However, Guo et al, 2015)  find that bank insolvency risk measured by the Z-score 
have a direct relationship with both the percentages of short-term and long-term 
incentive compensation. They study whether executive compensation in larger banks, 
especially the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks, induces more severe moral hazard behaviour. 
They also find that TBTF banks experience greater insolvency risk and more likely to be 
in financial distress than smaller banks. However, they ignore the compensation of other 
top executives.  
We expect that riskier banks, pay greater compensation to their CEOs as compared 
to others management team members to encourage aggressive risk taking leading to 
higher insolvency risk. CEO may have different pay structure than other top executives 
(Angbazo & Narayanan, 1997; Demsetz & Saidenberg, 1999).   Little attention is paid to 
variation in compensation structure across firms or differences or pay disparity between 
the compensation structure of CEOs and other top executives (Demsetz & Saidenberg, 
1999). Berri and Jewell (2004) claim that inequality in pay indicates that workers at the 
bottom of the firm’s hierarchy are competing in a tournament that is unfair since they 
are unable to share in the rewards of their hard labour. Thus, it is plausible to test 
whether the rising pay disparity led to more complex banks that threatened their 
survival. 
H3: High pay disparity is associated with higher insolvency risk 
4.2.4 Bank Institutional Ownership 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) consider whether bank performance during the 2007-
2008 credit crisis was related to CEO incentives prior to the crisis. They find no evidence 
to suggest that CEOs whose incentives are aligned with shareholders’ interests perform 
better. CEOs, whose pay is related to the bank’s share price, suffered large losses in the 
wake of the crisis. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced new requirements 
concerning the disclosure of information by banks in 2006; included in these were 
caveats on executive compensation. If their fiscal year finished on or after December 15, 
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2006, they were compelled to comply. The new requirements are designed to better 
inform investors and other stakeholders about how a bank’s compensation is set. 
Besides disclosure, institutional ownership is another effective form of corporate 
monitoring. Reddy et al. (2015) find that CEO compensation is subject to internal forces 
as opposed to external ones. For instance, CEOs that also serve on their companies’ 
board earn more suggesting that they influence the board to increase their pay. 
Similarly, companies that pay directors more, end up paying their CEOs more, which is 
consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. They find that the proportion 
of institutional and block shareholders is positively associated with CEO compensation 
but not operating performance, which puts into doubt the benefits from institutional 
investors’ monitoring. However, the results on the association between CEO 
compensation and bank performance are mixed. Wand and Chen (2015) find that 
executive compensation is positively related to board size and the shareholdings of the 
biggest shareholder. Compensation is inversely related to the proportion of 
independent directors on the board and state ownership. They find no link between the 
performance of the listed Chinese commercial banks and executive compensation. The 
presence of influential shareholders will act as a check on the on-CEO’s powers. Their 
presence may moderate the potential adverse effects resulting from CEO pay disparity. 
Conversely, these shareholders may collude with the CEO to increase pay provided that 
their interests are protected (see Pound, 1988). To account for their influence, we use 
the proportion of shares held by institutional investors, which include mutual funds, 
hedge funds, pension funds, banks and insurance companies. Empirical evidence 
suggests that they own two-third of US-listed firms (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Clay, 2002; 
Blume and Keim, 2012; Jafarinejad et al., 2015) we hypothesize that the higher the 
proportion of shares held by institutional investors, the higher is the bank’s efficiency 
despite large pay disparities. 
H4: Institutional ownership is directly related to bank efficiency irrespective of 
pay disparity. 
An emerging literature on the effects of institutional ownership on firm value 
suggests that in addition to the proportion of shares held by investors, it is equally 
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important to consider institutional ownership stability. They argue that not all 
institutional investors stay with a firm for the long-term. Some are short-term and would 
leave at the first sign of trouble. Elyasiani and Jia (2010) and Callen and Fang (2013) 
argue that “stable” institutional investors are more incentivized to monitor target firms 
and improve shareholder welfare. 
Recent literature suggests that besides ownership proportion, it is equally important 
to consider the stability of the ownership (Gaspar et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007; Yan and 
Zhang, 2009; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; Jafarinejad et al., 2015; Attig et al., 2012; Callen 
and Fang, 2013). Not all institutional investors will stay with a corporation for the long-
term and/or engage with the firm CEO’s to protect shareholders’ wealth. Many of them 
trade frequently and alter their shareholdings often. Others are passive investors, index 
trackers and have little incentive to engage in corporate governance similar to activist 
investors. We hypothesize that stable institutional investors are more influential in 
moderating the effects of pay disparity on bank efficiency.  
H5: The stability of institutional investors directly is directly associated with bank 
efficiency. 
4.3 Sample selection and data description 
We obtain our sample from the Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database. All firms 
should have a SIC code between 6000 and 6300. The sample period starts in 2000 and 
ends in 2014. We exclude the following firms since they are purely advisory businesses 
or wire-transfer agents and therefore cannot be classified as lending institutions: SIC 
codes 6282 (investment advisors), 6211 (pure brokerage businesses) and 6199 (wire 
transfer businesses). The retained banks should have compensation data in Execucomp, 
stock returns data in CRSP and accounting data in Bankscope and COMPUSTAT. We also 
downloaded data from the following sources: corporate governance G and E indices 
from ISS (formerly known as RiskMetrics); data related to the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) from ProPublica, and institutional ownership data from the Thomson 
Reuters database. The definition of variables used and the source of variables are 
presented in Appendix 18. We provide the list of the sample in Appendix 19. The final 
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sample comprises 1,171 firm-year observations from 121 banks. We present the sample 
distribution by year in Panel A of Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1: Sample Distribution 
Panel A – Distribution by Year  
Year N % 
2000 33 2.82 
2001 36 3.07 
2002 40 3.42 
2003 41 3.50 
2004 45 3.84 
2005 59 5.04 
2006 68 5.81 
2007 77 6.58 
2008 77 6.58 
2009 110 9.39 
2010 113 9.65 
2011 117 9.99 
2012 117 9.99 
2013 120 10.25 
2014 118 10.08 
Total 1,171 100.00 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Bankscope 
The highest number of firms sampled in this study was recorded in the year 2013 
(n=120) out of 121 or in percentage terms approximately 10.25% and followed by 2014 
for 118 firms. The smallest number of samples is in the year 2000 for only 33 banks and 
only 2.82%.  
We present the summary statistics of CEO, top five, and management team 
compensation in Panel B of Table 4.1. We calculate pay ratio as measures of tournament 
incentives using data from ExecuComp. The average CEO total compensation is 
US$6,090.93 million, and the standard deviation is US$10,621.42 million.  
Panel B: Summary Statistics of CEO, Top Five, and Management Team Compensation 
Variable Mean (USD ‘000) Median (USD ‘000) Std Dev (USD ‘000) 
CEO Compensation    
-Total salary 793.00*** 750.00*** 460.27 
-Total cash/ current 
compensation 
1,653.52*** 901.52*** 2,540.97 
-Total contingent 
compensation 
5,277.03*** 1,969.34*** 10,529.60 
-Total compensation-TDC1 6,090.93*** 2,832.40*** 10,621.42 
    
Top Five Management Team    
-Total salary 2,507.97*** 2,287.51*** 1,358.43 
-Total cash/ current 
compensation 
5,736.90*** 2,903.61*** 9,651.93 
-Total contingent 
compensation 
14,843.90*** 5,188.89*** 26,465.19 
-Total compensation-TDC1 17,351.86*** 7,865.25*** 26,950.41 
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Figures are in thousands 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Bankscope and Execucomp 
The average total asset is US$121,691.630 million, and the standard deviation is 
US$384,822.650 million (please refer to Appendix 22). The average return on assets 
(ROA) is 1.72. Large financial institutions are included; this is unsurprising as ExecuComp 
favours larger banks (Fahlenbrach et al., 2010). All the continuous variables share the 
significant p-value. This indicates that all variables are not significantly equal to zero. For 
a better understanding of the key variables used in this study, we present the univariate 
test results (please refer to Appendix 23). Our initial findings can be seen from the 
univariate test. The EFFICIENCY index is higher for banks with lower than the median 
CPS regardless of the types of CPS. In term of the stock volatility, banks that have above 
the median CPS have lesser stock volatility. Banks with above the median CPS have lower 
insolvency risk. From these initial results, we suggest that firms that pay high CPS are 
less efficient but more stable than those banks that pay lower CPS. To understand the 
association between efficiency, risk, and CPS, we ran multivariate regressions. We 
discuss the methodology used in detail in the next section. 
4.4 Methodology 
4.4.1 CEO Pay Slice (CPS) 
We follow Bebchuk et al. (2011)) to proxy for rent-seeking inducements. Under the rent-
seeking inducement hypothesis, the CEO pay portion dominates the CPS. The rational of 
using CEO Pay Slice (CPS) to proxy for rent-seeking inducements is because CPS could 
represent the relative importance of the CEO as well as the degree to which the CEO is 
able to extracts rents (Bebchuk et al. (2011). The greater the CPS, the higher the chances 
of the CEO to have power and influence over the bank’s decision making. Using CPS as 
the proxy for rent-seeking inducements, we can control for any bank-specific 
    
All Management Team    
-Total salary 2,003.20*** 1,742.28*** 1,215.77 
-Total cash/ current 
compensation 
4,822.20*** 2,165.00*** 8,886.89 
-Total contingent 
compensation 
10,574.54*** 3,073.39*** 19,940.77 
-Total compensation-TDC1 12,610.04*** 5,101.00*** 20,490.06 
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characteristics that affect the average level of compensation in the bank’s top executive 
team. Furthermore, CPS has a rich set of relations with various range of aspects of bank’s 
performance, behaviour and has been trending up over time (Frydman, 2005; Frydman 
and Saks, 2010; Bebchuk et al. (2011)). In contrast, we use CPS with firm efficiency and 
behaviour of banks at any given time.  
 
Specifically, we use the following CEO Pay Slice (CPS): 
𝐶𝑃𝑆 =
𝐶𝐸𝑂
𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝐸𝑂
 
 
 (4.1) 
 
We calculate the above ratio successively using four definitions of pay, i.e.: 
1. Total (ExecuComp variable TDC1); 
2. Salary (The dollar value of the base salary (cash and non-cash)); 
3. Current (Salary plus Bonus); and 
4. Contingent (TDC1 minus salary and Bonus). 
Categorizing pay as such allows us to consider the effects of both short- and long-
term measures of compensation (also see Pissaris et al., 2010). Current salary and bonus 
proxy for short-term incentive measures, while the contingent portion of executive 
compensation proxies for long-term incentive measures. TDC1 from ExecuComp 
includes ‘…salary, bonuses, other annual compensation, total value of restricted stock 
granted, Black and Scholes value of stock options granted, long-term incentive payouts, 
and all other total incentive compensation’ following Bebchuk et al. (2011, p.9). 
Thus, we end up with a 1×4 matrix of CPS. The use of these alternative measures 
provides some important benefits. First, they allow us to capture more than one 
dimension of the CEO’s pay. Furthermore, since each ratio is relating the CEO’s pay to 
the pay of other employees, they diminish the effects of firm-specific characteristics that 
affect the average executive remuneration. 
4.4.2 Institutional Ownership 
This section draws heavily on Elyasiani et al. (2010). To compute institutional ownership, 
we use two measures, i.e. the proportion of shares held by institutional investors (IOPr) 
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and the standard deviation of the institutional shareholding proportions (IOV). To 
measure IOPr and IOV, we follow Elyasiani et al. (2010) and compute the variable using 
20 quarters (i.e., the last five years including the sample year) of data as follows: 
𝐼𝑂𝑃𝑟𝑖 =
∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑗𝐽𝑖
𝑗=1
20
𝑡=1
20
 
 
 
(4.2) 
 
where 𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
 is the proportion of bank 𝑖 held by investor 𝑗 in quarter 𝑡 (𝑡 = 1, 2… 20), and 
𝐽𝑖  is the number of institutional investors in bank 𝑖.  
𝐼𝑂𝑉𝑖 =
∑ 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣(𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 )
𝐽𝑖
𝑗=1
𝐽𝑖
 
 
 
(4.3) 
 
IOV is the average of the standard deviations of the quarterly IOPr across all institutional 
investors 𝑗 in bank 𝑖. The higher IOV, the lower is the institutional ownership volatility. 
4.4.3 Bank efficiency and risk 
4.4.3.1 Bank Efficiency 
In previous studies of the pay disparity- performance relationship, scholar commonly 
use reduced-form model (Yu & Van Luu, 2016). However, following Yu and Van Luu, 
(2016), we use translog cost function that is more suitable taking into consideration the 
unique nature of the banking industry i.e., the combination of labour, interest, and 
capital to produce banking services.  
 
We use the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) method to compute firm efficiency 
(Aigner et al., 1977; Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000; Bonin et al., 2005). We use SFA to 
estimate cost functions. The use of a cost-over-profit function is motivated by the work 
of (Pulley and Humphrey, 1993; Berger et al., 1996; Bonin et al., 2005). We first estimate 
the minimum cost frontier for the entire sample. The efficiency measure for a specific 
bank is its distance or gap from the frontier. We use the following specification for the 
cost frontier: 
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
(4.4) 
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Where 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the total cost for the 𝑖th bank in year 𝑡. 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is a vector of input prices, and  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents a bank’s array of products and services. The term 𝑣𝑖𝑡  stands for the error 
term, while 𝑢𝑖𝑡 denotes bank inefficiency. We apply a translog specification to the cost 
function in (4.4) based on the standard symmetry and homogeneity assumptions as in 
the literature (Bonin et al., 2005). Similar to Fries and Taci (2005), the translog cost 
function, opted in this study, takes the form; 
ln 𝑇𝐶 = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑛
𝑛=1
 ln 𝑌𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗ln𝑃𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1
+  
1
2
[∑
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗ln𝑌𝑖 ln𝑌𝑗 +
𝑛
𝑗=1
∑
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗 ln 𝑃𝑖 ln𝑃𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
]
+  ∑
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
ln 𝑌𝑖 ln 𝑃𝑗 + 𝐸𝑖 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.5) 
To estimate the stochastic cost efficiency frontier for banks, we use the maximum 
likelihood procedure of Jondrow, Lovell and Schmidt (1982) as follow:  
𝜎𝜀
2 = 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣 
2   and 𝛽 = 𝜎𝑢
2/𝜎𝜀 
2  
(4.6) 
 
Where, lnTC = the natural logarithm of total costs; ln Y is the natural logarithm of output 
quantities; ln  𝑃  is the natural logarithm of input prices; 𝐸𝑖  = V + U is as defined in 
equation (4.4); 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿, 𝛾 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜌  are coefficients to be estimated. We employ the 
intermediation approach following Sealey and Lindley (1977) in order to define bank 
inputs and outputs and assumes that banks use labour and capital in order to collect 
funds and transform them into loans and other earning assets. We follow this approach 
that is used in previous studies to estimate efficiency (Fries & Taci, 2005; Mamatzakis, 
Matousek, & Vu, 2015; Matousek & Tzeremes, 2016). Total cost is the sum of interest 
expenses and general operating expenses. For the inputs variables, we employ the price 
of labour and physical capital. The price of labour is measured as the ratio of personal 
expenses to total assets, and the price of physical capital is measured as the ratio of 
operating expenses to fixed assets. We use two banks output following Fries and Taci 
(2005). One is loans to customers and another output is deposits. Loans to customers 
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includes all loans to non-bank entities and loans to other banks. Deposits includes total 
deposits from customers and other banks. From equation 4.5, we take the efficiency 
scores from thus specification as dependent variable in regression to investigate the 
effect of CPS on bank performance. The efficiency score ranges from 0 to 1. The nearer 
to 1 the score is, the greater efficiency the bank achieve. 
4.4.3.2 Bank Risk 
We use one-year stock return volatility (SDAR) and daily stock return volatility (SDD) as 
analogues for bank risk. A stock volatility is the variation in its stock prices over a period 
of time. We use the standard deviation of daily and monthly stock returns to measure 
the stock return volatility. We collect both daily and monthly annual returns for each 
bank in the sample from year 2000 to year 2014. We retrieve stock returns from the 
CRSP database using the Eventus software. We calculate the standard deviation of stock 
returns for each bank for each year from 2000 to 2014 using both daily and monthly 
data. Each bank in the sample has one variable for SDAR (using monthly stock return) 
and one variable for SDD (using daily stock returns) for each year. Measures based on 
stock return standard deviation are used in volatility measures and indices traded on the 
market and are market-based14.  
Following Agoraki et al. (2011) (also see Soedarmono et al., 2013) we proxy the risk-
taking behaviour of banks by the Z-index defined as follows: 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
      (4.7) 
Where 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡  is the return on assets, 𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  is the total equity to total assets. 
𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 it is an estimate of the standard deviation of the rate of return on assets. The 
Z-score is directly related to a bank’s default risk (Agoraki et al., 2011).  
                                                     
 
 
14 Previous study by Core et al. (1999), Low (2009), Cheng et al. (2015), Lee et al. (2008) among others, 
use the standard deviation of either daily stock returns or monthly stock returns as a proxy for risk or 
stock volatility in their study. 
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We present a Pearson correlation matrix among the independent variables (please 
refer to Appendix 20). The results indicate all the independent variables are low and 
moderately correlated which confirms multicollinearity is not a problem. The 
correlations are low to moderate, between -0.07 and 0.18. We are therefore confident 
that the variables provide sufficient independent information and that multicollinearity 
is not an issue (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). To assess for severity of multicollinearity in the 
regressions, we compute variance inflation factors (VIF). VIF measures the extent to 
which the variance of the estimated coefficients is inflated due to collinearity among 
independent variables in the regression. The VIFs of the estimated coefficient in the 
regression on EFFICIENCY (please refer to Appendix 21). The average VIF for the 
regression is 1.24, and the VIFs for individual variable range from 1.02 to 1.77, and the 
tolerance values range from 0.57 to 0.98. Moreover, the variance inflation factors (VIF) 
for selected independent variables are very low, suggesting that no multicollinearity 
problems. All the VIFs are below 5 so that multicollinearity does not appear to be an 
issue. Multicollinearity is low when the variance inflation factors (VIFs) are below a rule-
of-thumb threshold value of 10 and the tolerances larger than 0.1 (see for example 
Kennedy 1992, and Chatterjee and Hadi 2012). Therefore, we do not find any evidence 
of multicollinearity in our sample. 
The descriptive statistics of the pay ratios, ownership, banks’ efficiency and risk 
variables in this study is presented in Appendix 22. The list of control and instrumental 
variables are presented in Appendix 18. 
4.4.4 Multiple Regressions 
We estimate the following regression model to examine how CPS affects the level of 
efficiency and risk of banks: 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑃𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖 +
𝛽6𝑁𝐸𝑊𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑂𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑂𝑉𝑖 +
𝛽10𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐺𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖 +
+𝛽13𝐷𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽14𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽15𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 +
𝛽16𝑇𝐴𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.8) 
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Where EFFICIENCY is the efficiency score derived from stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA) model. It takes the value between 0 to 1.  𝐶𝑃𝑆𝑖 is the main variable of interest that 
equals to the percentage of the CEO total compensation out of the total compensation 
of the top five executives. We include control variables in Equation (4.8) as suggested 
by prior efficiency literature. Definitions of all variables are presented in Appendix 18. 
We account for several corporate governance elements that may determine the 
efficiency scores or bank performance. First of all, we include 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖   and 
𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖 to control for the CEO age and CEO tenure. 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 is the age of 
the CEO (Bebchuk et al., 2011; Cornett, Marcus, & Tehranian, 2008; Mamatzakis & 
Bermpei, 2015; Mishra & Nielsen, 2000). 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖 represents the number of 
years the CEO has been with the firm (Cornett et al., 2008; Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015; 
Mishra & Nielsen, 2000). Firms that have more matured CEO develop more solid 
management skills. 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖 l is a dummy variable representing CEOs that are also the 
chairperson of their board (Core et al., 1999; K. W. Lee et al., 2008; Mamatzakis & 
Bermpei, 2015). CEOs earn excessive compensation when they also occupy the board 
chairmanship and increases the rent-seeking influence over the compensation process, 
hence affecting the banks performance (Core et al.  1999). 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖 takes a value 
of 1 for male CEOs (Hart, David, Shao, Fox, & Westermann-Behaylo, 2015; Newton, 
2015). Women and men are different in their leadership behaviour and these 
differences may affect board functioning, consequently the banks performance (Haan & 
Vlahu, 2015). 𝑁𝐸𝑊𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 is a dummy variable representing the arrival of a new CEO in 
the sample year (Kale et al., 2009)(Reddy et al., 2015).  𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 is a dummy 
variable representing CEOs aged over 60. It is a proxy for a CEO that is close to retirement 
(Kale et al., 2009).  
We also include external governance elements as the control variables in this study. 
We include 𝐼𝑂𝑃𝑖   and 𝐼𝑂𝑉𝑖. 𝐼𝑂𝑃𝑖  is the percentage of ﬁrm i owned by institutions over a 
5-year period (i.e., 20 quarters). The value of the coefﬁcient reported is for IOP × 100. 
𝐼𝑂𝑉𝑖  is measured as the average standard deviation of institutional shareholding 
proportions across all investors in a ﬁrm over a 5-year period (i.e., 20 quarters). Both 
elements for external governance are following (Attig et al., 2012; Elyasiani & Jia, 2010, 
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2008; Jafarinejad et al., 2015). 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖  is a dummy variable representing the years 2007 
to 2009, i.e., coinciding with the years of the global financial crisis. there is a negative 
impact of the financial crisis dummy on bank performance (Pathan & Faff, 2013). 𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖 
is a dummy variable representing the years’ post-SOX legislation, i.e., the year after 
2002. The 𝐺𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖 is equal to the sum of the G and E indices. The G-Index (i.e. the, 
governance index) is from Gompers et al. (2003) and the E-Index (i.e., entrenchment 
index) is from Bebchuk et al. (2009). Higher values of the 𝐺𝐸𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖 are associated with 
weaker shareholder rights and a more retrenched management.  𝐷𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖  is a 
dummy variable representing instances when at least one board member also owns 
shares in the bank (Core et al., 1999). Past literatures suggesting that banks with higher 
bank ownership perform worse compared to banks with lower board ownership ( see 
e.g., (Core et al.,, 1999; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012) 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖 is the ratio of long-term debt-
to-total assets. 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖  represents the number of board members (Aebi, Sabato, 
& Schmid, 2012; K. W. Lee et al., 2008; Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2015). As the proxy for 
bank size, we use the logarithm of total asset, 𝑇𝐴𝑖 (Agoraki et al., 2011; D. Al-Najjar, 
2015; Guo et al., 2015; Le & Jaeger, 2015; Reddy et al., 2015). 
Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression does not eliminate the endogeneity 
issue. There may be two possible issues here. First, there may be variables that affect 
both bank efficiency and CEO pay that we did not account for in our model. Second, in 
place of pay disparity impacting firm’s efficiency, it could be the case that highly skilful 
CEOs are attracted to efficient and well-performing banks in the first place.  
To account for the endogeneity issues, we use a two-stage least square (2SLS) 
regression analysis. The first stage regression is an ordinary least square regression 
(OLS). A 2SLS regression approach is used in the second specification. The predicted 
values of the pay ratio are first computed. The pay ratio is the dependent variable (first 
stage regression), and the independent variables comprise all exogenous variables 
(second stage) along with instrument variables. The predicted values of the pay ratio are 
used in the second regression in place of the original values. We follow the same 
procedure in the regressions of the bank risk measures. 
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To address the endogeneity issues, we include instrumental variables in our multiple 
regressions. Following Kale et al. (2009) and Kini and Williams (2012), we use the 
number of vice presidents (number of VPs), and a dummy variable representing CFOs 
who are also a VP of their organization (CFO is VP). The higher the number of VPs, the 
higher the rent-seeking inducements are due to the great competition among VPs to 
become the CEO. Similarly, if the CFO is also a VP, the likelihood of becoming a CEO 
differs from non-VPs. We also include industry-median figures of the efficiency and risk 
variables as instrument variables. 
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Bank Efficiency and Pay Disparity 
We present the regressions of bank efficiency in Table 4.2. Column II presents the OLS 
findings. CPSi is the ratio of the CEO’s total compensation-to-the total compensation of 
the top five executives including the CEO. Its coefficient is negative and significant at the 
1% level, suggesting that CEOs that capture a higher proportion of the compensation of 
the top five executives fail to improve the bank efficiency. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that larger rent-seeking inducements will result in poorer bank performance. 
We obtain similar findings using 2SLS regressions in Columns III and IV, i.e., the 
coefficient of CPS is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Using 
instrument variables, the coefficient of CPSi is -0.009, which suggests that a 1% increase 
in the pay disparity ratio leads to a decline in the bank efficiency score of -0.009. Using 
the simultaneous equation approach to 2SLS, we use the same instrument variables plus 
an additional one, i.e., the median SFA score of all banks in a given year. We present the 
results in Column IV and V of Table 4.2. The coefficient on the predicted pay ratio 
variable is -0.008 and significant at the 1% level. Thus, our findings are robust to 
alternative specifications, i.e., the inverse relationship between bank efficiency and 
rent-seeking inducements are economically and statistically significant. 
The findings support the hypothesis that an inverse association between high pay 
disparity and bank efficiency exists, and that banks with high pay disparity 
underperform. The results remain the same when the total compensation is replaced by 
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(i) salary- (CPSii) (Panel B), (ii) current-(CPSiii) (Panel C), and (iii) contingent- (CPSiv) 
(Panel D) forms of compensation, respectively in the Appendix 23. 
Table 4.2: Bank efficiency and CPS 
Panel A: Results of Efficiency on CPSi - Total Compensation 
 CPSi 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables EFFICIENCY EFFICIENCY EFFICIENCY CPSi 
CPSi -0.001*** -0.009***   
CEOAGE -0.147** -0.180 -0.179  
CEODUAL 0.093** 0.129** 0.115** -5.601 
CEOEXPERIENCE 0.009 0.016 0.024** -0.731 
CEOGENDER 0.012 0.001 0.006  
NEWCEO -0.002 -0.018 -0.010 -3.315* 
RETIRINGCEO -0.010 -0.011 -0.014  
IOPr 0.000*** 0.000 0.000**  
IOV -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***  
CRISIS 0.008 -0.008 -0.045 5.104 
SOX -0.148*** -0.092 -12.823  
GE INDEX -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.233** 
DIRECTOR OWN 0.026* -0.002 0.020  
DEBT 0.119** 0.076 0.058  
BOARDSIZE -0.010 -0.143*** -0.142*** -8.334*** 
TA 0.108*** 0.099*** 0.100*** -3.624 
TARP    -0.139 
L5IO    -0.000** 
EFFICIENCY MEDIAN   -111.994  
PREDICTED CPSI   -0.008***  
PREDICTED EFFICIENCY    19.690 
CFOISVP    5.503*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.707* 
Constant 0.171 0.802** 32.315 57.360*** 
R-Squared 0.47 0.14   
     
Number of Observation 1,045 763 756 756 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-
Statistics for joint relevance 
 9.083*** Instruments used 
in IV (2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
EFFICIENCY 
industry-year 
median 
Hansen J-statistic  1.434   
Wald chi2  458.540***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 6.902***   
First-stage F-statistic  3.880***   
EFFICIENCY is efficiency scores using Stochastic Frontier Analysis. CPSi is the percentage of the CEO total 
compensation out of the total compensation of the top five executives. CEOAGE is the logarithm of the CEO age. 
CEODUAL is a dummy variable of 1 if the CEO is also the chairman and 0 if otherwise. CEOEXPERIENCE is a dummy 
variable of 1 if the tenure of the CEO is more than seven years and 0 if otherwise. CEOGENDER is 1 if the CEO is a male 
and 0 if otherwise. NEWCEO is a dummy variable of 1 if there is a new appointment of CEO in the year and 0 if 
otherwise. RETIRINGCEO is a dummy variable of 1 if the age of the CEO is more than 60 and 0 if otherwise. IOV is the 
institutional ownership volatility calculated as the average of the standard deviations of the quarterly institutional 
shareholding proportions of the firm including the sample year and the four years preceding it (i.e., 20 quarters). IOPr 
is the proportion of shares held by institutional investors calculated as the aggregate shareholdings proportion of firm 
over 20 quarters. IOV is the institutional ownership volatility calculated as the average of the standard deviations of 
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the quarterly institutional shareholding proportions of the firm including the sample year and the four years preceding 
it (i.e., 20 quarters). Crisis is a dummy variable of 1 if the period is 2007-2009 and 0 if otherwise. SOX is a dummy 
variable of 1 if the year is 2002 onwards and 0 if the year is 2000 and 2001. GE INDEX is the percentage of the scores 
of the combination of G-Index and E-Index. DIRECTOR OWN is a dummy variable of 1 if the CEO has shares with the 
firm and 0 if otherwise. DEBT is the long-term debts divided by total assets. BOARDSIZE is the logarithm of number of 
the board members. TA is the logarithm of the total assets as a proxy for the size of the firm. TARP is a dummy variable 
of 1 if the bank is the recipient of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and 0 if otherwise. L5IO is the number of 
shares held by the largest five institutional ownership. EFFICIENCY MEDIAN is the industry-year median efficient 
scores using Stochastic Frontier Analysis. PREDICTED CPSi is the predicted CPSi (percentage of the CEO total 
compensation out of the total compensation of the top five executives) generated from the simultaneous regression. 
PREDICTED EFFICIENCY is the predicted efficiency scores (Stochastic Frontier Analysis) generated from the 
simultaneous regression. CFOISVP is a dummy variable of 1 if the CFO of the firm is one of the VPs. NUMBEROFVPS is 
the number of the vice presidents. 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Bankscope, Execucomp and Compustat 
4.5.2 Stock Return Volatility and Pay Disparity 
In Table 4.3, we present the results from running multiple regressions on the standard 
deviation of annual bank stock returns (SDAR). While CPS adversely affects bank 
efficiency, banks with lower SDAR are associated with higher CPS. Using OLS regression, 
the coefficient of CPSi (i.e., representing the slice of the top five executives’ pay that 
belongs to the CEO) is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
Results based on 2SLS regressions are presented in Column III, and the coefficient of 
CPSi (total CEO compensation divided by total compensation of top five management 
team) is negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient is -0.004, which suggests 
that a 1% increase in CPSi decreases the bank’s standard deviation in its annual stock 
returns by 0.004. We present the results from estimating the simultaneous equations in 
Columns IV and V. The coefficient of the predicted CPSi variable is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. Our results remain constant upon replacing total 
compensation by (i) salary- CPSii (Panel B), (ii) current- CPSiii (Panel C), and (iii) 
contingent- CPSiv (Panel D) forms of compensation, respectively (please refer to 
Appendix 24). The overall results support our hypothesis that the higher the disparity 
pay ratio between the CEO and the top five management team, the lower the top 
management team risk-taking propensity.  
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Table 4.3: Return Volatility and CPS 
Panel A: Results of Bank Return Volatility (Standard Deviation of Annual Stock Return-SDAR) on CPS- Total 
Compensation 
 CPSi 
 SD Annual Stock Return 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables SDAR SDAR SDAR CPSii 
CPSi -0.000*** -0.004***   
CEOAGE -0.086* -0.029 -0.102*  
CEODUAL 0.005 0.010 -0.000 -2.846 
CEOEXPERIENCE -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 -0.085 
CEOGENDER -0.030** -0.035** -0.028**  
NEWCEO 0.007 0.009 0.011 -2.283 
RETIRINGCEO 0.009* 0.009 0.013**  
IOPR -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*  
IOV -0.000* -0.000* -0.000**  
CRISIS 0.051*** 0.127*** -0.044 4.873 
SOX -0.037*** -0.022 0.042  
GE INDEX -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.138* 
DIRECTO OWN -0.003 -0.015 -0.004  
DEBT 0.149*** 0.142*** 0.133***  
BOARDSIZE 0.003 -0.043** -0.035** -9.564*** 
TA -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -1.195 
TARP    -0.293 
L5IO    -0.000*** 
SDAR MEDIAN   1.687  
PREDICTED CPSI   -0.003***  
PREDICTED SDAR    -27.735 
CFOISVP    5.575*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.748* 
Constant 0.346*** 0.457*** 0.352 59.913*** 
R-Squared 0.48 0.25   
     
Number of Observation 991 730 723 723 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic 
for joint relevance 
 9.309*** Instruments used 
in IV (2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
SDAR industry-
year median 
Hansen J-statistic  0.0420   
Wald chi2  490.260***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 25.323***   
First-stage F-statistic  3.780***   
SDAR is the standard deviation of annual stock return. CPSi is the percentage of the CEO total compensation out of 
the total compensation of the top five executives. CEOAGE is the logarithm of the CEO age. CEODUAL is a dummy 
variable of 1 if the CEO is also the chairman and 0 if otherwise. CEOEXPERIENCE is a dummy variable of 1 if the tenure 
of the CEO is more than seven years and 0 if otherwise. CEOGENDER is 1 if the CEO is a male and 0 if otherwise. 
NEWCEO is a dummy variable of 1 if there is a new appointment of CEO in the year and 0 if otherwise. RETIRINGCEO 
is a dummy variable of 1 if the age of the CEO is more than 60 and 0 if otherwise. IOV is the institutional ownership 
volatility calculated as the average of the standard deviations of the quarterly institutional shareholding proportions 
of the firm including the sample year and the four years preceding it (i.e., 20 quarters). IOPr is the proportion of shares 
held by institutional investors calculated as the aggregate shareholdings proportion of firm over 20 quarters. IOV is 
the institutional ownership volatility calculated as the average of the standard deviations of the quarterly institutional 
shareholding proportions of the firm including the sample year and the four years preceding it (i.e., 20 quarters). Crisis 
is a dummy variable of 1 if the period is 2007-2009 and 0 if otherwise. SOX is a dummy variable of 1 if the year is 2002 
onwards and 0 if the year is 2000 and 2001. GE INDEX is the percentage of the scores of the combination of G-Index 
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and E-Index. DIRECTOR OWN is a dummy variable of 1 if the CEO has shares with the firm and 0 if otherwise. DEBT is 
the long-term debts divided by total assets. BOARDSIZE is the logarithm of number of the board members. TA is the 
logarithm of the total assets as a proxy for the size of the firm. TARP is a dummy variable of 1 if the bank is the recipient 
of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and 0 if otherwise. L5IO is the number of shares held by the largest five 
institutional ownership. SDARMEDIAN is the industry-year median standard deviation of annual stock return. 
PREDICTED CPSi is the predicted CPSi (percentage of the CEO total compensation out of the total compensation of the 
top five executives) generated from the simultaneous regression. PREDICTED SDAR is the predicted standard deviation 
of stock return generated from the simultaneous regression. CFOISVP is a dummy variable of 1 if the CFO of the firm 
is one of the VPs. NUMBEROFVPS is the number of the vice presidents. 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
For robustness of analysis, we repeat the regressions from Table 4.3 but using the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns as the dependent variable. We present the 
findings in Appendix 25. The results remain the same, i.e. all the variables representing 
CPS (CPSi, CPSii, CPSiii, and CPSiv) exert a downward and statistically significant effect 
on the measures of standard deviation. 
4.5.3 Firm Insolvency Risk and Pay Disparity 
Using standard deviation in bank stock returns does not provide a full picture of a bank’s 
solvency. Many banks suffer from stock price declines but are then rescued by their 
government as occurred during the 2007-2008 subprime mortgage crisis. Thus, besides 
share price fluctuations, it is important to consider a measure that captures a bank’s 
solvency risk since not all banks that suffer a decline in their share prices are rescued by 
their governments. Solvency risk due to unsystematic risk can be the result of a decline 
in the bank’s capital, or a sudden deterioration in the bank’s loan book, or internal fraud 
and the like. As explained earlier, we calculate the Z-score to proxy for a bank’s solvency 
risk. The Z-score shows the number of standard deviations a bank’s ROA must drop to 
below its expected value before equity is said to be depleted (Soedarmono et al., 2013). 
The lower the bank’s Z-score, the higher is its probability of default. We perform the 
multiple regressions on the Z-scores and present our findings in Table 4.4. 
The coefficient of CPSi is positive and statistically significant in the 2SLS regressions, 
i.e., high values of CPSi are associated with high Z-scores. Note that the Z-score is 
inversely related to bankruptcy/insolvency risk. Thus, consistent with the findings on the 
stock market-based risk measures, we find that the pay disparity between the CEO and 
the rest of the employees is higher at banks with little bankruptcy risk. The findings 
support our hypothesis that stable firms are more likely to afford high CPS. The Z-score 
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in Table 4.4 is based on a three-year rolling window. For robustness, we compute the Z-
scores using a five-year rolling window and present our findings in Appendix 26. The 
results remain consistent.  
Table 4.4: Bank Stability and CPS- Z-Score 3 
Panel A: Results of Bank Stability (ln(Z-Score3)) on CPSi - Total Compensation 
 CPSi 
 Bank Stability 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables ln(Z-Score3) ln(Z-Score3) ln(Z-Score3) CPSi 
CPSi 0.006* 0.102***   
CEOAGE 1.227 0.441 0.595  
CEODUAL 0.160 0.288 0.422 -4.291 
CEOEXPERIENCE 0.534*** 0.573*** 0.476*** -1.185 
CEOGENDER 0.210 0.483 0.374  
NEWCEO -0.126 -0.063 -0.108 -2.436 
RETIRINGCEO 0.038 0.070 0.116  
IOPR -0.001** 0.000 -0.001  
IOV -0.000 0.000 0.000  
CRISIS 0.086 -1.250*** -0.984** 4.363 
SOX 0.375 0.979 1.385*  
GE INDEX 0.017** 0.002 0.013 0.145* 
DIRECTOR OWN 0.127 0.125 -0.166  
DEBT -1.961*** -1.496* -0.906  
BOARDSIZE -0.427 0.485 0.316 -7.417** 
TA 0.131* 0.294** 0.228** -1.454** 
TARP    -0.358 
L5IO    -0.000** 
ZSCORE3 MEDIAN   0.003  
PREDICTED CPSI   0.078***  
PREDICTED LNZSCORE3    6.072 
CFOISVP    5.093*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.742* 
Constant 1.226 -3.615 -2.829 43.942*** 
R-Squared 0.16 0.00   
     
Number of Observation 1,030 751 747 747 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic for 
joint relevance 
 8.427*** Instruments 
used in IV 
(2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
Ln(z-score3) 
industry-year 
median 
Hansen J-statistic  0.274   
Wald chi2  121.110***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 11.001***   
First-stage F-statistic  3.840***   
Ln(z-score3) is the logarithm of the z-score calculated using the three-year rolling window. CPSi is the percentage of 
the total compensation of CEO out of the total compensation of the top five executives. CEOAGE is the logarithm of 
the CEO age. CEODUAL is a dummy variable of 1 if the CEO is also the chairman and 0 if otherwise. CEOEXPERIENCE is 
a dummy variable of 1 if the tenure of the CEO is more than seven years and 0 if otherwise. CEOGENDER is 1 if the 
CEO is a male and 0 if otherwise. NEWCEO is a dummy variable of 1 if there is a new appointment of CEO in the year 
and 0 if otherwise. RETIRINGCEO is a dummy variable of 1 if the age of the CEO is more than 60 and 0 if otherwise. 
IOV is the institutional ownership volatility calculated as the average of the standard deviations of the quarterly 
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institutional shareholding proportions of the firm including the sample year and the four years preceding it (i.e., 20 
quarters). IOPr is the proportion of shares held by institutional investors calculated as the aggregate shareholdings 
proportion of firm over 20 quarters. IOV is the institutional ownership volatility calculated as the average of the 
standard deviations of the quarterly institutional shareholding proportions of the firm including the sample year and 
the four years preceding it (i.e., 20 quarters). Crisis is a dummy variable of 1 if the period is 2007-2009 and 0 if 
otherwise. SOX is a dummy variable of 1 if the year is 2002 onwards and 0 if the year is 2000 and 2001. GE INDEX is 
the percentage of the scores of the combination of G-Index and E-Index. DIRECTOR OWN is a dummy variable of 1 if 
the CEO has shares with the firm and 0 if otherwise. DEBT is the long-term debts divided by total assets. BOARDSIZE 
is the logarithm of number of the board members. TA is the logarithm of the total assets as a proxy for the size of the 
firm. TARP is a dummy variable of 1 if the bank is the recipient of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and 0 if 
otherwise. L5IO is the number of shares held by the largest five institutional ownership. ZSCCORE3 MEDIAN is the 
industry-year median standard deviation of daily stock return. PREDICTED CPSi is the predicted CPSi (percentage of 
the total compensation of the CEO out of the total compensation of the top five executives) generated from the 
simultaneous regression. PREDICTEDLNZSCORE3 is the predicted standard deviation of daily stock return generated 
from the simultaneous regression. CFOISVP is a dummy variable of 1 if the CFO of the firm is one of the VPs. 
NUMBEROFVPS is the number of the vice presidents. 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
4.5.4 Institutional Ownership, Efficiency, Risk, and Pay Disparity 
The OLS regressions in Table 4.2 suggest that there exists a positive association between 
institutional ownership and bank efficiency exists. The coefficient of the variable IOP is 
positive and statistically significant. Conversely, the coefficient of IOV, which represents 
the standard deviation in the quarterly shareholdings of institutional investors, is 
negative and statistically significant. Thus, banks that are less efficient are associated 
with higher volatility in the shareholdings of their institutional investors. 
4.6 Conclusions 
This paper empirically examines how CEO pay slice (CPS) affects banks' efficiency and 
risk levels. We follow the measurement of pay disparity introduces by Bebchuk et al. 
(2011). CPS measures the gap between CEO pay and the pay of the bank's top five 
executives. Bebchuk et al. (2011) defined CPS as the fraction of the total compensation 
of the firm’s top-five executive team captured by the CEO. We extend the CPS measures 
by Bebchuk et al. (2011) into three other ratios namely, CPSii- salary, CPSiii- current and 
CPSiv- contingent.  The higher the CPS, the larger the disparity in CEO pay is. We find 
that higher pay disparity is associated with lower bank efficiency. Thus, the higher 
compensation of the CEO does not translate into higher bank efficiency.  
We have made a contribution to the literature by documenting the link between 
CPS and bank efficiency and risk. Despite the public outcry around the CEOs pay at the 
largest US financial institutions, there are very limited number of papers that examine 
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the link between CEO pay and bank efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, the only 
study that directly addresses the topic is Matousek and Tzeremes (2016). The authors 
study the effect of CEO compensation on bank’s technical efficiency using the non-
parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). According to the authors, a minimum 
salary level exists below which, CEO compensation is negatively related to bank 
performance which is inconsistent with the findings based on parametric approaches. 
We use parametric Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) as a measure of efficiency.  
We provide evidence that high CPS affects bank efficiency. The CPS coefficient is 
negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that CEOs that capture a higher 
proportion of the compensation of the top five executives fail to improve the bank 
efficiency. This is consistent with the hypothesis that larger rent-seeking inducements 
will result in poorer bank performance. The results remain the same with all four types 
of CPS breakdowns i.e., (i) total compensation- (CPSi) (ii) salary- (CPSii), (iii) current-
(CPSiii), and (iv) contingent- (CPSiv). Thus, our findings are robust to alternative 
specifications, i.e., the inverse relationship between bank efficiency and rent-seeking 
inducements are economically and statistically significant.  
Conversely, CPS is inversely associated with the standard deviation of the bank's 
stock returns and its bankruptcy risk. In our analysis, we use the standard deviation of 
one-year stock return volatility (SDAR) and daily stock return volatility (SDD) as 
analogues for bank risk. We also use the bankruptcy risk measure, Z- Score following 
Agoraki et al. (2011) to proxy the risk-taking behaviour of banks since not all banks that 
suffer a decline in their share prices are rescued by their governments. The Z-score is 
directly related to a bank’s default risk (Agoraki et al., 2011). The Z-score shows the 
number of standard deviations a bank’s ROA must drop to below its expected value 
before equity is said to be depleted (Soedarmono et al., 2013). The lower the bank’s Z-
score, the higher is its probability of default.  
Our finding reveals that, our measures of risks in our study support our hypotheses 
H2 and H3. Our H2 states that high pay disparity positively affects the bank’s risk and H3 
states that high pay disparity is associated with higher insolvency risk. Our results show 
that the coefficient of CPSi (total CEO compensation divided by total compensation of 
top five management team) is negative and significant at the 1% level for all tests that 
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we conduct (OLS, 2SLS and simultaneous equations). Our results remain constant upon 
replacing total compensation by (i) salary- CPSii, (ii) current- CPSiii, and (iii) contingent- 
CPSiv, respectively. The overall results support our hypothesis that the higher the 
disparity pay ratio between the CEO and the top five management team, the lower the 
top management team risk-taking propensity.  
H3 states that banks with high pay disparity is associated with higher insolvency or 
bankruptcy risk. The coefficient of CPS is positive and statistically significant in the 2SLS 
regressions, i.e., high values of CPS are associated with high Z-scores. Note that the Z-
score is inversely related to bankruptcy/insolvency risk. Thus, consistent with the 
findings on the stock market-based risk measures for our H2 above, we find that the pay 
disparity between the CEO and the top five management team is higher at banks with 
little bankruptcy risk. The findings support our hypothesis that stable firms are more 
likely to afford high CPS. Thus, stable banks are associated with high CEO pay disparity.  
We also find that institutional shareholdings and stability positively contribute to 
bank’s efficiency. We use two measures following Elyasiani et al. (2010), i.e. the 
proportion of shares held by institutional investors (IOP) and the standard deviation of 
the institutional shareholding proportions (IOV) to proxy for stability of institutional 
investors. The higher IOV, the lower is the institutional ownership volatility. The 
coefficient of the variable IOP is positive and statistically significant. Conversely, the 
coefficient of IOV, which represents the standard deviation in the quarterly 
shareholdings of institutional investors, is negative and statistically significant. Thus, 
banks that are less efficient are associated with higher volatility in the shareholdings of 
their institutional investors. 
We also find additional findings that the  2008 global financial crisis period directly 
affected banks' risk-taking behaviour among management team. We use the variable 
CRISIS  that takes the value of 1 if the period is 2007-2009 and 0 if otherwise. The 
coefficient of the variable CRISIS is positive and significant at 1% level on the regression 
on the stock market-based risk measures (standard deviation of stock returns). We find 
consistent findings on the analysis of the insolvency risk measures on the variable 
CRISIS. The coefficient of CRISIS  is negative and significant at 1% level. Note that the 
lower the Z-score is, the higher the bankruptcy/insolvency risk. Thus, during the global 
150 
 
 
 
financial crisis, the stock prices of banks are volatile and the insolvency risk of banks are 
higher.  
We do not find any significant result on the analysis of the relationship between the 
financial crisis and bank efficiency. Taken together, our results are consistent with our 
hypothesis that higher CPS is indeed associated with rent-seeking theory and agency 
theory. Our research is not only contributing to a wide range of literatures on bank 
efficiency and risk, but also provides several practical implications for regulators in 
monitoring banks’ operations and excessive risk-taking behaviour among banks 
managements. Our findings provide a practically useful way to assess the association 
between the CEO pay slice (CPS) with the level of efficiency and insolvency risk of the 
banks. Indeed, it is known that higher level of CPS may not always accurately reflect 
“true’’ level of bank efficiency and risks. It is important for institutional investors in 
assessing the bank efficiency and risk managed by CEO that have large pay disparity 
between the CEO and other top management teams.  
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Chapter 5 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The financial crisis in 2008, lead to ongoing debate on whether the bankruptcy law is 
efficient in rehabilitating financial constraints firms as well as the issues on government 
bailout practises for failures institutions in the US. This chapter summarises and 
evaluates the major findings of this thesis regarding the bidders’ performance after 
M&A involving financial constraints targets, earning management practices among firms 
that involve in restructuring and the relationship between bank efficiency and CEO pay 
disparity. Two of the research findings employ M&A and restructuring as the sample; 
our third research uses the banking sector as the sample. 
The main objectives of our first research paper are the corporate performance of 
bidders that acquired FCTs and bankrupt targets. We also extend our research scope in 
analysing the effect of the discount or premium in the deals. We find some consistent 
results of bidders that acquire FCTs or bankruptcy targets.  
Previous literature has not being consistent regarding the benefits of acquiring FCTs 
or bankruptcy targets. In addition to the recorded M&A and the deals value that have 
been reported as being increased since before the 2008 global financial crisis (Thomson 
Reuters, 2014), the deal value in the first three-quarters of 2014 reached almost US$1 
trillion (KPMG, 2015). There is a trend for bidders to acquire FCTs or bankruptcy targets. 
There are limited studies on the characteristics of bidders and targets engaged in M&A 
involving FCTs or bankruptcy targets. Furthermore, the analysis of comparing both the 
FCTs and bankruptcy targets with healthy targets in the same research is still lacking. We 
aim to fill the gap in the literature by having a comparison of these types of targets.  
After thoroughly conducting econometrics analysis, our final findings are:  
(i) that bidders of financially constrained targets (FCTs) pay lower M&A premiums; 
and  
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(ii) they earn higher M&A announcement period CARs than bidders of 
unconstrained targets.  
Even though the application of the Kaplan-Zingales Index (1997) has been applied by 
Khatami et al. (2015) to measure the level of financial constraints of targets, the findings 
of this study are contrary to their findings. They claim that financial constraints of target 
companies significantly increase acquisition premiums for targets. In our analysis, 
however, we find that financially constrained targets are acquired at discounts. As a 
robustness test, we conducted a similar test with another sample; we report a consistent 
result with the FCTs sample, especially in terms of corporate performance of bidders’ 
post-acquisition. The findings do not suggest that the acquisitions of FCTs or bankruptcy 
targets are better than the acquisitions of non-FCTs or non-bankruptcy. We also observe 
that the long-run stock performance of bidders of FCTs and their operating performance 
is not remarkable. However, this empirical research establishes the merits of acquiring 
FCTs or bankruptcy targets as a corporate reorganization strategy using market-based 
data and investors’ perceptions of value. 
Our main objective of the second empirical research is to examine the level of EM 
activities among the targets involved in restructuring in carve-outs, sell-offs, spin-offs, 
and other divestitures. We also analyse the extent of the level of EM activities of targets, 
and the impact on the targets’ performance. Specifically, we also analyse the impact of 
the level of EM activities with the changes in operational performance, ΔROA, the short-
term stock performance of targets, CARs, long-term stock performance of targets, and 
BHARs as well as the stock volatility of stock returns of targets.  
Our empirical findings for our second research reports that, on average, target 
companies manage earnings downward through both accrual-based and real EM the 
year before the announcement, in the year of the announcement and continue even 
after the announcements. We find that there are differences in ∆ROA, CARs, BHARs and 
SDARs between AEM and BEM groups associated with EM activities. We find that there 
is a negative relationship between the ∆ROA and the EM for the carve-out sample. We 
do not find any significant coefficient of EM proxy for other samples. 
From an economics perspective, the findings suggest that firms that manage their 
earnings above the industry year median EM index normally have fewer increments in 
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the changes in ROA. Thus, firms are believed to have reversed their previous transaction 
in later years after the restructuring year. As our second empirical research is more on 
an exploratory basis, there is a need for further analysis on each type of restructuring in 
more detail. As mentioned earlier, the results for corporate performance are mixed. The 
results for CARs and BHARs also show the same pattern as the changes in ROA. We also 
find a negative relationship between the post-SDARs and EM. Firms that manage 
earnings AEM have lesser stock volatility compared with firms that manage BEM. From 
an economics perspective, we can interpret these findings as an explanation of the need 
for managers to manage earnings to hype or smooth the stock prices. 
Our final empirical chapter renders new evidence on the relationship of CEO pay 
disparity on bank efficiency and risk-taking behaviour among bank managers. We report 
that CEO pay disparity has an inverse effect on bank efficiency. Literature on CEO and 
pay disparity with relation to bank efficiency is limited. Our main supposition is that high 
CEO pay disparity is associated with lower bank efficiency and more stability in terms of 
stock returns volatility. In addition, we inspect whether the existence of the institutional 
investors moderate the association between the CEO pay disparity and bank efficiency. 
We document that banks with a higher efficiency index have higher institutional 
ownership and less stability of ownership. We extend our analysis by including a GE-
Index, a combination of G-Index and E-Index that represents the proxy for corporate 
governance in our last empirical research. We find that firms with a high efficiency index 
have a lower GE-Index. From an economics perspective, this means that highly efficient 
banks have a greater tendency towards having a stronger shareholder right or lower 
management entrenchment.  
Econometrically, we use the HSM to correct for a selection bias, omitted variables 
and endogeneity issues. Our results are robust across three different econometric 
approaches and confirm that a firm with high CEO pay disparity is less efficient than 
firms that have lower CEO pay disparity. 
Our empirical results provide a detailed analysis on the differential compensation 
components of CEO’s and the top management team’s compensation package and how 
it could affect bank performance. Our findings suggest that the tournament theory does 
not really explain the actual condition in the real world when it comes to the efficiency 
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level of bank’s productivity and stock performance. The high pay disparity between the 
CEO and the rest of the top management suggests that it could lead to adverse results. 
The existence of institutional ownership could moderate the aggressive action of CEOs 
or CEO hubris. Supporting previous research on the benefits of having good corporate 
governance in place could provide a good internal monitoring system in firms.  
The findings of our third essay on banking are beneficial to not only to the banking 
industry and academia, but also to policy makers. The findings serve to support evidence 
to the newly imposed regulation by the Dodd-Frank Act in the US. This act imposed 
tighter regulation in 2010 after the financial crisis through the SEC; it states that 
companies are required to produce and present their CEO-TMT ratios by 2018. The new 
implementation is needed to repair the disastrous loss of trust in corporate leaders that 
is destroying the market economy.  
The detailed findings on the different categories of compensation that we have 
presented in this research are useful for the policy maker. This is because the need to 
protect the various arrays of investors and consumers means that detailed disclosure by 
companies is needed, not just the total CPS. This is important as different categories of 
pay will have a different impact on decision making. To date there are no clear detailed 
guidelines on the disclosures. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Variables Definition- Mergers and Acquisitions of Targets in Corporate 
Financial Distress and Bankruptcy 
Variables Definition 
Dependent variables  
CARS The cumulative abnormal return of the bidders in percentage over a three-day or 
four-day event window (-2, 0) and (-3,0) where 0 is the day of the announcements.  
BHRS The buy-and-hold returns in percentage for bidders for the 12 and 36 months 
following the announcement 
BHARS The buy-and-hold abnormal returns in percentage for bidders for the 12 and 36 
months following the announcement 
ROAS The return on assets ratio of the bidder one year prior to the M&A announcement 
and 1 to 3 years’ post M&A announcement 
DISCOUNT/PREMIUM Percentage of the deal value divided by the targets market value four weeks prior to 
the announcement 
FC A dummy variable of 1 representing firms that are fall under the financially 
constrained zone according to Kaplan-Zingales Index (1997) and 0 representing 
healthy firms 
BANKRUPTCY A dummy variable of 1 if the seller is bankrupt or goes bankrupt during the 
transaction and 0 if otherwise. 
 
Explanatory Variables  
FC A dummy variable of 1 representing firms that are fall under the financially 
constrained zone according to Kaplan-Zingales Index (1997) and 0 representing 
healthy firms 
BANKRUPTCY A dummy variable of 1 if the seller is bankrupt or goes bankrupt during the 
transaction and 0 if otherwise. 
DISCOUNT/PREMIUM Percentage of the deal value divided by the targets market value four weeks prior to 
the announcement 
 
Control Variables  
ACA Equals to 1 if the bidder only acquired certain assets only 
TECHBUBBLE a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for years 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 and 0 
otherwise 
SOX A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for years from 2002 onwards and 0 
otherwise 
CRISIS a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 
and 0 otherwise 
RELATED equals to 1 if the buyer’s and target’s SICs are equal at the two-digit level  
MULTIPLEBID Equals to number of bidders 
FRIENDLY equals to 0 if the bid status is friendly and 1 if hostile 
ICR Interest coverage ratio of the bidder calculated as EBIT divided by interest expenses 
ROEBIDDER Return on equity of the bidder 
COMPLETION Is measured as the number of days between deal closing and announcement date. 
ALLCASH Equals to 1 if the deal is financed by all cash 
TENDEROFFER Equals to 1 if the deal is tender offer 
TACOUNT Equals to number of target’s advisor 
AACOUNT Equals to number of bidder’s advisor 
SIZE Log of book value of total assets of the bidder 
SIZETARGET Log of book value of total assets of the target 
DEBTRATIO The bidder’s total liabilities divided by market value of equity, as of four weeks prior 
to the announcement 
TECHTARGET Equals 1 if the target is a high-tech firm 
TECHBIDDER Equals 1 if the bidder is a high-tech firm 
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TOBIN’S Q Equals to market value of assets (market value of equity- book value of equity + total 
assets) scaled by total assets  
TARGETADVISOR Equals 1 if the target has an advisor and 0 if otherwise 
MACCTIVITY Equals the logarithm of total value of the mergers and acquisition in the same year 
IMR Equals to the inverse mill ratios 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from COMPUSTAT, Thomson One Banker, CRSP, and statista.com 
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Appendix 2: Correlation matrix for the dependent variables in probit regression (first-stage) 
This table presents a Pearson correlation matrix of key variables of interest for the sample of firms included in our sample. The sample covers for 
all control variables for the period of 1985 to 2012. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
DEBTRATIO 1 1                  
ICR 2 -0.01 1                 
SIZE 3 0.05
* 
-0.01 1                
RELATED 4 -0.1* -0.01 -0.13* 1               
CRISIS 5 -0.01 0.02 0.10* 0.02 1              
SOX 6 -0.03 0.03* 0.14* 0.04* 0.54* 1             
ALLCASH 7 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.14* 0.09* 0.08* 1            
FRIENDLY 8 0.03 0.00 0.17* -0.42* 0.02 0.09* -0.44* 1           
AACOUNT 9 0.02 -0.01 0.17* -0.12* 0.08* 0.14* -0.29* 0.39* 1          
SIZETARGET 10 0.02 -0.03 0.59* 0.10* 0.09* 0.13* 0.07* -0.12* 0.13* 1         
ACA 11 -0.03 0.01 -0.12* 0.29* -0.05* -0.14* 0.39* -0.78* -0.45* 0.09* 1        
TENDEROFFER 12 0.04
* 
0.02 0.10* -0.21* 0.04* -0.01 0.10* 0.29* 0.17* -0.01 -0.26* 1       
MULTIPLEBID 13 0.01 -0.01 0.06* -0.03* -0.02 -0.03* -0.04* 0.08* 0.13* 0.06* -0.12* 0.14* 1      
MAACTIVITY 14 0.03 0.00 0.07* -0.06* -0.10* -0.14* -0.10* 0.16* 0.09* 0.02 -0.16* 0.06* -0.02 1     
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TACOUNT 15 0.00 -0.01 0.22* -0.28* 0.09* 0.14* -0.34* 0.69* 0.52* 0.04* -0.68* 0.30* 0.17* 0.12* 1    
COMPLETION 16 0.00 -0.01 0.08* 0.11* -0.01 -0.04* 0.17* -0.17* -0.13* 0.11* 0.13* -0.10* -0.01 -0.02 -0.12* 1   
TECHTARGET 17 0.02 -0.05* -0.06* 0.01 -0.11* -0.14* -0.06* 0.02 0.02 0.08* -0.01 -0.01 0.04* 0.01 0.02 -0.03 1  
TECHBIDDER 18 0.03
* 
-0.04* -0.22* 0.07* -0.10* -0.16* -0.01 -0.15* -0.04* 0.05* 0.12* -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.10* 0.01 0.56
* 
1 
*statistically significant at the 5% margin; and **statistically significant at the 1% margin.
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Appendix 3: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the first stage regression 
This table presents a Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of key variables of interest for the 
sample of firms included in our sample. The sample covers for all control variables for 
the period of 1985 to 2012. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
FRIENDLY 3.21 0.311253 
ACA 2.79 0.358744 
TACOUNT 2.39 0.418006 
SIZEBLOG 1.88 0.530753 
SIZETLOG 1.69 0.590526 
TECHBIDDER 1.64 0.611011 
SARBANES 1.57 0.637914 
TECHTARGET 1.48 0.674106 
AACOUNT 1.46 0.685923 
ALLCASH 1.45 0.689575 
FINCRISIS 1.42 0.704756 
TENDEROFFER 1.25 0.799079 
RELATED 1.24 0.809573 
MAACTIVITY 1.09 0.920127 
COMPLETION 1.08 0.925796 
BIDCOUNT 1.07 0.937945 
INTCOVBIDDER 1.01 0.985511 
DEBTRATIO 1.01 0.986937 
Mean 1.60  
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Appendix 4: Correlation matrix for the dependent variables in multiple regressions (second-stage) 
This table presents a Pearson correlation matrix of key variables of interest for the sample of firms included in our sample. The sample covers for 
all control variables for the period of 1985 to 2012. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
FC 1 1 
                    
PREMIUM 2 0.0 1 
                   
DEBT- 
RATIO 
3 0.0 0.0 1 
                  
ICR 4 -0.1* 0.0 -0.0 1 
                 
SIZE 5 -01* 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 
                
RELATED 6 0.0 0.0 0.0* 0.0 -0.1* 1 
               
CRISIS 7 0.0 0.0 -0.1* 0.0 0.1* 0.0 1 
              
SOX 8 -0.1* 0.0 0.0 0.0* 0.1* 0.0* 0.5* 1 
             
ALLCASH 9 -0.2* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1* 0.1* 0.1* 1 
            
FRIENDLY 10 -0.2* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2* -0.4* 0.0 0.1* -0.4* 1 
 
          
ACCOUNT 11 0.1* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2* -0.1* 0.1* 0.1* -0.3* 0.4* 1           
SIZETARGET 12 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6* 0.1* 0.13* 0.1* 0.1* 
-
0.1* 
0.1* 1 
 
        
ACA 13 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1* 0.3* -0.0* -0.1* 0.4* 
-
0.8* 
-0.4* 0.1* 1         
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TENDER-
OFFER 
14 0.0 0.0 0.0* 0.0 0.1* -0.2* 0.0* 0.0 0.1* 0.3* 0.2* -0.0 -0.3* 1        
MULTIPLEBID 15 -0.1* 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1* 0.3* -0.1* -0.1* 0.4* 
-
0.8* 
-0.5* 0.1* 1.0 0.1* 1       
MAACTIVITY 16 0.0 0.0 0.0* 0.0 0.1* -0.2* 0.0* 0.0 0.1* 0.3* 0.2* 0.0 -0.3* 0.1* 0.0 1      
TACOUNT 17 0.1* -0.0 0.00 -0.01 0.2* -0.3* 0.1* 0.1* -0.3* 0.7* 0.5* 0.0* -0.7* 0.3* 0.2* 0.1* 1     
COMPLETION 18 0.1* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1* -0.0* 0.0 -0.0* -0.0* 0.1* 0.1* 0.1* -0.1* -0.1* 0.0 0.0 -0.1* 1.0    
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
TECHTARGET 19 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1* -0.1* -0.1* -0.1* -0.1* 0.2* 0.1* 0.0 -0.2* 0.0 0.0* 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0   
TECHBIDDER 20 0.1* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2* -0.3* 0.0* 0.1* -0.3* 0.7* 0.5* 0.0* -0.7* 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1* 0.0 0.6* 1.0  
IMR 21 -0.1* 0.1* 0.0 0.0 0.01* 0.1* 0.0 -0.0* 0.2* 
-
0.2* 
-0.1* 0.1* 0.1* 0.0 
-
0.2* 
-
0.1* 
-0.2* 0.1* 
-
0.6* 
-
05* 
1.0 
*statistically significant at the 5% margin; and **statistically significant at the 1% margin. 
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Appendix 5: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the second stage regression 
This table presents a Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of key variables of interest for the 
sample of firms included in our sample. The sample covers for all control variables for 
the period of 1985 to 2012. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
IMR 5.03 0.19869 
FRIENDLY 3.6 0.277558 
ACA 3.03 0.330141 
TACOUNT 2.51 0.398885 
TECHBIDDER 2.27 0.441315 
TECHTARGET 2.11 0.47386 
SIZEBLOG 1.9 0.525704 
ALLCASH 1.87 0.535127 
SIZETLOG 1.77 0.566403 
SARBANES 1.62 0.6191 
AACOUNT 1.54 0.648282 
FINCRISIS 1.43 0.697379 
INTCOVBIDDER 1.37 0.728218 
RELATED 1.26 0.792108 
TENDEROFFER 1.26 0.794913 
BIDCOUNT 1.18 0.85006 
COMPLETION 1.13 0.885101 
MAACTIVITY 1.1 0.907821 
FCTPREMIUM 1.05 0.952624 
DEBTRATIO 1.04 0.962816 
PREMIUM 1.01 0.986312 
Mean 1.86  
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Appendix 6: Variable Definition- Accrual-based EM and Real EM Activities Around Corporate 
Reorganization and Restructuring 
Dependent variables used in this study 
Variable  Variable Definition Source 
Measures of earnings management  
TOTAL EM Earnings management proxy calculated based on Jones 
(1999) model and Roychowdhury (2006).  
EM is calculated based on whether a firm is classified as an 
earning management firm-year observation or not. EM 
takes the value of 1 if either of the real earnings 
management activities aggregate proxies either (RM_1 or 
RM_2) or discretionary accruals is above the industry-year 
median following the method by Zang (2012) and Cohen 
and Zarowin (2010).  
Discretionary accruals (DA) are estimated using the cross-
sectional Jones (1991) model. Abnormal cash from 
operations are estimated as the deviations from the 
predicted values from the following industry-year 
regression: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
 = 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2  
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘3
△ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where OCF is cash flow from operations (Compustat data 
item 308 minus Compustat data item 124); SALES are 
annual sales revenues (Compustat data item 12) and 
Assets are total assets (Compustat data item 6). Abnormal 
production costs are estimated as the deviations from the 
predicted values from the following industry-year 
regression: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
 = 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2  
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘3
△ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘4
△ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where PROD are production costs, defined as the sum of 
costs of goods sold (Compustat data item 41) and change 
in inventory during the year (Compustat data item 3). 
Abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated as the 
deviations from the predicted values from the following 
industry-year regression: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
 = 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2  
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where DISX are discretionary expenses during the year, 
and are defined as the sum of advertizing expenses 
(Compustat data item 45), R&D expenses (Compustat data 
item 46) and SGandA (Compustat data item 189). 
 
Derived 
RM_1 Following the method by Zang (2012) and Cohen and 
Zarawin (2010).  
RM_1= abnormal discretionary expenses X (-1) + abnormal 
production costs 
RM_1 takes the value of 1 if the figure is lower than the 
industry-year median RM_1 and 0 if otherwise. 
 
Derived 
RM_2 Following the method by Zang (2012) and Cohen and 
Zarawin (2010).  
Derived 
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RM_2= abnormal cash flows from operations X (-1) + 
abnormal discretionary expenditures X (-1) 
RM_2 takes the value of 1 if the figure is lower than the 
industry-year median RM_2 and 0 if otherwise. 
 
Measures of performance 
ΔROA ROA is return on assets and is defined as income before 
extraordinary items divided by beginning of period total 
assets. 
The changes in ROA is calculated as the average 
differences in annual ROA after and before the 
restructuring 
Compustat and 
Derived 
CARS Cumulative abnormal returns of the parent target for the 
three-day window events (-2,0), (-1,+1) and (0,+3) with day 
0 being the restructuring announcement day. 
Eventus 
BHRS BHRs is the buy-and-hold retrun (BHRs) for event window 
(1,+12), (1,+24), and (1,+36) for market model and Fama-
French three- factor and momentum model event window 
(1,+12), (1,+24), and (1,+36). 
Eventus 
BHARS BHARs is the buy-and-hold abnormal return and are 
calculated by taking the different between the BHRs of 
market model and BHRs of Fama-French three- factor and 
momentum model for the event window (1,+12), (1,+24), 
and (1,+36). 
Eventus and Derived 
𝑺𝑫𝑨𝑹𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕 Standard deviation of monthly annual return of firms for 
t+1 to +3 
 
Eventus 
 
Explanatory Variables Variable Definition Source 
SOX  A dummy variable equals to 1 if the year is 2002 (post-
Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and 0 if otherwise 
Derived 
OPTION Option represents the Black-Scholes value of option 
compensation as a proportion of total compensation 
received by the CEO and the CFO of a firm 
Execucomp 
BONUS Bonus is the average bonus compensation as a proportion 
of total compensation received by the CEO and the CFO of 
a firm 
Execucomp 
SHARES Shares, is the weighted average number of common shares 
outstanding at the beginning of the year, before the 
restructuring 
Execucomp 
MKT_CAP Mkt_Cap is market value of equity and is calculated as the 
closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of shares 
outstanding at fiscal year-end 
Compustat 
B_M B_M is the book-to-market ratio, where the book value of 
common equity, is divided by market value of equity 
Compustat 
HAB_BEAT Hab_Beat is the frequency of meeting/beating analysts’ 
earnings forecasts in the past four quarters of the 
announcement 
IBES 
ANALYST Analyst is the number of analysts following the firm IBES 
LEVERAGE Leverage is the sum of short term and long term debt 
divided by average total assets 
Compustat 
INDUSTRY CONC Industry Conc is the sum of the largest four sales divided 
by the sum of sales in a given industry 
Compustat 
NDUSTRY ROA Industry ROA is the average return on assets in a given 
industry 
Compustat 
INDUSTRY LEVERAGE Industry Leverage is the average leverage ratio in the firms 
industry 
Compustat 
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INDUSRTY M_B Industry M_B is the market-to-book ratio in a given 
industry 
Compustat 
IMR IMR is the inverse mills ratio calculated from the Probit 
regression in the first-stage of Heckman Selection 
Regression. 
Derived 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat, CRSP, and Thomson One Database 
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Appendix 7: Descriptive statistics for sample firms conducting carve-out, sell-off, 
spin-off and divestiture during 1985-2015. 
Panel A: Size characteristics 
Type Number of Obs Total assets 
($ thousand) 
Market value 
($ thousand) 
Book-to-market 
Carve-out     
Mean 1396 $2,977.420 $3476.870 0.402 
Median 1396 $720.906 $824.463 0.346 
Std. dev 1396 $11222.620 $11091.400 0.707 
     
Sell-off     
Mean 6990 $14454.920 $10875.780 0.453 
Median 6990 $1978.650 $1442.860 0.471 
Std. dev 6990 $71147.150 $34967.280 3.594 
     
Spin-off     
Mean 385 $8978.210 $7677.940 0.460 
Median 385 $1741.280 $1807.360 0.402 
Std. dev 385 $26709.390 $18927.360 0.437 
     
Divestiture     
Mean 1724 $31748.610 $10721.480 0.519 
Median 1724 $1622.930 $1202.430 0.446 
Std. dev 1724 $168151.150 $32176.880 0.595 
Panel B – Year Distribution Based on the Year of Restructuring or Reorganization 
 Carve-out Sell-off Spin-off Divestiture 
Year N % N % N % N % 
1985 5 0.36 164 2.35 13 3.38 25 1.45 
1986 6 0.43 222 3.18 10 2.60 20 1.16 
1987 6 0.43 192 2.75 9 2.34 27 1.57 
1988 7 0.50 184 2.63 14 3.64 32 1.86 
1989 7 0.50 213 3.05 8 2.08 42 2.44 
1990 3 0.21 204 2.92 14 3.64 49 2.84 
1991 16 1.15 182 2.60 4 1.04 59 3.42 
1992 19 1.36 242 3.46 15 3.90 68 3.94 
1993 24 1.72 237 3.39 18 4.68 69 4.00 
1994 14 1.00 278 3.98 11 2.86 69 4.00 
1995 21 1.50 290 4.15 20 5.19 80 4.64 
1996 27 1.93 353 5.05 17 4.42 85 4.93 
1997 38 2.72 321 4.59 25 6.49 85 4.93 
1998 42 3.01 339 4.85 23 5.97 89 5.16 
1999 26 1.86 355 5.08 25 6.49 76 4.41 
2000 51 3.65 273 3.91 27 7.01 74 4.29 
2001 117 8.38 245 3.51 8 2.08 46 2.67 
2002 91 6.52 261 3.73 10 2.60 56 3.25 
2003 203 14.54 304 4.35 13 3.38 67 3.89 
2004 123 8.81 311 4.45 9 2.34 60 3.48 
2005 82 5.87 291 4.16 10 2.60 82 4.76 
2006 93 6.66 282 4.03 7 1.82 71 4.12 
2007 83 5.95 269 3.85 19 4.94 73 4.23 
2008 60 4.30 228 3.26 16 4.16 80 4.64 
2009 59 4.23 213 3.05 9 2.34 56 3.25 
2010 65 4.66 185 2.65 5 1.30 53 3.07 
2011 64 4.58 164 2.35 16 4.16 66 3.83 
2012 44 3.15 188 2.69 10 2.60 65 3.77 
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Total 1396 100.00 6990 100.00 385 100.00 1724 100.00 
Notes to Appendix 7: Total assets are at the beginning of the period of total assets (Compustat data item #6); Market value refers 
to market value of equity and is calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end, multiplied by the number of shares outstanding at 
fiscal year-end (Compustat annual data item #199 times Compustat annual Data item #25); book-to-market ratio, where the book 
value of common equity (Compustat annual data item #60) is divided by market value of equity (calculated as the closing price at 
fiscal year-end multiplied by the number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat annual Data item #199 times 
Compustat annual Data item #25)). 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat and Thomson One Database 
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Appendix 8: Accrual-based earnings management proxies around carve-out, sell-off, 
spin-off and divestiture  
Panel A: Accrual-based and real earnings management proxies around carve-out. 
Year -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Discretionary accruals -0.081*** -0.086*** -0.073*** -0.080*** -0.097*** -0.112*** -0.095*** 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations 
-0.058*** -0.100*** -0.086*** -0.057*** -0.072*** -0.063*** -0.072*** 
Abnormal production 
costs 
0.089*** 0.074*** 0.090*** 557.300*** 0.089*** 0.102*** 0.082*** 
Abnormal 
discretionary expenses 
0.179*** 0.210*** 0.189*** 0.196*** 0.220*** 0.245*** 0.235*** 
Panel B: Accrual-based and real earnings management proxies around sell-off. 
Year -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Discretionary accruals -0.033*** -0.053*** -0.069*** -0.058*** -0.060*** -0.105*** -0.070*** 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations 
-0.031*** -0.036*** -0.024*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 0.040*** 0.010*** 
Abnormal production 
costs 
0.135*** 0.126*** 0.140*** 2564.058*** 0.104*** 0.123*** 0.105*** 
Abnormal 
discretionary expenses 
0.103*** 0.123*** 0.142*** 0.121*** 0.133*** 0.138*** 0.142*** 
Panel C: Accrual-based and real earnings management proxies around spin-off. 
Year -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Discretionary accruals -0.008*** -0.022*** -0.079*** -0.065*** -0.079*** -0.105*** -0.070*** 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations 
-0.030*** -0.021** -0.016 -0.012 -0.016 0.046*** 0.038*** 
Abnormal production 
costs 
0.054*** -0.021** 0.144*** 1992.674*** 0.059** 0.121*** 0.076*** 
Abnormal 
discretionary expenses 
0.096*** 0.133*** 0.216*** 0.148*** 0.157*** 0.144*** 0.139*** 
Panel D: Accrual-based and real earnings management proxies around divestiture. 
Year -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Discretionary accruals -0.029*** -0.042*** -0.061*** -0.042*** -0.052*** -0.102*** -0.076*** 
Abnormal cash flows 
from operations 
-0.019*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.009*** 0.028*** 0.011** 
Abnormal production 
costs 
0.101*** 0.084*** 0.131*** 2245.253*** 0.082*** 0.135*** 0.086*** 
Abnormal 
discretionary expenses 
0.070*** 0.100*** 0.124*** 0.101*** 0.099*** 0.110*** 0.121*** 
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% 
level. 
Notes to Appendix 8: This table reports time series of accrual-based and real earnings management proxies from year 
-3 to year +3 relative to the carve-out, sell-off, spin-off and divestiture (year 0). Discretionary accruals are estimated 
using the cross-sectional Jones’ (1991) model. Abnormal cash from operations are estimated as the deviations from 
the predicted values from the following industry year regression: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
 = 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2  
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘3
△ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where OCF is cash flow from operations (Compustat data item #308 minus Compustat data item #124); SALES are 
annual sales revenues (Compustat data item #12) and Assets are total assets (Compustat data item #6). Abnormal 
production costs are estimated as the deviations from the predicted values from the following industry year 
regression: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
 = 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2  
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘3
△ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘4
△ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where PROD are production costs, defined as the sum of costs of goods sold (Compustat data item #41) and change 
in inventory during the year (Compustat data item #3). Abnormal discretionary expenses are estimated as the 
deviations from the predicted values from the following industry-year regression: 
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𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
 = 𝑘1
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑘2  
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where DISX are discretionary expenses during the year, and are defined as the sum of advertizing expenses 
(Compustat data item #45), R&D expenses (Compustat data item #46) and SG&A (Compustat data item #189). 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat Database 
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Appendix 9: Bidders’ changes in ROA (ΔROA) 
This table reports the univariate analysis of differences in means, t-test and difference in medians, Wilcoxon test. The 
changes in ROA are calculated as the average differences in annual ROA after and before the restructuring. EM is 
calculated based on whether a firm is classified as an earning management firm year observation or not. It is indicator 
variable that gets the value of 1 if either of the real earnings management activities aggregate proxies either (RM_1 
or RM_2) or discretionary accruals is above the industry year median following the method by Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010). 
Panel A Carve-out  
  Firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 117) 
Firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 1200) 
Tests of differences 
between firms having 
EM below median 
industry-year EM and 
firms having EM above 
median industry-year 
EM 
ΔROA  Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
Average change in ROA 
between post and pre-
restructuring 
0.050 
(1.595) 
0.016 
(9.500*) 
0.006 
(0.153) 
0.005 
(13.000) 
0.044 
(0.331) 
0.011 
(1.043) 
Panel B Sell-off  
  Firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 555) 
Firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 5936) 
Tests of differences 
between firms having 
EM below median 
industry-year EM and 
firms having EM above 
median industry-year 
EM 
ΔROA  Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
Average change in ROA 
between post and pre-
restructuring 
-0.037 
(-0.761) 
-0.005 
(-13.500) 
-0.012 
(-1.112) 
0.007 
(178.000***) 
-0.026 
(-0.694) 
-0.012 
(-2.331**) 
Panel C Spin-off  
  Firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 39) 
Firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 330) 
Tests of differences 
between firms having 
EM below median 
industry-year EM and 
firms having EM above 
median industry-year 
EM 
ΔROA  Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
Average change in ROA 
between post and pre-
restructuring 
-0.651 
(-0.968) 
-0.017 
(-1.500) 
0.686 
(1.016) 
0.008 
(11.000) 
-1.337 
(-0.675) 
-0.025 
(-0.134) 
Panel D Divestiture  
  Firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 140) 
Firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 1531) 
Tests of differences 
between firms having 
EM below median 
industry-year EM and 
firms having EM above 
median industry-year 
EM 
ΔROA  Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
Average change in ROA 
between post and pre-
restructuring 
-0.008 
(-0.708) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(-0.078) 
0.001 
(7.500) 
-0.007 
(-0.202) 
-0.001 
(-0.551) 
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% level. 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat Database 
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Appendix 10: Correlation matrix for the independent variables in probit regression (first-stage) 
This table presents a Pearson correlation matrix of key variables of interest for the sample of firms included in our sample. The sample covers for all independent variables 
for the period of 1985 to 2015. All variables are defined in Appendix 6. 
Panel A: Carve-Out 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
ROA 1 1         
OPTION 2 -0.183** 1        
BONUS 3 -0.113** 0.184** 1       
SHARES 4 -0.024 0.094** 0.099** 1      
MKT_CAP 5 0.173** 0.091** 0.143** 0.786** 1     
B_M 6 -0.198** -0.039 -0.012 -0.075* -0.198** 1    
HAB_BEAT 7 0.041 0.020 0.104** 0.153** 0.235** -0.085** 1   
ANALYST 8 0.018 0.066* 0.012 0.521** 0.496** -0.008 0.191** 1  
LEVERAGE 9 -0.038 0.055 -0.050 0.087** -0.053 -0.187** -0.003 0.030  
Panel B: Sell-off          
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
ROA 1 1         
OPTION 2 -0.006 1        
BONUS 3 0.026 0.084** 1       
SHARES 4 0.062** 0.087** 0.043** 1      
MKT_CAP 5 0.155** 0.074** 0.045** 0.915** 1     
B_M 6 -0.016 -0.030* 0.038* -0.175** -0.199** 1    
HAB_BEAT 7 0.056** 0.000 0.051** 0.174** 0.215** -0.104** 1   
ANALYST 8 0.045** 0.056** 0.019 0.545** 0.534** -0.116** 0.262** 1  
LEVERAGE 9 -0.026 -0.034* -0.032* 0.036* -0.039** -0.118** -0.061** -0.017 1 
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Panel c: Spin-off         
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
ROA 1 1         
OPTION 2 0.013 1        
BONUS 3 0.112 0.131* 1       
SHARES 4 0.125* 0.144* 0.017 1      
MKT_CAP 5 0.218** 0.119* 0.095 0.925** 1     
B_M 6 0.017 -0.045 -0.105 -0.061 -0.069 1    
HAB_BEAT 7 0.026 -0.043 -0.001 0.068 0.121* -0.044 1   
ANALYST 8 -0.001 0.031 0.017 0.386** 0.414** -0.047 0.153* 1  
LEVERAGE 9 0.054 -0.068 0.003 0.045 -0.008 -0.504** -0.032 0.060 1 
Panel D: Divestiture        
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ROA 1 1       
OPTION 2 0.002 1      
SHARES 3 0.014 0.015 1     
B_M 4 -0.219** -0.0064 -0.113** 1    
HAB_BEAT 5 0.014 0.002 0.141** -0.077* 1   
ANALYST 6 0.006 0.002 0.499** -0.056 0.172** 1  
LEVERAGE 7 0.038 0.024 0.071* -0.104** -0.034 0.020 1 
*statistically significant at the 5% margin; **statistically significant at the 1% margin. 
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Appendix 11: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the first stage regression 
This table presents a Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of key variables of interest for the sample of firms included in our sample. The sample covers for all independent variables 
for the period of 2000 to 2015. All variables are defined in Appendix 6. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
MKT_CAP 3.41 0.293595 6.94 0.144035 8.60 0.116285   
SHARES 3.16 0.316008 6.83 0.146476 8.01 0.124813 1.36 0.737402 
ANALYST 1.45 0.690722 1.49 0.669165 1.25 0.802537 1.35 0.74013 
ROA 1.20 0.835506 1.07 0.935664 1.13 0.883219 1.05 0.951467 
B_M 1.16 0.865561 1.07 0.935281 1.41 0.711315 1.08 0.928042 
LEVERAGE 1.12 0.894374 1.06 0.944194 1.45 0.688294 1.02 0.981957 
BONUS 1.08 0.922916 1.01 0.985806 1.09 0.919095   
OPTION 1.08 0.923071 1.02 0.982840 1.06 0.945752 1.00 0.999192 
HAB_BEAT 1.08 0.923297 1.10 0.907519 1.05 0.951989 1.04 0.960418 
Mean 1.64  2.40  2.78  1.13  
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Appendix 12: Bidders’ announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
This table reports the univariate analysis of differences in means, t-test and difference in medians, 
Wilcoxon test. CARs is the cumulative abnormal return (CARs) for 3-day event window (-2,0), (-1, +1) and 
(0,+3) for market model and Fama-French three-factor and momentum model for the 3-day event window 
(-2,0), (-1, +1) and (0,+3). EM is calculated based on whether a firm is classified as an earning management 
firm year observation or not. It is indicator variable that gets the value of 1 if either of the real earnings 
management activities aggregate proxies either (RM_1 or RM_2) or discretionary accruals is above the 
industry year median following the method by Cohen and Zarowin (2010). The sample covers for all 
control variables for the period of 1985 to 2015. All variables are defined in Appendix 6. 
Panel A Carve-out  
  Firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 122) 
Firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 1255) 
Tests of differences between 
firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM and 
firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
CAR estimation 
method 
Windows Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
Market Model (-2,0) -4.020% 
(-5.379***) 
 
-4.396% 
(-27***) 
-2.320% 
(-11.005***) 
-1.944% 
(-162.5***) 
-1.700% 
(-2.37**) 
-2.452% 
(-
2.759***) 
 (-1,+1) -3.310% 
(-4.533***) 
-3.171% 
(-27***) 
-2.330% 
(-7.618***) 
-2.306% 
(-212.5***) 
-0.979% 
(-0.97) 
-0.865% 
(-1.022) 
 (0,+3) -2.390% 
(-3.141***) 
-2.285% 
(-18***) 
-1.420% 
(-4.544***) 
-1.539% 
(-161.5***) 
-0.966% 
(-0.94) 
-0.746% 
(-0.647) 
Fama-French 
three- factor and 
momentum 
model 
(-2,0) 0.091% 
(4.974***) 
0.082% 
(23***) 
0.101% 
(13.396***) 
0.086% 
(215.5***) 
-0.010% 
(-0.39) 
-0.004% 
(-0.159) 
 (-1,+1) 0.091% 
(23***) 
0.082% 
(23***) 
0.101% 
(214***) 
0.086% 
(214***) 
-0.009% 
(-0.38) 
-0.004% 
(-0.149) 
 (0,+3) 0.091% 
(4.974***) 
0.082% 
(23***) 
0.101% 
(13.396***) 
0.086% 
(215.5***) 
-0.010% 
(-0.39) 
-0.004% 
(-0.159) 
Panel B Sell-off  
  Firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 256) 
Firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 3068) 
Tests of differences between 
firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM and 
firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
CAR estimation 
method 
Windows Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
Market Model (-2,0) -0.892% 
(-2.442**) 
-0.255% 
(-12) 
-0.555% 
(-4.792***) 
-0.254% 
(-73***) 
-0.337% 
(-0.81) 
-0.001% 
(-1.101) 
 (-1,+1) -1.140% 
(-2.864***) 
-0.927% 
(-28***) 
-0.240% 
(-2.052**) 
-0.372% 
(-164***) 
-0.899% 
(-2.13**) 
-0.555% 
(-1.604) 
 (0,+3) -0.697% 
(-1.683*) 
-0.791% 
(-26***) 
0.147% 
(1.283) 
-0.258% 
(-99***) 
-0.844% 
(-2.04**) 
-0.533% 
(-1.960*) 
Fama-French 
three- factor and 
momentum 
model 
(-2,0) 0.072% 
(6.845***) 
0.061% 
(42.5***) 
0.071% 
(23.505***) 
 
0.071% 
(666.5***) 
0.002% 
(0.13) 
-0.010% 
(-1.076) 
 (-1,+1) 0.072% 
(6.845***) 
0.061% 
(42.5***) 
0.071% 
(23.505***) 
0.071% 
(666.5***) 
0.002% 
(0.13) 
-0.010% 
(-1.076) 
 (0,+3) 0.072% 
(6.845***) 
0.061% 
(42.5***) 
0.071% 
(23.505***) 
0.071% 
(666.5***) 
0.002% 
(0.13) 
-0.010% 
(-1.076) 
Panel C Spin-off  
  Firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 17) 
Firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 173) 
Tests of differences between 
firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM and 
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firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
CAR estimation 
method 
Windows Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
Market Model (-2,0) -0.570% 
(-0.495) 
-1.200% 
(-0.5) 
0.793% 
(1.822*) 
-0.133% 
(-1.5) 
-1.360% 
(-0.95) 
-1.067% 
(-0.612) 
 (-1,+1) 0.674% 
(0.601) 
2.809% 
(2.5) 
1.580% 
(3.736***) 
0.802% 
(10.5) 
-0.909% 
(-0.65) 
2.007% 
(0.021) 
 (0,+3) 1.070% 
(0.873) 
0.053% 
(0.5) 
1.010% 
(2.061**) 
0.053% 
(3.5) 
0.061% 
(0.04) 
0.000% 
(0.465) 
Fama-French 
three- factor and 
momentum 
model 
(-2,0) 0.047% 
(2.232**) 
0.051% 
(2.5) 
0.075% 
(7.582***) 
0.082% 
(44***) 
-0.027% 
(-0.85) 
-0.031% 
(-1.248) 
 (-1,+1) 0.047% 
(2.232**) 
0.051% 
(2.5) 
0.075% 
(7.582***) 
0.082% 
(44***) 
-0.027% 
(-0.85) 
-0.031% 
(-1.248) 
 (0,+3) 0.047% 
(2.232**) 
0.051% 
(2.5) 
0.075% 
(7.582***) 
0.082% 
(44***) 
-0.027% 
(-0.85) 
-0.031% 
(-1.248) 
 
Panel D Divestiture  
  Firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 84) 
Firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 1017) 
Tests of differences between 
firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM and 
firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
CAR estimation 
method 
Windows Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
Market Model (-2,0) -0.739% 
(-0.779) 
-0.386% 
(-3) 
0.815% 
(3.692***) 
0.358% 
(58.5***) 
-1.550% 
(-1.91*) 
-0.744% 
(-
3.011***) 
 (-1,+1) -0.847% 
(-0.757) 
-1.625% 
(-10**) 
0.862% 
(3.603***) 
0.308% 
(26.5) 
-1.710% 
(-1.92*) 
-1.933% 
(-
2.989***) 
 (0,+3) 0.681% 
(0.568) 
-0.310% 
(-4) 
1.230% 
(5.005***) 
0.343% 
(39.5**) 
-0.545% 
(-0.59) 
-0.653% 
(-0.389) 
Fama-French 
three- factor and 
momentum 
model 
(-2,0) 0.125% 
(5.298***) 
0.076% 
(18***) 
0.081% 
(13.207***) 
0.076% 
(190***) 
0.044% 
(1.96*) 
0.000% 
(1.088) 
 (-1,+1) 0.125% 
(5.298***) 
0.076% 
(18***) 
0.081% 
(13.207***) 
0.076% 
(190***) 
0.044% 
(1.96*) 
0.000% 
(1.088) 
 (0,+3) 0.125% 
(5.298***) 
0.076% 
(18***) 
0.081% 
(13.207***) 
0.076% 
(190***) 
0.044% 
(1.96*) 
0.000% 
(1.088) 
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% level. 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from CRSP and COMPUSTAT Database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
198 
 
 
 
Appendix 13: Bidders’ buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
This table reports the univariate analysis of differences in means, t-test and difference in medians, 
Wilcoxon test. BHR is the buy-and-hold return for event window (0,+12), (1,+24), and (0,+36) for market 
model and Fama-French three-factor and momentum model event window (0,+12), (1,+24), and (1,+36). 
BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return, and are calculated by taking the difference between the BHRs 
of market model and BHRs of Fama-French three-factor and momentum model for the event window (0, 
+12), (1,+24), and (1,+36). EM is calculated based on whether a firm is classified as an earnings 
management firm year observation or not. It is indicator variable that gets the value of 1 if either of the 
real earnings management activities aggregate proxies either (RM_1 or RM_2), or if discretionary accruals 
is above the industry year median following the method by Cohen and Zarowin (2010). The sample covers 
for all control variables for the period of 1985 to 2015. All variables are defined in Appendix 6. 
Panel A Carve-out  
  Firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 122) 
Firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 1248) 
Tests of differences 
between firms having EM 
below median industry-year 
EM and firms having EM 
above median industry-year 
EM 
BHR estimation 
method 
Windows Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
Market 
Model(MM 
(1,+12) 
months 
-28.500% 
(-3.393***) 
-25.087% 
(-17***) 
-8.910% 
(-3.746***) 
-6.884% 
(-82***) 
-19.590% 
(-2.43**) 
-18.203% 
(-2.282**) 
 (1,+24) 
months 
-59.570% 
(-4.636***) 
-43.323% 
(-16) 
-13.600% 
(-4.049***) 
-10.712% 
(-75***) 
-45.980% 
(-4.01***) 
-32.611% 
(-3.268***) 
 (0,+36) 
months 
-70.900% 
(-3.740***) 
-45.292% 
(-11*) 
-23.090% 
(-5.205***) 
-14.834% 
(-78***) 
-47.820% 
(-3.11***) 
-30.458% 
(-2.205**) 
Fama-French 
three- factor 
and momentum 
model (FFMM) 
(1,+12) 
months 
1.470% 
(4.190***) 
1.188% 
(17***) 
1.710% 
(16.353***) 
1.502% 
(275***) 
-0.242% 
(-0.69) 
-0.314% 
(-1.000) 
 (1,+24) 
months 
1.570% 
(3.668***) 
1.411% 
(17***) 
2.000% 
(14.530***) 
1.744% 
(281***) 
-0.433% 
(-0.94) 
-0.333% 
(-1.584) 
 (0,+36) 
months 
1.570% 
(3.668***) 
1.411% 
(17***) 
2.000% 
(17.530***) 
1.744% 
(281***) 
-0.433% 
(-0.94) 
-0.333% 
(-1.584) 
BHAR 
estimation 
method 
Windows Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
BHR (MM) 
minus 
BHR(FFMM) 
(1,+12) 
months 
-29.970% 
(-3.516***) 
-27.156% 
(-17***) 
-10.620% 
(-4.416***) 
-8.662% 
(-100***) 
-19.350% 
(-2.38**) 
-18.494% 
(-2.187**) 
 (1,+24) 
months 
-61.140% 
(-4.691***) 
-45.545% 
(-15***) 
-15.600% 
(-4.587***) 
-13.224% 
(-82***) 
-45.540% 
(-3.92***) 
-32.321% 
(-3.158***) 
 (1,+36) 
months 
-72.48% 
(-3.785***) 
-48.782% 
(-11*) 
-25.090% 
(-5.599***) 
-16.436% 
(-80***) 
-47.400% 
(-3.05***) 
-32.346% 
(-2.154**) 
Panel B Sell-off  
  Firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 256) 
Firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 3028) 
Tests of differences 
between firms having EM 
below median industry-year 
EM and firms having EM 
above median industry-year 
EM 
BHR estimation 
method 
Windows Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
Market Model (0,+12) 
months 
-2.480% 
(-0.763) 
1.553% 
(4.5) 
-4.210% 
(-4.866***) 
-3.068% 
(-84***) 
1.730% 
(0.55) 
4.621% 
(0.859) 
 (0,+24) 
months 
-7.450% 
(-1.437) 
-7.697% 
(-8.5) 
-6.810% 
(-4.832***) 
-2.898% 
(-69**) 
-0.634% 
(-0.12) 
-4.799% 
(-0.495) 
 (0,+36) 
months 
-10.910% 
(-1.549) 
-13.975% 
(-9.5) 
-7.880% 
(-4.441***) 
-3.942% 
(-79***) 
-3.030% 
(-0.47) 
-10.033% 
(-0.938) 
Fama-French 
three- factor 
(0,+12) 
months 
1.290% 
(8.034***) 
1.207% 
(74.5***) 
1.500% 
(31.615***) 
1.339% 
(860***) 
-0.209% 
(-1.23) 
-0.132% 
(-0.730) 
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and momentum 
model 
 (0,+24) 
months 
1.400% 
(7.000***) 
1.034% 
(63.5***) 
1.400% 
(26.943***) 
1.036% 
(720***) 
0.004% 
(0.02) 
-0.002% 
(-0.113) 
 (0,+36) 
months 
1.400% 
(7.000***) 
1.034% 
(63.5***) 
1.400% 
(26.943***) 
1.036% 
(720***) 
0.004% 
(0.02) 
-0.002% 
(-0.113) 
BHAR 
estimation 
method 
Windows Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
BHR (MM) 
minus 
BHR(FFMM) 
(0,+12) 
months 
-3.770% 
(-1.146) 
0.306% 
(3.5) 
-5.710% 
(-6.521***) 
-3.800% 
(-126***) 
1.940% 
(0.61) 
4.106% 
(0.830) 
 (0,+24) 
months 
-8.850% 
(-1.683*) 
-7.056% 
(-10.5) 
-8.210% 
(-5.753***) 
-4.138% 
(96***) 
-0.638% 
(-0.12) 
-2.918% 
(-0.762) 
 (0,+36) 
months 
-12.310% 
(-1.729*) 
-13.606% 
(-9.5) 
-9.280% 
(-5.171***) 
-5.610% 
(-90***) 
-3.030% 
(-0.46) 
-7.996% 
(-0.915) 
Panel C Spin-off  
  Firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 122) 
Firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 1255) 
Tests of differences 
between firms having EM 
below median industry-year 
EM and firms having EM 
above median industry-year 
EM 
BHR estimation 
method 
Windows Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
Market Model (0,+12) 
months 
24.060% 
(2.047*) 
9.774% 
(2.5) 
-5.900% 
(-1.584) 
-3.592% 
(-7.000) 
29.960% 
(2.43**) 
13.366% 
(1.939*) 
 (0,+24) 
months 
28.770% 
(1.389) 
16.949% 
(0.5) 
-11.650% 
(-1.908*) 
-10.913% 
(-12*) 
40.420% 
(1.98**) 
27.862% 
(1.614) 
 (0,+36) 
months 
8.230% 
(0.407) 
11.381% 
(2.5) 
-24.490% 
(-3.260***) 
-23.673% 
(-16**) 
32.720% 
(1.33) 
35.054% 
(1.657*) 
Fama-French 
three- factor 
and momentum 
model 
(0,+12) 
months 
1.340% 
(4.014***) 
1.137% 
(7.5***) 
1.560% 
98.330***) 
1.284% 
(48***) 
-0.221% 
(-0.37) 
-0.147% 
(-0.033) 
 (0,+24) 
months 
1.380% 
(5.005***) 
1.036% 
(8.5***) 
1.340% 
(7.207***) 
1.285% 
(45***) 
0.045% 
(0.07) 
-0.249% 
(-0.085) 
 (0,+36) 
months 
1.380% 
(5.005***) 
1.036% 
(8.5***) 
1.340% 
(7.207***) 
1.285% 
(45***) 
0.045% 
(0.07) 
-0.249% 
(-0.085) 
BHAR 
estimation 
method 
Windows Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
BHR (MM) 
minus 
BHR(FFMM) 
(0,+12) 
months 
22.710% 
(1.923*) 
6.158% 
92.5) 
-7.460% 
(-1.987**) 
 
-4.125% 
(-10) 
30.180% 
(2.42**) 
10.283% 
(1.934*) 
 (0,+24) 
months 
27.390% 
(1.316) 
12.309% 
(0.5) 
-12.990% 
(-2.108**) 
-12.501% 
(-14**) 
40.380% 
(1.96*) 
24.810% 
(1.596) 
 (0,+36) 
months 
6.850% 
(0.338) 
10.239% 
(2.5) 
-25.820% 
(-3.410***) 
-24.079% 
(-16**) 
32.670% 
(1.32) 
34.318% 
(1.633) 
Panel D Divestiture  
  Firms having EM below 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 84) 
Firms having EM above 
median industry-year EM 
(N= 1008) 
Tests of differences 
between firms having EM 
below median industry-year 
EM and firms having EM 
above median industry-year 
EM 
BHR estimation 
method 
Windows Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
Market Model (0,+12) 
months 
0.562% 
(0.092) 
4.916% 
(9*) 
1.890% 
(1.122) 
3.293% 
(39**) 
-1.330% 
(-0.22) 
1.623% 
(0.572) 
 (0,+24) 
months 
-7.340% 
9-0.736) 
12.449% 
(6) 
1.400% 
(0.549) 
5.788% 
(33*) 
-8.740% 
(-0.94) 
6.661% 
(0.290) 
 (0,+36) 
months 
-5.900% 
(-0.476) 
11.316% 
(6) 
-3.260% 
(-1.017) 
7.212% 
(33**) 
-2.650% 
(-0.23) 
4.104% 
(0.390) 
200 
 
 
 
Fama-French 
three- factor 
and momentum 
model 
(0,+12) 
months 
1.810% 
(5.774***) 
1.284% 
(23***) 
1.590% 
(20.059***) 
1.364% 
(292***) 
0.221% 
(0.76) 
-0.080% 
(-0.206) 
 (0,+24) 
months 
1.950% 
(4.654***) 
1.146% 
(20***) 
1.570% 
(16.256***) 
1.343% 
(246***) 
0.378% 
(1.06) 
-0.197% 
(-0.433) 
 (0,+36) 
months 
1.950% 
(4.654***) 
1.146% 
(20***) 
1.570% 
(16.256***) 
1.343% 
(246***) 
0.378% 
(1.06) 
-0.197% 
(-0.433) 
BHAR 
estimation 
method 
 Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
BHR (MM) 
minus 
BHR(FFMM) 
Windows       
 (0,+12) 
months 
-1.250% 
(-0.204) 
3.504% 
(5) 
0.299% 
(0.176) 
1.647% 
(27*) 
-1.550% 
(-0.25) 
1.857% 
(0.585) 
 (0,+24) 
months 
-9.290% 
(-0.911) 
12.471% 
(5) 
-0.171% 
(-0.066) 
5.164% 
(24) 
-9.120% 
(-0.97) 
7.307% 
(0.303) 
 (0,+36) 
months 
-7.850% 
(-0.623) 
11.033% 
96) 
-4.830% 
(-1.495) 
7.153% 
(29*) 
-3.020% 
(-0.26) 
3.880% 
(0.406) 
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% level. 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat and CRSP Database 
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Appendix 14: Results from OLS Regression of Changes in ROAs, CARs, BHARs and SDARs for Carve-out 
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regression of changes in ROAs, CARs, BHARs and SDARs for carve-out. The sample covers for all control variables for the period of 1985 
to 2015. All variables are defined in Appendix 6. 
Panel A Results from Multiple Regression of Changes in ROAs, and CARs for Carve-out 
 ΔROA CARs (-2,0) CARs (-1,+1) 
 ΔROA ΔROA ΔROA CARs  
(-2,0) 
CARs  
(-2,0) 
CARs  
(-2,0) 
CARs 
 (-1,+1) 
CARs 
 (-1,+1) 
CARs 
 (-1,+1) 
DA 0.000   0.000***   0.000   
RM_1  -0.014*   -0.004   -0.001  
RM_2   -0.004   -0.002   -0.004 
SOX -0.060* -0.058* -0.058* 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006 
OPTION -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
SHARES 0.137** 0.132** 0.136** -0.029* -0.029* -0.027* -0.036** -0.036** -0.036** 
MKT_CAP -0.080** -0.078** -0.080** 0.0278* 0.031** 0.030** 0.037** 0.038** 0.038** 
B_M -0.031 -0.031 -0.033 -0.017 -0.010 -0.012 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 
HAB_BEAT -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
ANALYST -0.039 -0.039 -0.040 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.018 0.017 0.017 
LEVERAGE 0.449** 0.444** 0.448** -0.062** -0.058** -0.058** -0.058** -0.057** -0.057** 
INDUSTRY CONC 15.570 15.320 15.460 0.425** 0.416** 0.381* 0.425** 0.427** 0.402* 
INDUSTRY LEVERAGE 0.088 0.090 0.088 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 
INDUSTRY ROA 0.297*** 0.299*** 0.296*** 0.005 0.007 0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
IMDUSTRY M_B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Constant -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.042 -0.052 -0.049 -0.078** -0.080** -0.080** 
          
Observation 354 354 354 421 421 421 421 421 421 
F-statistics 4.23 4.26 4.21 2.930 2.410 2.470 1.750 1.780 1.800 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.050 0.044 0.042 
R-squared 0.379 0.382 0.378 0.067 0.056 0.051 0.064 0.065 0.066 
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Panel B Results from Multiple Regression of Changes in BHARs, and Post-SDARs for Carve-out 
 BHAR (+1,+12) Post-SDARs 
 BHAR (+1,+12) BHAR (+1,+12) BHAR (+1,+12) Post-SDARs Post-SDARs Post-SDARs 
DA 0.000   0.000   
RM_1  0.007   0.003  
RM_2   0.048*   0.001 
SOX -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.032*** 
OPTION -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
SHARES 0.142 0.145 0.149* 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 
MKT_CAP 0.136 0.132 0.126 -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.108*** 
B_M 0.031 0.028 0.029 -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 
HAB_BEAT 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.001 
ANALYST -0.299*** -0.297*** -0.287*** 0.018 0.019 0.018 
LEVERAGE 0.411*** 0.411*** 0.405*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.078*** 
INDUSTRY CONC -5.965*** -6.009*** -5.741*** -0.165 -0.180 -0.156 
INDUSTRY LEVERAGE 0.208** 0.209** 0.213** -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
INDUSTRY ROA 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.231*** 0.005 0.004 0.004 
IMDUSTRY M_B 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* 
Constant -0.740*** -0.734*** -0.735*** 0.439*** 0.443*** 0.440*** 
       
Observation 420 420 420 420 420 420 
F-statistics 3.740 3.720 4.050 10.670 10.530 10.860 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.088 0.088 0.094 0.238 0.24 0.238 
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% level. 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat, CRSP, and Thomson One Database 
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Appendix 15: Results from OLS Regression of Changes in ROAs, CARs, BHARs and SDARs for Sell-off 
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regression of changes in ROAs, CARs, BHARs and SDARs for sell-off. The sample covers for all control variables for the period of 1985 to 
2015. All variables are defined in Appendix 6. 
Panel A Results from Multiple Regression of Changes in ROAs, and CARs for Sell-off 
 ΔROA CARs (-2,0) CARs (-1,+1) 
 ΔROA ΔROA ΔROA CARs  
(-2,0) 
CARs  
(-2,0) 
CARs  
(-2,0) 
CARs 
 (-1,+1) 
CARs 
 (-1,+1) 
CARs 
 (-1,+1) 
DA 0.000   0.000   0.000   
RM_1  -0.002*   0.000**   0.000***  
RM_2   0.002***   -0.001   -0.001 
SOX 0.028 0.027 0.033 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.006 
OPTION -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SHARES 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.076*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 
MKT_CAP -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.084*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
B_M -0.107 -0.108 -0.100 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
HAB_BEAT -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ANALYST 0.067 0.068 0.074 -0.020** -0.020** -0.020** -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
LEVERAGE -0.088 -0.088 -0.079 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 
INDUSTRY 
CONC 
-1.702 -1.676 -1.696 -0.036 -0.038 -0.036 -0.177 -0.181 -0.178 
INDUSTRY 
LEVERAGE 
0.025* 0.024* 0.026* 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.010* 0.010* 
INDUSTRY ROA 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
IMDUSTRY M_B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Constant 0.173* 0.178* 0.135 -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 
          
Observation 1,677 1,677 1,677 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077 
Robust 
Standard Error 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics 7.860 10.600 96.050 4.370 4.380 4.460 4.840 4.880 5.020 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.073 0.074 0.074 
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Panel B Results from Multiple Regression of Changes in BHARs, and Post-SDARs for Sell-off 
 BHAR (+1,+12) Post-SDARs 
 BHAR (+1,+12) BHAR (+1,+12) BHAR (+1,+12) Post-SDARs Post-SDARs Post-SDARs 
DA 0.000   0.000   
RM_1  0.002***   0.000*  
RM_2   0.003   0.000 
SOX -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
OPTION -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SHARES -0.040 -0.046 -0.041 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
MKT_CAP 0.118** 0.126** 0.119** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.073*** 
B_M 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HAB_BEAT -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
ANALYST -0.138** -0.139** -0.138** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
LEVERAGE -0.190** -0.192** -0.187** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
INDUSTRY CONC 3.836** 3.810** 3.840** -0.343* -0.347* -0.342* 
INDUSTRY LEVERAGE 0.072 0.073 0.069 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
INDUSTRY ROA 0.015 0.018 0.014 0.005 0.005 0.005 
IMDUSTRY M_B 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Constant -0.268*** -0.280*** -0.266*** 0.274*** 0.274*** 0.275*** 
       
Observation 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,882 1,882 1,882 
Robust Standard Error Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics 2.460 2.650 2.350 28.690 29.350 28.640 
Prob > F 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.145 0.145 0.145 
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% level. 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat, CRSP, and Thomson One Database 
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Appendix 16: Results from OLS Regression of Changes in ROAs, CARs, BHARs and SDARs for Spin-off 
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regression of changes in ROAs, CARs, BHARs and SDARs for spin-off. The sample covers for all control variables for the period of 1985 to 
2015. All variables are defined in Appendix 6. 
Panel A Results from Multiple Regression of Changes in ROAs, and CARs for Spin-off 
 ΔROA CARs (-2,0) CARs (-1,+1) 
 ΔROA ΔROA ΔROA CARs  
(-2,0) 
CARs  
(-2,0) 
CARs  
(-2,0) 
CARs 
 (-1,+1) 
CARs 
 (-1,+1) 
CARs 
 (-1,+1) 
DA -0.000*   0.000   0.000   
RM_1  0.000   0.000   0.001  
RM_2   0.002   -0.001   -0.003 
SHARES 0.112 0.113 0.112 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.010 -0.003 -0.003 
MKT_CAP -0.091 -0.093 -0.092 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
HAB_BEAT 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
INDUSTRY LEVERAGE -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 
INDUSTRY M_B 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Constant 0.111 0.116 0.115 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.031 0.032 0.032 
          
Observation 117 117 117 64 64 64 64 64 64 
Robust Standard 
Error 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics 1.720 1.210 1.230 0.320 0.340 0.280 0.770 0.370 0.330 
Prob > F 0.123 0.304 0.294 0.923 0.915 0.943 0.593 0.893 0.920 
R-squared 0.046 0.043 0.043 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.043 0.028 0.032 
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Panel B Results from Multiple Regression of Changes in BHARs, and Post-SDARs for Spin-off 
 BHAR (+1,+12) Post-SDARs 
 BHAR (+1, +12) BHAR (+1, +12) BHAR (+1, +12) Post-SDARs Post-SDARs Post-SDARs 
DA 0.000   -0.000*   
RM_1  -0.055***   -0.002  
RM_2   -0.085***   0.003 
SHARES -0.386 -0.456 -0.369 0.044 0.044 0.042 
MKT_CAP 0.158 0.196 0.150 -0.057** -0.058** -0.057** 
HAB_BEAT 0.038 0.024 0.044 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
INDUSTRY LEVERAGE -0.090 0.023 -0.047 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
INDUSTRY M_B -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Constant 0.233 0.169 0.215 0.242*** 0.245*** 0.246*** 
       
Observation 62 62 62 110 110 110 
Robust Standard Error Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics 1.980 25.400 2.860 3.480 2.790 2.730 
Prob > F 0.099 0.000 0.017 0.004 0.015 0.017 
R-squared 0.099 0.262 0.151 0.109 0.103 0.103 
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% level. 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat, CRSP, and Thomson One Database 
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Appendix 17: Results from OLS Regression of Changes in ROAs, CARs, BHARs and SDARs for Divestiture 
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares of changes in ROAs, CARs, BHARs and SDARs for divestitures. The sample covers for all control variables for the period of 1985 to 2015. 
All variables are defined in Appendix 6. 
Panel A Results from Multiple Regression of Changes in ROAs, and CARs for Divestiture 
 ΔROA CARs (-2,0) CARs (-1,+1) 
 ΔROA ΔROA ΔROA CARs  
(-2,0) 
CARs  
(-2,0) 
CARs  
(-2,0) 
CARs 
 (-1,+1) 
CARs 
 (-1,+1) 
CARs 
 (-1,+1) 
DA 0.000   -0.000***   -0.000***   
RM_1  -0.001*   0.000   0.000  
RM_2   0.001*   0.000   0.000 
SOX -0.035** -0.036** -0.035** 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.009 
OPTION 0.010 0.010 0.010 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
SHARES 0.062* 0.063* 0.058 -0.072*** -0.075*** -0.076*** -0.072*** -0.076*** -0.077*** 
MKT_CAP -0.024 -0.025 -0.023 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 
B_M 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.006 0.004 
HAB_BEAT -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
ANALYST -0.045* -0.045* -0.044 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.017 -0.015 -0.015 
LEVERAGE -0.073 -0.072 -0.072 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.046* 0.045* 0.045* 
INDUSTRY 
CONCENTRATION 
-0.595** -0.586** -0.584** -0.332** -0.315** -0.309** -0.410*** -0.387*** -0.383*** 
INDUSTRY LEVERAGE -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.019 0.019* 0.019* 
INDUSTRY ROA 0.093* 0.092* 0.093* -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
IMDUSTRY M_B 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
Constant 0.027 0.028 0.028 -0.062** -0.063** -0.061** -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.084*** 
          
Observation 455 455 455 344 344 344 344 344 344 
Robust Standard 
Error 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics 3.390 3.950 3.750 6.160 2.570 2.450 6.850 2.740 2.760 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.001 
R-squared 0.123 0.124 0.125 0.079 0.076 0.076 0.079 0.075 0.076 
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Panel B Results from Multiple Regression of Changes in BHARs, and Post-SDARs for Divestiture 
*Represent significant at the 10% level. ** Represent significant at the 5% level. *** Represent significant at the 1% level. 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Compustat, CRSP, and Thomson One Database 
 
 BHAR (+1,+12) Post-SDARs 
 BHAR (+1,+12) BHAR (+1,+12) BHAR (+1,+12) Post-SDARs Post-SDARs Post-SDARs 
DA 0.000   0.000   
RM_1  0.000   0.000  
RM_2   0.002   0.001*** 
SOX -0.075 -0.074 -0.075 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 
OPTION -0.049** -0.050** -0.049** 0.0049* 0.005* 0.005* 
SHARES -0.054 -0.048 -0.058 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.051*** 
MKT_CAP 0.165* 0.163* 0.166* -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.064*** 
B_M 0.016 0.014 0.003 0.013 0.013 0.009 
HAB_BEAT -0.020 -0.020 -0.021 0.005** 0.005** 0.004* 
ANALYST -0.184 -0.188 -0.184 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 
LEVERAGE 0.115 0.116 0.115 -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.047*** 
INDUSTRY CONC -1.909** -1.959** -1.918** -0.311*** -0.313*** -0.300*** 
INDUSTRY LEVERAGE -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 0.014 0.014 0.014 
INDUSTRY ROA -0.035 -0.034 -0.036 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
IMDUSTRY M_B 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Constant -0.222 -0.224 -0.215 0.264*** 0.263*** 0.266*** 
       
Observation 343 343 343 513 513 513 
Robust Standard Error Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics 1.290 1.220 1.230 9.350 9.450 16.320 
Prob > F 0.218 0.266 0.259 0.150 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.044 0.044 0.046 0.150 0.150 0.177 
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Appendix 18: Variable Definition- The Effects of Pay Slice and Corporate Governance on Bank’s 
Efficiency and Risk-Taking Behaviour 
Variable  Variable Definition Source 
Measures of performance 
ROA Return on assets. The ratio of net income to total assets. Bankscope 
EFFICIENCY Efficiency score calculated using Stochastic frontier 
analysis. 
Derived 
LN(ZSCORE5) The natural logarithm of the Z-score. The Z-score measure 
the distance from insolvency. 
Zi,t =
ROAi,t + (
E
A)i,t
σ (ROA)i,t
 
Where ROA is return on assets, E/A denotes the equity to 
asset ratio and σ (ROA) is the standard deviation of return 
on assets. We use a five-year rolling time window rather 
than the full sample period, to compute the standard 
deviation of ROA to allow for time variation in the 
denominator of the Z-score. 
Derived 
LN(ZSCORE3) The natural logarithm of the Z-score. The Z-score measure 
the distance from insolvency. 
Zi,t =
ROAi,t + (
E
A)i,t
σ (ROA)i,t
 
Where ROA is return on assets, E/A denotes the equity to 
asset ratio and σ (ROA) is the standard deviation of return 
on assets. We use a three-year rolling time window rather 
than the full sample period, to compute the standard 
deviation of ROA to allow for time variation in the 
denominator of the Z-score. 
 
Explanatory Variables 
IOPr Institutional ownership proportion (IOPr) is the 
percentage of ﬁrm I owned by institutions over a 5-year 
period (i.e., 20 quarters). The value of the coefﬁcient 
reported is for IOPr × 100. 
Following Jafarinejad et al. (2015) and Elyasiani et al. 
(2010) 
 
𝐼𝑂𝑃𝑟 =
(∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑗𝑗𝑡
𝑗=1
20
𝑡=1 )
20
 
 
 
Derived.  
 
 
IOV Institutional ownership volatility (IOVi) is measured as the 
average standard deviation of institutional shareholding 
proportions across all investors in a ﬁrm over a 5-year 
period (i.e., 20 quarters). 
Following Jafarinejad et al. (2015) and Elyasiani et al. 
(2010) 
 
𝐼𝑂𝑉𝑖 =
(∑ Stdev(𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑗𝑗𝑡
𝑡=1 )
j𝑖
 
Derived 
 
L5IO L5io is the number of shares held by the largest five 
institutional ownership. 
Thomson Reuters 
CEODUAL A dummy variable equals to 1 if the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board. This variable is important as it 
serve as a proxy for the relative importance of the CEO to 
the firm (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005) 
Execucomp 
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BOARDSIZE The logarithm of the number of board members. ExecuComp 
SOX  A dummy variable equals to 1 if the year is January 1- 
December 2014 (post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and 0 if 
otherwise 
Derived 
NEWCEO A dummy variable is there any changes of CEO the last 12 
months period equals to 1 and 0 if otherwise 
Execucomp 
CEOEXPERIENCE Dummy variable of 1 if the tenure is more than seven 
years and 0 if otherwise. Following (Bebchuk et al., 2011) 
method. / Number of years. 
Execucomp 
TARP An indicator variable would equal to 1 if the bank received 
funding from the Troubled Assets Relief Program and 0 
otherwise 
http://projects.propublica. 
org/bailout/list 
 
DIRECTOR OWN The percentage of shares owned by board of directors Execucomp 
LEVERAGE Long term debt (data item 9) / Total Assets (data item 6) Compustat 
RETIRINGCEO RETIRINGCEO is a dummy variable of 1 if the age of the 
CEO is more than 60 and 0 if otherwise 
Execucomp 
CEOGENDER CEOGENDER is 1 if the CEO is a male and 0 if otherwise Execucomp 
CRISIS Dfcrisis is a dummy variable of 1 if the period is 2007-2009 
and 0 if otherwise 
Derived 
CPSIII CEO current compensation divided by the current 
compensation of top four management team. CEO 
Compensation/ Top 4 executive following Pissaris, S. 
Jeffus, W. Gleason (2010) 
Derived 
CPSIV CEO contingent compensation divided by total contingent 
compensation of top four management team. CEO 
Compensation/ Top 4 executive following Pissaris, S. 
Jeffus, W. Gleason (2010) 
Derived 
CPSI Total CEO compensation divided by the total 
compensation of top five management team. The total 
compensation as measured by data item TDC1 from 
ExecuComp containing salary, bonus, other annual 
compensation, total value of restricted stock granted, 
Black and Scholes value of stock options granted, long-
term incentive payouts, and all other total incentive 
compensation following the definition by Bebchuk et al. 
(2011) 
Derived 
CPSII Ceo salary compensation divided by salary of total top five 
of management team. CEO pay/ Top Management Team 
following Carpenter and Sanders (2002) and Wade et al. 
(2006) 
Derived 
GEINDEX It is the combination of two indexes, i.e., Entrenchment 
Index consists of six of the governance/shareholder rights 
provision. Eindex ranges between 0 and 6, where higher 
values indicate weaker shareholder rights or more 
retrenched management, and Governance Index (GIndex), 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), which is based on a 
broader set of 24 governance provisions. A high G-index 
value represents weak shareholder (or strong managerial) 
power. GEindex is the percentage of the scores of the 
combination of G-Index and E-Index.  
RiskMetrik 
TA The proxy of firm size measured by logarithm of a total 
asset in the balance sheet.  
Derived 
CEOAGE The logarithm of the age of the CEO.  Execucomp 
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ZSCORE5MEDIAN Is the industry-year median of ln(zscore5) Derived 
ZSCORE3MEDIAN Is the industry-year median of ln(zscore3) Derived 
EFFICIENCYMEDIAN Is the industry-year median of SFA  Derived 
SDARMEDIAN Is the industry-year median of standard deviation of 
annual stock return 
Derived 
SDDAILYMEDIAN Is the industry-year median of standard deviation of daily 
stock return 
Derived 
CFOISVP Cfoisvp is a dummy variable of 1 if the CFO of the firm is 
one of the VPs. 
Execucomp 
NUMBEROFVPS Numberofvps is the number of the vice presidents. Execucomp 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Bankscope, Execucomp and Compustat 
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Appendix 19: List of Banks 
No. Bank Name  
1 Affiliated Managers Group, Inc. 
2 American Express Company 
3 Anchor BanCorp Wisconsin Inc 
4 Associated Banc-Corp. 
5 Astoria Financial Corporation 
6 BBandT Corporation  
7 BBCN Bancorp, Inc  
8 BBX Capital Corporation 
9 Bancorpsouth, Inc.  
10 Bank Mutual Corporation 
11 Bank Of The Ozarks Inc 
12 Bank of America Corporation 
13 Bank of Hawaii Corporation 
14 Bank of New York Mellon Corporation 
15 Banner Corporation  
16 BlackRock, Inc  
17 BofI Holding Inc  
18 Boston Private Financial Holdings Inc 
19 Brookline Bancorp Inc 
20 CIT Group, Inc  
21 CME Group Inc  
22 CVB Financial Corp  
23 Capital One Financial Corporation 
24 Cardinal Financial Corporation 
25 Cascade Bancorp  
26 Cathay General Bancorp Inc 
27 Central Pacific Financial Corp. 
28 Charles Schwab Corporation 
29 Citigroup Inc  
30 City Holding Company 
31 City National Corporation 
32 Columbia Banking System, Inc 
33 Comerica Incorporated 
34 Commerce Bancshares, Inc. 
35 Community Bank System, Inc. 
36 Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc 
37 Dime Community Bancshares, Inc 
38 Discover Financial Services 
39 E*Trade Financial Corporation 
40 East West Bancorp, Inc 
41 FNB Corporation  
42 Fifth Third Bancorp  
43 First BanCorp  
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44 First Commonwealth Financial Corp. 
45 First Financial Bancorp 
46 First Financial Bankshares, Inc 
47 First Horizon National Corporation 
48 First Midwest Bancorp, Inc 
49 First NBC Bank Holding Company 
50 First Niagara Financial Group, Inc 
51 FirstMerit Corporation 
52 Flagstar Bancorp Inc  
53 Franklin Resources, Inc. 
54 Fulton Financial Corporation 
55 Glacier Bancorp, Inc  
56 Goldman Sachs Group, Inc 
57 Hancock Holding Company 
58 Hanmi Financial Corporation 
59 Home Bancshares, Inc. 
60 Hudson City Bancorp Inc 
61 Huntington Bancshares Inc 
62 Independent Bank Corp. 
63 Independent Bank Corporation 
64 International Bancshares Corporation 
65 Irwin Financial Corporation 
66 JPMorgan Chase and Co 
67 KeyCorp   
68 Legg Mason Inc  
69 MandT Bank Corporation 
70 MB Financial Inc  
71 Morgan Stanley  
72 NBT Bancorp, Inc.  
73 National Penn Bancshares, Inc. 
74 Northern Trust Corporation 
75 OFG Bancorp  
76 Old National Bancorp 
77 Oritani Financial Corp 
78 PHH Corporation  
79 PNC Financial Services Group Inc 
80 PacWest Bancorp  
81 People's United Financial, Inc 
82 Pinnacle Financial Partners, Inc. 
83 Popular, Inc  
84 Privatebancorp, Inc.  
85 Prosperity Bancshares, Inc 
86 Provident Financial Services, Inc. 
87 Raymond James Financial Inc 
88 Regions Financial Corporation 
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89 S and T Bancorp, Inc.  
90 SEI Investments Company 
91 SLM Corporation-Sallie Mae 
92 SVB Financial Group  
93 Signature Bank  
94 Simmons First National Corporation 
95 Southside Bancshares, Inc 
96 State Street Corporation 
97 Stifel Financial Corp  
98 SunTrust Banks, Inc.  
99 Synovus Financial Corp 
100 T. Rowe Price Group, Inc 
101 TCF Financial Corporation 
102 TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation 
103 Talmer Bancorp Inc  
104 Texas Capital Bancshares, Inc 
105 Tompkins Financial Corp 
106 TrustCo Bank Corp of NY 
107 Trustmark Corporation 
108 UMB Financial Corporation 
109 US Bancorp  
110 Umpqua Holdings Corporation 
111 United Bankshares, Inc. 
112 United Community Banks, Inc 
113 Valley National Bancorp 
114 Visa Inc   
115 Washington Federal Inc 
116 Webster Financial Corp 
117 Wells Fargo and Company 
118 Westamerica Bancorporation 
119 Wilshire Bancorp, Inc. 
120 Wintrust Financial Corporation 
121 Zions Bancorporation 
 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Bankscope 
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Appendix 20: Correlation Matrix of independent variables 
This table presents a Pearson correlation matrix of key variables of interest for the sample of banks included in our sample. The sample covers for all independent variables 
for the period of 2000 to 2014. All variables are defined in Appendix 18. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
CPS 1 1.00                
CEOAGE 2 0.08** 1.00               
CEODUAL 3 -0.03 0.01 1.00              
CEOEXPERIENCE 4 0.11** 0.07* 0.01 1.00             
CEOGENDER 5 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.03 1.00            
NEWCEO 6 -0.08** 0.00 0.02 -0.3** 0.00 1.00           
RETIRINGCEO 7 0.05 0.44** 0.02 0.13** 0.07* -0.1** 1.00          
IOP 8 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.04 1.00         
IOV 9 -0.09** -0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 1.00        
CRISIS 10 0.05 -0.09** -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.09** -0.3** -0.1** 0.00 1.00       
SOX 11 -0.08** 0.00 -0.10* -0.05 -0.03 -0.06* 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 1.00      
GEINDEX 12 -0.02 -0.02 0.08** 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.10** 0.02 -0.06 -0.1** -0.3** 1.00     
DIRECTOWN 13 -0.01 0.04 -0.12** 0.00 -0.08* -0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.16* 0.36* -0.5** 1.00    
DEBT 14 -0.05 0.10** 0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.1** 0.01 0.07* -0.1** 1.00   
BOARDSIZE 15 -0.2** -0.14** 0.00 -0.1** 0.09** 0.18** -0.1** 0.02 0.00 -0.07* -0.2** 0.15** -0.2** 0.06 1.00  
TA 16 -0.17** 0.02 0.06 -0.2** 0.09** 0.00 -0.1** 0.08* 0.14** -0.2** -0.1** -0.04 -0.2** 0.17** 0.19** 1.00 
*statistically significant at the 5% margin; **statistically significant at the 1% margin.
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Appendix 21:  Variance Inflator Analysis (VIF) 
This table presents a Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of key variables of interest for the sample of firms 
included in our sample. The sample covers for all independent variables for the period of 2000 to 2014. 
All variables are defined in Appendix 18. 
Variable  VIF 1/VIF 
DIRECTOWN 1.77 0.566200 
GEINDEX 1.60 0.623172 
RETIRINGCEO 1.50 0.665362 
TA 1.40 0.716456 
CEOAGE 1.32 0.758439 
CRISIS 1.29 0.773803 
SOX 1.23 0.810725 
BOARDSIZE 1.18 0.844019 
CEOEXPERIENCE 1.18 0.848031 
NEWCEO 1.15 0.872874 
CPS 1.09 0.918799 
DEBT 1.08 0.927294 
CEOGENDER 1.04 0.965655 
IOV 1.03 0.968109 
CEODUAL 1.03 0.972046 
IOP 1.02 0.980965 
Mean  1.24  
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Appendix 22: Firm Characteristics, Efficiency Scores, and Risk Index Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the firm characteristics, efficiency scores, and risk index descriptive statistics for the 
sample of firms included in our sample. The sample covers for all independent variables for the period of 
2000 to 2014. All variables are defined in Appendix 18. 
Panel A: Characteristics of Banks 
Variable Mean (USD ‘000) Median (USD ‘000) Std Dev (USD ‘000) 
Employees (#Thousands) 15.056*** 2.824*** 44.178 
Equity  13,781,490.570*** 1,918,150.000*** 40,507,914.690 
Deposit/Equity 6.467*** 6.821*** 3.179 
Profit before Tax  1,610,285.830*** 224,300.000*** 4,616,658.470 
Total Operating Expenses 3,230,054.330*** 175,750.000*** 8,700,706.250 
Total Assets  121,691.630*** 14,787.210*** 384,822.650 
Return on Assets (ROA) 1.720*** 1.034*** 3.466 
Liabilities - Total 108,009.170*** 12,573.810*** 344,909.360 
Overheads  3,905,581.800*** 418,200.000*** 11,488,536.320 
Figures are in thousands and for the year 2014. Only ROA and Deposit/Equity are in ratios. 
Panel B: Efficiency Scores and Risk Index and Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev 
EFFICIENCY 0.230*** 0.180*** 0.145 
LN(ZSCORE3) 1.826*** 1.928*** 0.728 
LN(ZSCORE5) 1.785*** 1.878*** 0.666 
SDAR 0.089*** 0.070*** 0.066 
SDD 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.017 
IOV 24,898.170*** 936.896*** 315,422.090 
IOPR 255.815*** 273.492*** 115.972 
L5IO 104,804,527.000*** 24,000,000.000*** 283,413,134.000 
BOARDSIZE 1.730*** 1.609*** 0.190 
DEBT 0.090*** 0.071*** 0.087 
GEINDEX 17.363*** 13.000*** 10.912 
CPSi 0.374*** 0.366*** 0.137 
CPSii 0.327*** 0.324*** 0.121 
CPSiii 0.327*** 0.324*** 0.130 
CPSiv 0.388*** 0.388*** 0.189 
Panel C: Frequencies Tables for Control Variables 
Variables Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
CeodualL:     
CEO not having duality 
roles 
1161 99.15 1161 99.15 
CEO having duality 
roles 
10 0.85 1171 100.00 
     
SOX:     
Year before SOX 69 5.89 69 5.89 
Year after SOX 1102 94.11 1171 100.00 
     
Retiringceo:     
CEO age is less than 60 
years old 
808 69.00 808 69.00 
CEO age is more than 
60 years old 
363 31.00 1171 100.00 
     
Newceo:     
Not having new CEO in 
the year 
1100 93.94 1100 93.94 
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Having a new CEO in 
the year 
71 6.06 1171 100.00 
     
Ceoexperience:     
CEO tenure is less than 
7 years 
437 37.32 437 37.32 
CEO tenure is more 
than 7 years  
734 62.68 1171 100.00 
     
Ceogender:     
Female 19 1.62 19 1.62 
Male 1152 98.38 1171 100.00 
     
Director Own:     
CEO is not having any 
ownership with the 
firm 
345 29.46 345 29.46 
CEO having ownership 
with the firm 
826 70.54 1171 100.00 
     
TARP:     
Not TARP recipients 775 66.18 775 66.18 
TARP recipients 396 33.82 1171 100.00 
     
Crisis:     
Years other than 2007-
2009 
907 77.46 907 77.46 
During the financial 
crisis in the year 2007-
2009 
264 22.54 1171 100.00 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Bankscope, Execucomp and Compustat 
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Appendix 23: Bank efficiency and CPS 
This table presents the findings on the relationship between the bank efficiency and CPS for the sample 
of firms included in our sample. The sample covers for all independent variables for the period of 2000 to 
2014. All variables are defined in Appendix 18. 
Panel B: Results of Efficiency on CPSii- Total Salary  
Panel C: Results of Efficiency on CPS – Total Current Compensation 
 CPSiii 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables EFFICIENCY EFFICIENCY EFFICIENCY CPSiii 
CPSiii -0.002*** -0.010***   
CEOAGE -0.136* -0.138 -0.158  
CEODUAL 0.092** 0.120** 0.124*** -1.340 
CEOEXPERIENCE 0.011 0.029** 0.029*** 1.415 
 CPSii 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables EFFICIENCY EFFICIENCY EFFICIENCY CPSii 
CPSii -0.002*** -0.013***   
CEOAGE -0.128* -0.062 -0.092  
CEODUAL 0.088** 0.084 0.091* -4.435 
CEOEXPERIENCE 0.009 0.016 0.024** -0.004 
CEOGENDER 0.009 -0.027 -0.023  
NEWCEO -0.004 -0.017 -0.011 -2.344 
RETIRINGCEO -0.009 -0.001 -0.002  
IOPR 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000  
IOV -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***  
CRISIS 0.011 0.016 -0.041 -5.241 
SOX -0.161*** -0.167*** -12.834  
GEINDEX -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.093 
DIRECTOR OWN 0.027** 0.003 0.006  
DEBT 0.118** 0.126** 0.110**  
BOARDSIZE -0.016 -0.152*** -0.137*** -6.623*** 
TA 0.107*** 0.096*** 0.099*** 0.270 
TARP    0.238 
L5IO    -0.000 
EFFICIENCY MEDIAN   -112.052  
PREDICTEDC PSII   -0.011***  
PREDICTED EFFICIENCY    -21.970 
CFOISVP    4.827*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.511 
Constant 0.201 0.860** 32.363 56.084*** 
R-Squared 0.48 0.14   
     
Number of Observation 1,045 763 756 756 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-
Statistic for joint relevance 
 7.165*** Instruments used 
in IV (2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
EFFICIENCY 
industry-year 
median 
Hansen J-statistic  1.109   
Wald chi2  460.930***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
of endogeneneity 
 .006   
First-stage F-statistic  4.480***   
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CEOGENDER 0.009 -0.017 -0.008  
NEWCEO -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -1.639 
RETIRINGCEO -0.009 0.001 -0.003  
IOPR 0.000*** -0.000 0.000  
IOV -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***  
CRISIS 0.007 0.001 -0.048 -1.360 
SOX -0.161*** -0.124** -12.913  
GE INDEX -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.018 
DIRECTOR OWN 0.028** 0.014 0.014  
DEBT 0.109* 0.056 0.050  
BOARDSIZE -0.016 -0.155*** -0.132*** -8.950*** 
TA 0.104*** 0.082*** 0.090*** -0.237 
TARP    -0.908 
L5IO    -0.000* 
EFFICIENCY MEDIAN   -112.759  
PREDICTED CPSIII   -0.008***  
PREDICTED EFFICIENCY    -27.578 
CFOISVP    5.554*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.525 
Constant 0.214 0.862*** 32.519 56.992*** 
R-Squared 0.48 0.24   
     
Number of Observation 1,045 763 756 756 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-
Statistic for joint relevance 
 9.263*** Instruments used 
in IV (2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
EFFICIENCY 
industry-year 
median 
Hansen J-statistic  0.931   
Wald Chi2  516.570***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 16.207***   
First-stage F-statistic  7.210***   
Panel D: Results of Efficiency on CPS- Total Contingent Compensation 
 CPSiv 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables EFFICIENCY EFFICIENCY EFFICIENCY CPSiv 
CPSiv -0.000** -0.009**   
CEOAGE -0.142** -0.081 -0.101  
CEODUAL 0.095*** 0.130 0.118** -5.721 
CEOEXPERIENCE 0.009 0.021 0.027*** 0.014 
CEOGENDER 0.013 0.003 0.013  
NEWCEO -0.000 -0.011 -0.002 -2.384 
RETIRINGCEO -0.010 -0.014 -0.018  
IOPR 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*  
IOV -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***  
CRISIS 0.009 -0.010 -0.040 7.883 
SOX -0.145*** -0.092 -12.789  
GE INDEX -0.004*** -0.001 -0.004*** 0.476*** 
DIRECTOROWN 0.028** 0.028 0.049**  
DEBT 0.124** 0.118 0.092*  
BOARDSIZE -0.005 -0.167** -0.151*** -11.075** 
TA 0.109*** 0.101*** 0.100*** -4.047 
TARP    0.294 
L5IO    -0.000 
EFFICIENCYMEDIAN   -111.501  
PREDICTEDCPSIV   -0.007***  
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PREDICTEDEFFICIENCY    23.397 
CFOISVP    6.229*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.375 
Constant 0.128 0.637 32.025 57.042*** 
R-Squared 0.47 0.00   
     
Number of Observation 1,045 763 756 756 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-
Statistic for joint relevance 
 7.942*** Instruments used 
in IV (2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
EFFICIENCY 
industry-year 
median 
Hansen J-statistic  0.191   
Wald Chi2  239.04***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 0.192   
First-stage F-statistic  2.440***   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Bankscope, Execucomp and Compustat 
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Appendix 24: Return Volatility and CPS 
This table presents the findings on the relationship between on return volatility and CPS for the sample of 
firms included in our sample. The sample covers for all independent variables for the period of 2000 to 
2014. All variables are defined in Appendix 18. 
Panel B: Results of Bank Return Volatility (Standard Deviation of Annual Stock Return-SDAR) on CPS – Total Salary  
Panel C: Results of Bank Return Volatility (Standard Deviation of Annual Stock Return-SDAR) on CPS – Total Current 
Compensation 
 CPSiii 
 SDAR 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables SDAR SDAR SDAR CPSiii 
CPSiii -0.000* -0.004***   
CEOAGE -0.087* -0.061 -0.094*  
CEODUAL 0.005 0.004 0.004 -4.335 
 CPSii 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables SDAR SDAR SDAR CPSii 
CPSii -0.000** -0.005***   
CEOAGE -0.087* -0.048 -0.069  
CEODUAL 0.004 -0.016 -0.009 -7.936* 
CEOEXPERIENCE -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.100 
CEOGENDER -0.030** -0.046** -0.039***  
NEWCEO 0.008 0.009 0.011 -2.474 
RETIRINGCEO 0.010** 0.018** 0.018***  
IOPR -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000***  
IOV -0.000 -0.000* -0.000**  
CRISIS 0.051*** 0.134*** -0.043 -5.323 
SOX -0.036*** -0.051* 0.040  
GE INDEX -0.000* -0.001 -0.001 -0.015 
DIRECTOR OWN -0.003 -0.014 -0.009  
DEBT 0.150*** 0.172*** 0.152***  
BOARDSIZE 0.004 -0.042** -0.033** -6.976*** 
TA -0.008*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -2.242*** 
TARP    0.143 
L5IO    -0.000 
SDAR MEDIAN   1.688  
PREDICTED CPSII   -0.004***  
PREDICTED SDAR    37.537 
CFOISVP    4.843*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.567 
Constant 0.342*** 0.586*** 0.364 55.417*** 
R-Squared 0.48 0.16   
     
Number of Observation 991 730 723 723 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic 
for joint relevance 
 7.517*** Instruments 
used in IV 
(2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
SDAR industry-year 
median 
Hansen J-statistic  0.018   
Wald chi2  435.320***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneneity 
 9.997***   
First-stage F-statistic  4.270***   
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CEOEXPERIENCE -0.006 0.003 0.000 1.335 
CEOGENDER -0.030** -0.042** -0.033**  
NEWCEO 0.008 0.014 0.014 -0.911 
RETIRINGCEO 0.010** 0.017** 0.017***  
IOPr -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000***  
IOV -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
CRISIS 0.050*** 0.129*** -0.043 1.357 
SOX -0.036*** -0.039 0.040  
GE INDEX -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 0.056 
DIRECTOR OWN -0.003 -0.009 -0.006  
DEBT 0.149*** 0.138*** 0.130***  
BOARDSIZE 0.004 -0.044** -0.030* -9.402*** 
TA -0.008*** -0.020*** -0.014*** -3.610*** 
TARP    -0.845 
L5IO    -0.000 
SDARMEDIAN   1.671  
PREDICTEDCPSIII   -0.003***  
PREDICTEDSDAR    -13.174 
CFOISVP    5.702*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.656* 
Constant 0.342*** 0.559*** 0.343 66.320*** 
R-Squared 0.48 0.26   
     
Number of Observation 991 730 723 723 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic 
for joint relevance 
 9.487*** Instruments used 
in IV (2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
SDAR industry-
year median 
Hansen J-statistic  0.010   
Wald Chi2  493.180***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 13.401***   
First-stage F-statistic  6.900***   
Panel D: Results of Bank Return Volatility (Standard Deviation of Annual Stock Return-SDAR) on CPS – Total 
Contingent Compensation 
 CPSiv 
 SD Annual Stock Return 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables SDAR SDAR SDAR CPSiv 
CPSiv -0.000 -0.004**   
CEOAGE -0.087* 0.035 -0.074  
CEODUAL 0.006 0.009 0.002 -3.188 
CEOEXPERIENCE -0.006* -0.001 -0.001 0.846 
CEOGENDER -0.030** -0.033 -0.025*  
NEWCEO 0.008 0.014 0.014* -1.365 
RETIRINGCEO 0.009* 0.005 0.012*  
IOPr -0.000 -0.000** -0.000**  
IOV -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*  
CRISIS 0.051*** 0.126*** -0.038 6.462 
SOX -0.034*** -0.025 0.032  
GE INDEX -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.407*** 
DIRECTOR OWN -0.003 0.001 0.006  
DEBT 0.151*** 0.164*** 0.146***  
BOARDSIZE 0.005 -0.051* -0.037** -12.975*** 
TA -0.008*** -0.012** -0.011*** -0.863 
TARP    0.079 
L5IO    -0.000* 
SDAR MEDIAN   1.644  
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PREDICTED CPSIV   -0.003***  
PREDICTED SDAR    -1.823 
CFOISVP    6.288*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.335 
Constant 0.330*** 0.330 0.294 53.755*** 
R-Squared 0.48 0.00   
     
Number of Observation 991 730 723 723 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic 
for joint relevance 
 7.972*** Instruments used 
in IV (2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
SDAR industry-
year median 
Hansen J-statistic  0.122   
Wald Chi2  286.840***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 11.533***   
First-stage F-statistic  2.330***   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Bankscope, Execucomp, CRSP, and Compustat 
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Appendix 25: Bank Return Volatility and CPS 
This table presents the findings on the relationship between on return volatility (Standard Deviation of Daily 
Stock Return- SDD) and CPS for the sample of firms included in our sample. The sample covers for all 
independent variables for the period of 2000 to 2014. All variables are defined in Appendix 18. 
Panel A: Results of Bank Volatility (Standard Deviation of Daily Stock Return- SDD) on CPS - Total Compensation 
 
 
CPSi 
 SD Daily Stock Return 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables SDD SDD SDD CPSi 
CPSi -0.000*** -0.001***   
CEOAGE -0.012 -0.006 -0.008  
CEODUAL 0.006*** 0.002 0.001 -3.341 
CEOEXPERIENCE -0.003*** -0.002* -0.001 -0.609 
CEOGENDER -0.009* -0.010*** -0.009***  
NEWCEO -0.000 0.000 0.001 -3.039 
RETIRINGCEO 0.002 0.003* 0.002*  
IOPR -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*  
IOV 0.000 -0.000* -0.000*  
CRISIS 0.023*** 0.036*** 0.086 6.416 
SOX -0.011*** -0.007 -0.035  
GE INDEX -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.167** 
DIRECTOR OWN 0.002 -0.005** -0.003*  
DEBT 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.024***  
BOARDSIZE -0.001 -0.008** -0.008** -8.869*** 
TA -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** -1.388* 
TARP    -0.208 
L5IO    -0.000*** 
SDD MEDIAN   -1.490  
PREDICTED CPSI   -0.001***  
PREDICTED SDD    -159.736 
CFOISVP    5.469*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.665 
Constant 0.073*** 0.102*** 0.142 60.184*** 
R-Squared 0.430 0.520   
     
Number of Observation 1,038 756 750 750 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-
Statistic for joint relevance 
 8.975*** Instruments used 
in IV (2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
SDD industry-year 
median 
Hansen J-statistic  0.117   
Wald chi2  1078.890***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 29.388***   
First-stage F-statistic  3.990***   
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Panel B: Results of Bank Volatility (Standard Deviation of Daily Stock Return- SDD) on CPS - Salary  
Panel C: Results of Bank Volatility (Standard Deviation of Daily Stock Return- SDD) on CPS - Current  
 CPSii 
 SD Daily Stock Return 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables SDD SDD SDD CPS 
CPSii -0.000* -0.001***   
CEOAGE -0.010 0.004 -0.001  
CEODUAL 0.006*** -0.001 -0.001 -6.985* 
CEOEXPERIENCE -0.003*** -0.002* -0.001 -0.165 
CEOGENDER -0.009* -0.012*** -0.011***  
NEWCEO 0.000 0.001 0.001 -3.086* 
RETIRINGCEO 0.002 0.003** 0.003***  
IOPR -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000***  
IOV 0.000 -0.000* -0.000**  
CRISIS 0.023*** 0.038*** 0.087 -7.699 
SOX -0.010*** -0.013** -0.036  
GE INDEX -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** -0.016 
DIRECTOR OWN 0.002 -0.005** -0.004**  
DEBT 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.028***  
BOARDSIZE -0.001 -0.008* -0.007** -6.363*** 
TA -0.001** -0.003*** -0.002*** -2.236*** 
TARP    0.363 
L5IO    -0.000 
SDD MEDIAN   -1.494  
PREDICTED CPSII   -0.001***  
PREDICTED SDD    223.051 
CFOISVP    4.843*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.520 
Constant 0.068*** 0.104*** 0.145 52.130*** 
R-Squared 0.43 0.46   
     
Number of Observation 1,038 756 750 750 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic 
for joint relevance 
 7.123*** Instruments used 
in IV (2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
SDD industry-
year median 
Hansen J-statistic  0.075   
Wald chi2  955.730***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 7.919***   
First-stage F-statistic  4.470***   
 CPSiii 
 SD Daily Stock Return 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables SDD SDD SDD CPS 
CPSiii -0.000** -0.001***   
CEOAGE -0.011 -0.003 -0.006  
CEODUAL 0.006*** 0.002 0.002 -4.101 
CEOEXPERIENCE -0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 0.903 
CEOGENDER -0.009* -0.012*** -0.010***  
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Panel D: Results of Bank Volatility (Standard Deviation of Daily Stock Return- SDD) on CPS - Contingent 
NEWCEO -0.000 0.002 0.001 -1.610 
RETIRINGCEO 0.002 0.004** 0.003***  
IOPr -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000***  
IOV 0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
CRISIS 0.023*** 0.037*** 0.088 1.983 
SOX -0.011*** -0.009* -0.037  
GE INDEX -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.084 
DIRECTOR OWN 0.002 -0.004* -0.003**  
DEBT 0.031*** 0.025*** 0.023***  
BOARDSIZE -0.001 -0.009** -0.007** -9.035*** 
TA -0.002** -0.004*** -0.003*** -3.667*** 
TARP    -0.775 
L5IO    -0.000 
SDD MEDIAN   -1.569  
PREDICTED CPSIII   -0.001***  
PREDICTED SDD    -46.828 
CFOISVP    5.719*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.566 
Constant 0.071*** 0.104*** 0.145 64.440*** 
R-Squared 0.43 0.54   
     
Number of Observation 1,038 756 750 750 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic 
for joint relevance 
 9.285*** Instruments used 
in IV (2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
SDDaily industry-
year median 
Hansen J-statistic  0.031   
Wald chi2  1110.790***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 27.319***   
First-stage F-statistic  7.140***   
 CPSiv 
 SD Daily Stock Return 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables SDD SDD SDD CPS 
CPSiv -0.000* -0.001**   
CEOAGE -0.011 0.002 -0.002  
CEODUAL 0.006*** 0.002 0.001 -5.781 
CEOEXPERIENCE -0.003*** -0.002 -0.001 -1.243 
CEOGENDER -0.009* -0.010** -0.008***  
NEWCEO 0.000 0.001 0.002 -2.270 
RETIRINGCEO 0.002 0.002 0.002*  
IOPr -0.000* -0.000** -0.000*  
IOV 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*  
CRISIS 0.023*** 0.036*** 0.086 0.540 
SOX -0.010*** -0.007 -0.036  
GE INDEX -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.094 
DIRECTOR OWN 0.002* -0.002 -0.000  
DEBT 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.026***  
BOARDSIZE -0.001 -0.010* -0.008** -13.408*** 
TA -0.001** -0.002** -0.002*** -2.243** 
TARP    0.267 
L5IO    -0.000* 
SDD MEDIAN   -1.459  
PREDICTED CPSIV   -0.001***  
PREDICTED SDD    -26.389 
CFOISVP    6.674*** 
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Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Bankscope, Execucomp, CRSP, and Compustat 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.447 
Constant 0.069*** 0.087** 0.128 72.747*** 
R-Squared 0.43 0.22   
     
Number of Observation 1,038 756 750 750 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic 
for joint relevance 
 7.973*** Instruments used 
in IV (2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
SDD industry-
year median 
Hansen J-statistic  0.0300   
Wald chi2  655.780***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 7.072***   
First-stage F-statistic  2.450***   
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Appendix 26: Bank Stability and CPS- Z-Score 3 
This table presents the findings on the relationship between on bank stability (ln(Z-Score3)) and CPS for the 
sample of firms included in our sample. The sample covers for all independent variables for the period of 
2000 to 2014. All variables are defined in Appendix 18. 
Panel B: Results of Bank Stability (ln(Z-Score3)) on CPSii – Total Salary  
  
 CPSii 
 Bank Stability 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables ln(Z-Score3) ln(Z-Score3) ln(Z-Score3) CPSii 
CPSii 0.006 0.134***   
CEOAGE 1.131 -0.834 -0.252  
CEODUAL 0.166 0.745 0.660 -7.399* 
CEOEXPERIENCE 0.537*** 0.573*** 0.474*** -1.134 
CEOGENDER 0.220 0.782 0.655  
NEWCEO -0.131 -0.098 -0.102 -1.684 
RETIRINGCEO 0.040 -0.036 0.001  
IOPr -0.001* 0.002* 0.002  
IOV -0.000 0.000 0.000  
CRISIS 0.109 -1.491*** -1.019** -2.476 
SOX 0.360 1.789** 1.435**  
GE INDEX 0.018*** 0.025** 0.025** -0.075 
DIRECTOR OWN 0.121 0.066 -0.033  
DEBT -1.956*** -1.863** -1.414**  
BOARDSIZE -0.437 0.524 0.268 -5.648** 
TA 0.130* 0.307** 0.236** -2.690*** 
TARP    0.287 
L5IO    -0.000 
ZSCORE3 MEDIAN   0.003  
PREDICTED CPSII   0.111***  
PREDICTED LNZSCORE3    6.702** 
CFOISVP    4.787*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.567* 
Constant 1.381 -3.862 -3.143 49.787*** 
R-Squared 0.16 0.00   
     
Number of Observation 1,030 751 747 747 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic for 
joint relevance 
 6.776*** Instruments 
used in IV 
(2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
Ln(z-score3) 
industry-year 
median 
Hansen J-statistic  0.565   
Wald chi2  115.760***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 1.197   
First-stage F-statistic  4.470***   
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Panel C: Results of Bank Stability (ln(Z-Score3)) on CPSiii – Total Current Compensation 
 CPSiii 
 Bank Stability 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables ln(Z-Score3) ln(Z-Score3) ln(Z-Score3) CPSiii 
CPSiii 0.005 0.105***   
CEOAGE 1.157 -0.002 0.410  
CEODUAL 0.151 0.368 0.319 -5.110 
CEOEXPERIENCE 0.533*** 0.436*** 0.440*** -0.050 
CEOGENDER 0.218 0.653 0.501  
NEWCEO -0.137 -0.205 -0.188 -0.799 
RETIRINGCEO 0.039 -0.052 0.010  
IOPr -0.001** 0.001 0.000  
IOV -0.000* 0.000 0.000  
CRISIS 0.124 -1.355*** -0.958** 2.162 
SOX 0.348 1.394* 1.424**  
GE INDEX 0.017*** 0.012 0.016 0.039 
DIRECTOR OWN 0.118 -0.070 -0.108  
DEBT -1.933*** -1.177 -0.845  
BOARDSIZE -0.444 0.547 0.178 -7.786*** 
TA 0.137* 0.442*** 0.315** -3.934*** 
TARP    -0.894 
L5IO    -0.000 
ZSCORE3 MEDIAN   0.003  
PREDICTED CPSiii   0.073**  
PREDICTED LNZSCORE3    8.561** 
CFOISVP    5.453*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.603* 
Constant 1.398 -3.781 -2.515 48.985*** 
R-Squared 0.16 0.00   
     
Number of Observation 1,030 751 747 747 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic for 
joint relevance 
 8.792*** Instruments 
used in IV 
(2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
Ln(z-score3) 
industry-year 
median 
Hansen J-statistic  .6829   
Wald Chi2  127.220***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 16.136***   
First-stage F-statistic  7.040***   
Panel D: Results of Bank Stability (ln(Z-Score3)) on CPSiv – Total Contingent Compensation 
 CPSiv 
 Bank Stability 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables ln(Z-Score3) ln(Z-Score3) ln(Z-Score3) CPSiv 
CPSiv 0.004** 0.090**   
CEOAGE 1.199 -0.818 -0.095  
CEODUAL 0.152 0.277 0.361 -6.203 
CEOEXPERIENCE 0.533*** 0.522*** 0.464*** -1.321 
CEOGENDER 0.208 0.421 0.297  
NEWCEO -0.139 -0.196 -0.199 -1.633 
RETIRINGCEO 0.040 0.146 0.154  
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IOPr -0.001** 0.000 -0.001  
IOV -0.000* 0.000 0.000  
CRISIS 0.100 -1.257*** -1.033** 0.209 
SOX 0.352 1.290 1.589**  
GE INDEX 0.016** -0.015 0.009 0.086 
DIRECTOR OWN 0.107 -0.329 -0.424  
DEBT -1.987*** -1.780* -1.245*  
BOARDSIZE -0.440 0.679 0.321 -13.800*** 
TA 0.125* 0.234* 0.219** -2.045* 
TARP    -0.021 
L5IO    -0.000* 
ZSCORE3 MEDIAN   0.003  
PREDICTED CPSiv   0.066**  
PREDICTED LNZSCORE3    1.271 
CFOISVP    6.482*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.470 
Constant 1.418 -0.743 -1.072 70.020*** 
R-Squared 0.16 0.00   
     
Number of Observation 1,030 751 747 747 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic 
for joint relevance 
 7.469*** Instruments used 
in IV (2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
Ln(z-score3) 
industry-year 
median 
Hansen J-statistic  1.023   
Wald Chi2  85.980***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneneity 
 3.319*   
First-stage F-statistic  2.450***   
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Bankscope, Execucomp and Compustat 
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Appendix 27: Bank Stability and CPS- Z- Score 5 
This table presents the findings on the relationship between on bank stability (ln(Z-Score5)) and CPS for the 
sample of firms included in our sample. The sample covers for all independent variables for the period of 
2000 to 2014. All variables are defined in Appendix 18. 
Panel A: Results of Bank Stability (ln(Z-Score5)) on CPSi - Total Compensation 
 CPSi 
 Bank Stability 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables ln(Z-Score5) ln(Z-Score5) ln(Z-Score5) CPSi 
CPSi 0.006** 0.055*   
CEOAGE 1.418 1.377 1.774  
CEODUAL -0.067 0.241 0.287 -3.779 
CEOEXPERIENCE 0.631*** 0.611*** 0.583*** -1.279 
CEOGENDER 0.554* 0.644 0.435  
NEWCEO -0.036 -0.061 -0.055 -2.445 
RETIRINGCEO -0.014 -0.031 -0.032  
IOPr -0.001* -0.000 -0.001  
IOV -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000  
CRISIS 0.164 -0.869*** -0.457 4.709 
SOX -0.060 0.447 0.745  
GE INDEX 0.015** 0.010 0.018** 0.158** 
DIRECTOR OWN 0.126 0.011 -0.155  
DEBT -2.756*** -2.146*** -1.929***  
BOARDSIZE -0.420 0.139 -0.135 -7.343** 
TA 0.054 0.181* 0.121 -1.171 
TARP    -0.300 
L5IO    -0.000** 
ZSCORE5 MEDIAN   1.889  
PREDICTED CPSi   0.034  
PREDICTED LNZSCORE5    6.578* 
CFOISVP    5.255*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.733* 
Constant 1.350 -2.191 -4.943 40.179*** 
R-Squared 0.18 0.06   
     
Number of Observation 1,039 759 753 753 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic for 
joint relevance 
 8.913*** Instruments 
used in IV 
(2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
Ln(z-score5) 
industry-year 
median 
Hansen J-statistic  2.101   
Wald chi2  144.570***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneneity 
 10.503***   
First-stage F-statistic  3.930***   
Panel B: Results of Bank Stability (ln(Z-Score5)) on CPSii – Total Salary  
 CPSii 
 Bank Stability 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables ln(Z-Score5) ln(Z-Score5) ln(Z-Score5) CPSii 
CPSii 0.009*** 0.072*   
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Panel C: Results of Bank Stability (ln(Z-Score5)) on CPSiii – Total Current Compensation 
 CPSiii 
 Bank Stability 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables ln(Z-Score5) ln(Z-Score5) ln(Z-Score5) CPSiii 
CPSiii 0.005* 0.055*   
Ceoage 1.358 1.153 1.710  
Ceodual -0.071 0.274 0.220 -4.385 
Ceoexperience 0.628*** 0.540*** 0.580*** -0.065 
Ceogender 0.565* 0.734* 0.474  
Newceo -0.042 -0.139 -0.095 -1.024 
Retiringceo -0.015 -0.096 -0.069  
IOPr -0.001* 0.000 -0.001  
IOV -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000  
Crisis 0.196 -0.936*** -0.452 2.709 
SOX -0.072 0.681 0.762  
GE Index 0.016*** 0.016* 0.020** 0.060 
Director Own 0.118 -0.094 -0.128  
Debt -2.729*** -2.048*** -1.934***  
Boardsize -0.425 0.145 -0.256 -7.813*** 
TA 0.064 0.258** 0.141 -3.540*** 
Ceoage 1.317 0.696 1.410  
Ceodual -0.044 0.482 0.389 -6.820* 
Ceoexperience 0.631*** 0.614*** 0.583*** -1.017 
Ceogender 0.570* 0.796* 0.555  
Newceo -0.030 -0.080 -0.052 -2.002 
Retiringceo -0.016 -0.091 -0.082  
IOPr -0.001 0.001 0.000  
IOV -0.000** 0.000 0.000  
Crisis 0.173 -1.009*** -0.472 -2.283 
SOX -0.039 0.894 0.767  
GE Index 0.016*** 0.023** 0.023*** -0.055 
Director Own 0.121 -0.023 -0.098  
Debt -2.751*** -2.434*** -2.147***  
Boardsize -0.399 0.150 -0.157 -5.936** 
TA 0.060 0.189* 0.125 -2.381*** 
TARP    0.283 
L5IO    -0.000 
ZScore5 Median   1.889  
Predicted CPSii   0.048  
Predicted lnzscore5    5.033* 
cfoisvp    4.848*** 
numberofvps    -0.569* 
Constant 1.268 -2.283 -5.073 50.434*** 
R-Squared 0.19 0.06   
     
Number of Observation 1,039 759 753 753 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic for 
joint relevance 
 6.970***   
Hansen J-statistic  2.642 Instruments 
used in IV 
(2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
Ln(z-score5) 
industry-year 
median 
Wald chi2  144.700***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 0.207   
First-stage F-statistic  4.560***   
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TARP    -0.881 
L5IO    -0.000 
ZScore5 Median   1.878  
Predicted CPSiii   0.026  
Predicted lnzscore5    7.991*** 
cfoisvp    5.550*** 
numberofvps    -0.609* 
Constant 1.408 -2.179 -4.426 46.396*** 
R-Squared 0.18 0.08   
     
Number of Observation 1,039 759 753 753 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic for 
joint relevance 
 9.071*** Instruments 
used in IV 
(2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
Ln(z-score5) 
industry-year 
median 
Hansen J-statistic  2.667   
Wald Chi2  148.350***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 22.884***   
First-stage F-statistic  7.220***   
Panel D: Results of Bank Stability (ln(Z-Score5)) on CPSiv – Total Contingent Compensation 
 CPSiv 
 Bank Stability 
Estimation type OLS IV (2SLS) Simultaneous equations (2SLS) 
Dependent Variables ln(Z-Score5) ln(Z-Score5) ln(Z-Score5) CPSiv 
CPSiv 0.003 0.044   
CEOAGE 1.393 0.955 1.531  
CEODUAL -0.079 0.214 0.236 -6.151 
CEOEXPERIENCE 0.632*** 0.581*** 0.588*** -1.182 
CEOGENDER 0.553* 0.619 0.402  
NEWCEO -0.049 -0.137 -0.099 -1.743 
RETIRINGCEO -0.011 -0.002 -0.018  
IOPr -0.001* -0.000 -0.001  
IOV -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000  
CRISIS 0.184 -0.899*** -0.478 -0.025 
SOX -0.095 0.637 0.819  
GE INDEX 0.015** 0.003 0.017* 0.082 
DIRECTOR OWN 0.112 -0.219 -0.239  
DEBT -2.780*** -2.351*** -2.074***  
BOARDSIZE -0.447 0.137 -0.204 -12.965*** 
TA 0.048 0.143 0.107 -2.117* 
TARP    0.028 
L5IO    -0.000* 
ZSCORE5 MEDIAN   1.874  
PREDICTED CPSiv   0.023  
PREDICTED LNZSCORE5    1.203 
CFOISVP    6.615*** 
NUMBEROFVPS    -0.520 
Constant 1.602 -0.736 -3.918 69.286*** 
R-Squared 0.18 0.00   
     
Number of Observation 1,039 759 753 753 
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-Statistic 
for joint relevance 
 7.948*** Instruments used 
in IV (2SLS) 
CFO is VP 
Number of VPs 
Ln(z-score5) 
industry-year 
median 
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Hansen J-statistic  2.752*   
Wald Chi2  126.320***   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
 1.721   
First-stage F-statistic  2.430***   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Source: Compiled by author from data obtained from Bankscope, Execucomp and Compustat 
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Acquisitions of Financially Constrained Targets 
Abstract 
We examine the extent to which bidders’ stock returns at acquisition announcements 
reflect the financing needs of the target firm. We find that bidders of financially 
constrained targets pay lower acquisition premiums and earn higher announcement 
period cumulative abnormal returns than bidders of unconstrained targets. The lower 
premium and positive stock market reaction are both sources of value for bidders’ 
shareholders. Our results contrast the findings of the literature that document an 
insignificant wealth transfer to bidder shareholders.  
 
Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Financial Constraints; Financially Constrained 
Targets; Event Study; Cumulative Abnormal Returns; M&A Premiums 
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Acquisitions of Financially Constrained Targets 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the wealth effects of targets’ financial constraints in mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A). Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classify firms as financially 
constrained as long as there exists a “wedge” between their internal and external costs 
of finance. Since there always exists an extra cost to raise external finance (for example, 
flotation costs in raising new equity), all firms are financially constrained by default, 
albeit to a different degree. We use an index derived from Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
to categorise target firms in domestic US M&As as financially constrained. The benefit 
of using the KZ classification in M&A is that it allows us to differentiate amongst targets 
based on their financial constraints. We then test how the target firms’ financial 
constraint affects the premium paid by bidder firms in M&A, as well as its impact on the 
wealth of the bidder shareholders. We also examine the factors that cause bidders to 
select targets that are financially constrained.  
Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001), whose study draws heavily from Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997), define “financial constraints” as frictions that prevent a firm from 
financing all its desired investments. The interesting question, therefore, is whether 
investors perceive the M&A market as a place to resolve target firms’ financial 
constraints. Using a sample of European acquisitions and accounting data, Erel, Jang and 
Weisbach (2015) document a decline in target firms’ cash balance, sensitivity of cash-
to-cash flow and sensitivity of investment-to-cash flow post-acquisition. The authors 
conclude that acquisitions relieve financial frictions in target firms and is a potential 
source of value. However, 97.4% of their sample targets are private firms. It would be of 
interest to see whether investors reward the acquisitions of publicly-listed traded 
targets, which are subject to more public scrutiny and have access to more sources of 
funds (for instance, the stock market) than private firms. Our paper is a test for evidence 
using a different sample (i.e., US-based domestic acquisitions), wealth variables (i.e., 
stock market-based M&A announcement period returns and M&A premiums) and 
measures of targets’ financial constraints (i.e., the Kaplan-Zingales Index) to ascertain 
the value created in acquisitions of financially-constrained targets. The sample of public 
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targets provides a stiffer test of the benefits of M&A since these firms have access to 
more sources of funds than private firms do and, therefore, they would rely on the M&A 
market less than private firms do as a mean to resolve their financial constraints. 
Following this opening section, we undertake a review of the literature in Section 2, 
prior to formulating our hypotheses. We also outline the research importance in that 
section. The third section presents our research approach and sampling procedures. We 
present and discuss our findings in Section 4; and, conclude the paper in the final 
section. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (henceforth KZ), find that “financially constrained” does not 
equate to “financially distressed”. They find that financially constrained firms are 
associated with increases in debt. Moreover, firms that are likely or possibly constrained 
are associated with respectable interest coverage ratios, i.e., their medians range 
between 2.84 and 4.20. Lastly, possibly constrained firms are as healthy as firms that 
were never financially constrained. Conversely, using 62 financially distressed firms from 
1979-1988 (which coincides with KZ’s sample period), Brown, James and Mooradian 
(1994) document mean and median interest coverage ratios of 0.634 and 0.434, 
respectively. Furthermore, the authors document that financially distressed firms are 
“extremely” highly geared with mean and median leverage ratios of 0.83 and 0.792, 
respectively, which severely handicap their ability to raise further debt and these firms 
have recourse to asset sales as a means to raise finance. Consequently, the financial 
characteristics between financially-constrained and financially-distressed/bankrupt 
firms differ.  
Lamont et al. (2001) too do not use “financial constraints” to mean financial distress 
or economic distress or bankruptcy risk though the authors caution that they are 
possibly correlated (similar to Livdan, Sapriza and Zhang’s (2009) study of the effects of 
financial constraints on expected returns). Likewise, while it is well documented that the 
stock returns of financially distressed firms are negative (see Campbell, Hilscher and 
Szilagyi, 2011), there is little consensus on the direction of stock returns of financially 
constrained firms. Lamont et al. (2011) report that financial constraints and stock 
returns are inversely related while Whited and Wu (2006), and Livdan, Sapriza and 
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Zhang’s (2009) find that they are directly related. Thus, results based on studies of 
acquisitions of failed/bankrupt/distressed targets (for instance, Bartunek, Madura and 
Tucker, 1995; Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1998; Jory and Madura, 2009; Faelten and 
Vitkova, 2014; Meier and Servaes, 2014; Precourt and Oppenheimer, 2016; Bruyland 
and Maeseneire, 2016) are not wholly applicable to acquisitions of financially 
constrained firms. 
We briefly summarize the findings of the literature on distressed and bankrupt 
acquisitions as follows. Bruton, Oviatt and White (1994) examine 51 acquisitions of 
financially distressed firms and find that acquirer’s prior acquisition experience is 
positively related to acquisition performance. Clark and Ofek (1994) find that 
restructuring success is positively related to the financial distress of the target. Using a 
sample of 55 acquisitions in Chapter 11, Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) document 
positive and significant abnormal stock returns for the bidder and bankrupt target at the 
announcement of the acquisition. The authors conclude that takeovers represent an 
efficient deployment of bankrupt assets. Bartunek, Madura and Tucker (1995), Jory and 
Madura (2009), and Faelten and Vitkova (2014) find that acquirers of bankrupt assets 
earn positive abnormal returns at the M&A announcement. Meier and Servaes (2014) 
document that acquirers of bankrupt companies or assets earn excess returns higher 
than when they acquire regular targets. The authors conclude that this evidence is 
consistent with the view that acquirers benefit from fire sales of distressed and bankrupt 
companies. Precourt and Oppenheimer (2016) find that distressed targets sell their 
assets at a premium compared to bankrupt firms. They also find that acquisitions in 
Chapter 11 offer greater economic value than acquisitions outside of bankruptcy. 
Bruyland and Maeseneire (2016) find that acquisitions of distressed firms lead to an 
increase in bidder’s default risk. 
M&A remains an important corporate restructuring and reorganization strategy, and 
research on the topic has been ongoing for several decades. The findings from the 
finance literature suggest that while M&A reward target firm shareholders, they fail to 
deliver for bidder firm shareholders (Gregory, 1997; Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000). There are 
various propositions advanced to explain this underperformance. For instance, it is likely 
that managers of the bidding firms view takeovers as a means to maximize their own 
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interests at the expense of their shareholders (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006), which 
is consistent with the classic agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976). There is also 
the possibility that these managers overestimate the value of their target firms (Seth, 
Song and Pettit, 2000), which is consistent with the managerial hubris hypothesis of 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Fuller et al. (2002). Under the managerial hubris 
hypothesis, managers of the bidding firm erroneously believe that they are better able 
to extract value from the target firm’s assets than the target’s current managers. 
Besides the finance literature, attempts to explain the disappointing performance of 
M&A have been made in the strategy and organizational behaviour literature. While not 
an exhaustive list, the following reasons have been advanced as explanations of the 
bidding firms’ underperformance: wrong decision-making and poor integration 
processes (also see, Schweiger and Very, 2003); poor organizational learning from prior 
M&A experiments (also see, Hayward, 2002); and a lack of culture fit between the bidder 
and the target (also see, Cartwright, 2005).  
Despite the extant research on M&A, the empirical findings to date suggest that 
M&A continue to underperform prompting calls for the examination of omitted 
variables in the literature (see King et al., 2004). We examine the financial constraints of 
the target firms, which is important for various reasons. First, Lamont et al. (2001) find 
that “financial constraints” affect firm value and that the stock performance of 
financially constrained firms differs from unconstrained ones. Other studies that 
document how financial constraint affects stock returns include Gomes, Yaron and 
Zhang (2006), Whited and Wu (2006), Livdan, Sapriza and Zhang (2009), and Campello 
and Chen (2010). To the extent that “financial constraints” is a priced factor in stock 
returns, it would affect the stock returns of acquirers at M&A announcements. To the 
best of our knowledge, how much of this factor affects bidders’ wealth in M&A is yet to 
be resolved. This paper tests the extent to which part of the factor structure in bidders’ 
stock returns at M&A announcements reflects a particular source of economic 
information, i.e., the degree of financial constraints in the target firm.  
Second, and as documented above, financial constraints do not necessarily imply 
that the business’ survival is at stake to the same extent as financial distress. In the latter 
case, these firms are close to or already in a bankruptcy state. Firms that are financially 
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distressed often cannot secure financing without major restructuring (mostly through 
Chapters 7 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). Conversely, financially 
constrained firms do not require to be restructured to continue in operation. 
Third, and to the extent that “financial constraints” and “financial distress” are 
partially correlated, in many instances it is not possible to calculate an index of financial 
constraints for bankrupt or distressed targets since many of them become delisted. 
Conversely, our study offers the possibility to calculate an index of financial distress for 
all target firms, which should serve to complement prior findings and resolve potential 
biases inherent in samples of distressed and/or bankrupt targets. 
The major difficulty of financially constrained firms is a lack of liquidity and capital, 
which could be due to internal as well as external factors (for instance, during the peak 
of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis many firms experienced difficulties in raising 
finance (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Mokhova, 2011)). These firms could potentially 
fare better from external funding. It is in this context that we argue that M&A can be a 
source of value-added. The bidder firm can possibly extract value from the acquisition 
of a financially constrained target in two ways: (i) by unblocking vital sources of finances 
to allow the target firm to realize its potential, and (ii) by negotiating a bargain deal that 
will benefit its shareholders. To the extent that a target firm is in violation of debt 
covenants, deprived of its usual sources of credit, renegotiating debt payments, or 
unable to fund new investments (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997), the combination of its 
business with another firm would increase the combined entity’s asset base, which 
should improve access to finance for the target firm. All other things being equal, it is 
unlikely that a bidder firm will pay the same premium for a financially constrained target 
as for an unconstrained one and does not extract a price for improving the target’s 
access to finance. As far as bidder firms extract a price for improving the sources of 
finance of target firms (consistent with Stein, 1997, and Erel et al., 2015), acquisitions of 
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financially constrained targets would be associated with lower M&A premium.16 The 
lower premium serves to compensate the bidder firm in lessening the financial 
constraints of the target firm. Thus, in terms of hypotheses, we offer two direct tests as 
follows: 
H1:  Bidders of financially constrained targets (FCTs) experience positive 
announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
H2:  The M&A premium is inversely related to a target’s degree of financial 
constraint 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Data and Sampling 
Our sample period starts in 1985 and ends in 2012. Domestic M&A data is obtained from 
the Thomson One Deal database. Both bidders and targets are US publicly-listed firms, 
and M&A deals are completed as well as the deal value is reported. We exclude firms 
with SICs 4900-4999 and 6000-6999 since they are highly regulated. Bidder firms should 
have return data in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and 
accounting data in the COMPUSTAT database. Target firms should have data in CRSP to 
calculate the M&A premium and they should have data in COMPUSTAT to calculate their 
KZ index. The sample distribution is presented in Table 1. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The highest number of M&A occurred in the year 1998 (309 in that year, which 
represents 7.01% of the total sample). The second highest number of acquisitions 
                                                     
 
 
16 Stein (1997) suggests that headquarters tend to realign internal funds to prioritise projects with positive 
net present values. It implies an investment interdependence between the newly acquired target firm and 
the rest of the bidder company’s divisions/subsidiaries since they are now all located under the same roof 
and can compete equally for internal funds. 
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occurred in 1999 (n = 280, which represents 6.36% of the overall sample). The total 
number of M&A over the sample period from 1985 to 2012 is 4,405. 
3.2 KZ Index 
Lamont et al. (2006) derive an index of financial constraint based on Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), which they refer to as the KZ Index and is estimated as follows: 
KZ Indext = −1.002 (
Cash Flowt
PPEt−1
) + 0.283 Qt
+ 3.139 (
Debtt
Debtt + Book Equityt
) − 39.368 (
Dividendst
PPEt−1
)
− 1.315 (
Casht
PPEt−1
) + ϵt 
(1) 
where cash flow is computed as Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and 
Amortization (EBITDA), Q is the ratio of (Book Value of Assets minus Book Value of Equity 
minus Deferred Taxes plus Market Value of Equity)-to-Book Value of Assets; Debt is the 
sum of long-term debt and current liabilities; and PPE is the value of property, plant and 
equipment. The KZ index is directly related to a firm’s financial constraints. Thus, a 
financially-constrained firm is one with low cash flow-to-PPE and high debt ratio. The 
firm also pays low dividends and has a low cash balance relative to its PPE. 
3.3 Classification of Target Firms by KZ Index 
After calculating the KZ index for each target firm, we form quartiles by ranking all target 
firms using their KZ index. We refer to the top quartile as financially constrained targets 
(FCTs) and the bottom quartile as unconstrained targets (non-FCTs). We do this for the 
sake of analysis and presentation of the results. While there is no certainty that the top 
and bottom quartiles comprise all financially-constrained and unconstrained targets, 
respectively, yet, as a group, the top quartile targets are more financially constrained 
than the bottom quartile. Our classification seems to work since both the mean and 
median KZ index increase monotonically as we move up the quartiles from 1 to 4 (see 
Table 2). For instance, the median KZ indices in Quartiles 1 to 4 are -9, 0, 2 and 3, 
respectively, with higher KZ Index representing more financial constraints. Despite its 
flaws (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010), Lamont et al. (2011) argue that the KZ index is a useful 
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one out of the measures of financial constraints since it is based on an in-depth study of 
firms. Many other studies in corporate finance use the KZ index including Baker, Stein 
and Wurgler (2002); Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004); Hovakimian (2009); 
Campello and Chen (2010); and Li (2011). 
The classification scheme leaves us with target firms at two ends (Q1 vs. Q4) of the 
financial constraint spectrum as follows: at one end we have the most financially 
constrained firms (FCTs) that face the largest “wedge” between their internal and 
external costs of funds (i.e., Q4 or Quartile 4 firms), and at the other end we end up with 
the least financially constrained firms with the most amount of liquid assets (i.e., Q1 or 
Quartile 1 firms). The rank of a quartile increases monotonically with financial 
constraint. 
3.4 Measuring Bidders’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
Bidders’ abnormal returns are obtained from the following market model: 
Ri,t = αi + βiRm,t + ϵi,t (2) 
where i represents bidder firm i, t represents a day, R represents a bidder’s daily return 
and Rm  represents the daily return on the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio. We 
estimate the market model using the 255 daily returns ending 11 days prior to the M&A 
announcement. We cumulate the daily abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement date to obtain the announcement period cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs). Day 0 represents the day of the M&A announcement and we present CARs for 
the following windows, i.e. (-2, +1), (-2, 0) and (-3, 0). We include the daily returns of the 
days immediately preceding the announcement to account for possible leakage of the 
M&A news. To confirm hypothesis 1, we expect bidders’ CARs to be positive and 
statistically significant. 
3.5 M&A Premium 
To the extent that bidders alleviate the financial constraint of the target firms and enable 
them to finance their desired investments as well as to reduce their costs of capital, 
bidders will charge target firms a price for that facility. Consequently, we hypothesize 
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that the M&A premium paid by bidders of financially constrained targets (FCTs) would 
be lower than that paid for unconstrained targets (non-FCTs). The M&A premium is the 
surplus by which the deal value exceeds the target firm’s market capitalization four 
weeks prior to the M&A announcement. The M&A premium is expressed as a 
percentage of the target firm’s market capitalization. To confirm hypothesis 2, we 
expect FCTs and M&A premiums to be inversely related. 
M&A Premium
=
Deal Value − Target Market Capitalization 4 wks prior to Announcement
Target Market Capitalization 4 wks prior to Announcement
 
(3) 
We present descriptive statistics on the KZ Index, CARs and MA Premium for the overall 
sample in Table 2. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 3, we present the various CARs by quartiles of the KZ index. Irrespective of 
the CAR windows, both the mean and median CARs are negative for targets in the first 
quartile (i.e., the non-FCTs) and positive for targets in the fourth quartile (i.e., the FCTs), 
respectively. Thus, bidders experience a negative market reaction upon announcement 
of acquiring a non-FCT but experience a positive market reaction in acquisitions of FCTs. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
4. Results 
4.1 Univariate Tests of CARs by KZ Index 
We compare the mean CARs by quartiles of KZ index in Panel A of Table 4. The mean (-
3, 0) CARs of bidders of FCTs is 0.7% and the median is -0.1%. The mean is significantly 
different from 0 but not the median. Conversely, the mean CARs of bidders of non-FCTs 
is -0.3% and the median is -0.1%, though, both are insignificantly different from zero. 
Upon comparing the mean CARs between bidders of FCTs and non-FCTs, the mean CARs 
of bidders of FCTs exceed that of non-FCTs by 1.0%, and the difference is statistically 
significant. In unreported results, tests based on (-2, +1) CARs and (-2, 0) CARs yield 
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similar findings. Thus, consistent with hypothesis 1, the CARs of bidders of FCTs are 
positive. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
As a robustness check, we combine the third and fourth quartiles of FCTs and 
compare the mean and median CARs of that group with the first quartile of non-FCTs. 
Our findings stay the same, i.e., the CARs of bidders of FCTs from quartiles 3 and 4 are 
significantly higher than the CARs of bidders of non-FCTs from quartile 1. The differences 
in mean and median CARs are 1.1% and 0.1%, respectively, and both are statistically 
significant. 
4.2 Univariate Tests of M&A Premiums by KZ Index 
In Panel B of Table 4, we compare and contrast the M&A premium paid between bidders 
of FCTs and non-FCTs. The mean (median) M&A premium paid by bidders of FCTs is 4.4% 
(-1.5%) and that paid by bidders of non-FCTs is 39% (-1.7%). Using median figures, the 
M&A premium paid by bidders of FCTs is lower by 0.79% and that difference is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, consistent with hypothesis 2, the univariate 
findings suggest that bidders of FCTs pay lower M&A premiums than bidders of non-
FCTs. 
4.3 Multiple Regressions of Bidder CARs 
To be able to associate the positive announcement period CARs to acquisitions of FCTs 
and to remove the effects of confounding variables, we perform multiple regressions of 
bidders’ CARs. First, though, we account for endogeneity issues to control for the risk of 
incorrectly identifying a causal relationship between acquisitions of FCTs and bidders’ 
M&A announcement period CARs, when the observed “relationship” could be due to an 
unidentified factor that is affecting both variables.  
To control for endogeneity, we use the Heckman two-stage estimation procedure. 
This method is appropriate since we have a non-random sample selection, i.e., bidder 
CARs are only observed for targets that accepted an offer. Consequently, our estimators 
could be biased since we do not know what the outcome would be for those targets that 
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refused a bidder’s offer. To control for the sample selection bias, we predict the 
likelihood of a target firm accepting a bidder’s offer at the first stage using a probit 
model, calculate the predicted inverse Mills ratio (IMR) for each M&A transaction, and 
in the second stage, estimate the bidders’ CAR using the IMR as a predictor in the model 
(also see Wooldridge, 2009). If the coefficient on IMR is statistically equal to zero, there 
is no evidence of sample selection endogeneity, and ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression results are consistent. If the coefficient on IMR is statistically different from 
zero, then we report the coefficients from the corrected model. To conserve space, the 
independent variables used are presented in the notes accompanying Tables 5 and 6. 
The selection of the independent variables follows previous studies on the determinants 
of M&A premium (Walkling and Edmister, 1985; Kaufman, 1988; Lang et al., 1989; 
Servaes, 1991; Palia, 1993; Cotter and Zenner, 1994; Schwert, 2000; Flanagan and 
O'Shaughnessy, 2003; Madura and Ngo, 2008). 
The dependent variable in the first-stage probit regression takes a value of 1 for 
targets that are in the fourth quartile (i.e., the most financially constrained) and a value 
of 0 for targets in the first quartile (i.e., the unconstrained firms). We present the 
findings from the first-stage probit regressions in Table 5. Successful bids of FCTs are 
characterized as follows: low bidder’s interest coverage ratio; large bidder size; stock 
offers; small target size; acquisitions of certain assets; multiple bids; large number of 
target firm M&A advisors; and, tech firms. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
We include the IMR in the multiple regression of bidder CARs and present our 
findings in Table 5. The coefficient of the IMR is not statistically significant from 0 at the 
5% level suggesting that the OLS regression results are consistent. The variable of 
interest is FCT, which takes a value of 1 for FCTs in quartile 4 and a value of 0 for 
unconstrained targets in quartile 1. The coefficient of the dummy variable FCT is positive 
and statistically significant. Our coefficient estimate suggests that bidders’ of FCTs 
experience a 4.60% CARs from day -3 to the day of the M&A announcement higher than 
the CARs of bidders of unconstrained targets. Considering that the average size of the 
bidder firm is $7,672 million, the increase in the wealth of the shareholders of a typical 
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bidder of an FCT as opposed to an unconstrained target is an extra $353 million over 
four days leading up to the M&A announcement. Our results stay the same if we 
increase the sample size of FCTs to include quartile 3 firms. As expected, though, there 
is a decrease in the magnitude of the coefficient from 4.60% to 3.90% given that the 
enlarged set includes the less financially constrained targets from quartile 3. 
We further find that bidder size and strategic acquisitions adversely affect the bidder 
CARs, while all cash offers and acquisitions of certain assets positively affect bidder 
CARs. Bidders’ CARs are higher post-SOX, and while the global financial crisis starting 
mid-2007 adversely affected bidder CARs yet the related coefficient is not statistically 
significant. 
4.4 Multiple Regressions of M&A Premiums 
We follow the same Heckman two-stage estimation procedure to ascertain the effects 
of acquisitions of FCTs on the M&A premium paid by bidder firms, and present our 
findings in Table 6. The size of the coefficient representing FCTs is negative and large, 
and it is statistically significant. The findings suggest that FCTs are sold at a considerable 
discount relative to unconstrained targets (i.e., non-FCTs). Our findings stay the same 
upon enlarging the sample of FCTs to include targets from both quartiles 3 and 4. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Furthermore, large bidders tend to pay higher M&A premiums and acquisitions of 
certain assets, acquisitions in the tech industry, and contested bids command higher 
premiums. Conversely, bidders that pay with cash also pay lower M&A premiums and 
the smaller the target size, the smaller is the M&A premium. 
5. Conclusion 
The empirical analysis in this paper establishes two things, i.e. (i) bidders of financially 
constrained targets (FCTs) pay lower M&A premiums and (ii) earn higher M&A 
announcement period CARs than bidders of unconstrained targets.  
The findings do not necessarily suggest that acquisitions of FCTs are superior than 
the acquisitions of non-FCTs. As a matter of fact, in undocumented findings we observe 
that the long run stock performance of bidders of FCTs and their operating performance 
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are not remarkable. However, this paper establishes the merits of acquiring FCTs as a 
corporate reorganization strategy using market-based data and investors’ perceptions 
of value.  
The major difficulty of FCTs is a lack of liquidity and capital, which could be due to 
both internal and external factors. These firms are not bankrupt and they are not 
undertaking any financial restructuring. Thus, bidders can extract value from the 
acquisition of an FCT by unblocking vital sources of finances to allow the firm to realize 
its potential, which should lead to positive M&A announcement period cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs).  
To the extent that the M&A enlarges the asset base of the target firm, which should 
restrict collateral constraints in raising external finance, we would expect bidder firms 
to charge a price for providing this facility. The discount in the deal value compared to 
acquisitions of non-FCTs represents a pseudo-fee bidders charge to alleviate the target 
firm’s financial constraints. We are not advocating that post-M&A target firms are in a 
position to finance all desired investments thanks to bidders’ financial power. We only 
expect that targets are in a better position to bridge the gap between their desired 
investments and their access to funds following the M&A, i.e., there is a lessening in 
their pre-M&A level of financial constraints.  
Based on the above arguments, which are corroborated by the findings of this paper, 
acquisition of FCTs represents a viable corporate restructuring and reorganization 
strategy to lessen the financial constraints of target firms and to extract value for the 
bidder shareholders. 
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Table 1: Sample Distribution of M&A Involving Financial Constrained Targets (FCTs) 
 FCT 
Year of Announcement N % 
1985 0 0 
1986 158 3.59 
1987 184 4.18 
1988 184 4.18 
1989 194 4.40 
1990 171 3.88 
1991 141 3.20 
1992 107 2.43 
1993 123 2.79 
1994 208 4.72 
1995 240 5.45 
1996 240 5.45 
1997 247 5.61 
1998 309 7.01 
1999 280 6.36 
2000 264 5.99 
2001 150 3.41 
2002 96 2.18 
2003 125 2.84 
2004 131 2.97 
2005 147 3.34 
2006 125 2.84 
2007 150 3.41 
2008 102 2.32 
2009 81 1.84 
2010 86 1.95 
2011 77 1.75 
2012 85 1.93 
Total 4,405 100.00 
The sample period starts in 1985 and ends in 2012. Domestic M&A data is obtained from the Thomson One Deal 
database. Both bidders and targets are US publicly-listed firms, and M&A deals are completed as well as the deal 
value is reported. We exclude firms with SICs 4900-4999 and 6000-6999 since they are highly regulated. Bidder firms 
should have return data in the CRSP database and accounting data in the COMPUSTAT database. Target firms should 
have data in CRSP to calculate the M&A Premium and they should have data in COMPUSTAT to calculate their KZ 
Index. FCT stands for Financially Constrained Targets.   
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of M&A Involving FCTs*  
 N Mean  Median Standard 
Deviation 
Target Characteristics     
Target Size 4405 $2,892,800,000 $248,739,000 $18,645,850,000 
KZ Index 4,405 -9.308 1.105 98.526 
KZ Index by Quartiles:     
1st Quartile 1085 -43.078*** -9.233*** 194.637 
2nd Quartile 1115 -0.518*** -0.314*** 1.115 
3rd Quartile 1104 1.997*** 2.045*** 0.468 
4th Quartile 1101 3.733*** 3.205*** 5.360 
     
Deal Characteristics     
CAR (-2,0) 4405 0.003 0.002 0.070 
CAR (-3,0) 4405 0.004 -0.001 0.086 
CAR (-2,+1) 4405 0.006 0.004 0.083 
M&A Premium 4005 12.868 -1.693 587.289 
Number of days to completion 4405 169.971 92.000 282.696 
     
Bidder Characteristics     
Debt Ratio 4250 1.234 0.989 9.281 
Interest Coverage Ratio 3813 45.935 5.336 470.833 
Bidder Size 4405 $7,672,290,000 $906,695,000 $28,051,850,000 
Tobin’s Q 4370 2.160 1.604 2.509 
KZ Index is calculated from Equation 1 and represents the financial constraint index of a target firm. The higher the 
value of the KZ Index, the more financially constrained is the target firm. CAR (-2,0) represents the bidder’s three-day 
cumulative abnormal returns with day 0 being the M&A announcement day; CAR (-3, 0) represents the bidder’s four-
day cumulative abnormal returns with day 0 being the M&A announcement day; CAR (-2,+1) represents the bidder’s 
four-day cumulative abnormal returns with day 0 being the M&A announcement day. M&A Premium represents the 
difference between the deal value and the target’s market capitalization four weeks prior to the announcement 
(expressed as a % of the latter). Debt Ratio is the bidder’s total liabilities divided by market value of equity, as of four 
weeks prior to the announcement. Interest coverage ratio of the bidder is calculated as EBIT divided by interest 
expenses in year t-1. BIDDER SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of the bidder in the year t-
1. TARGET SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of the target in the year t-1. TOBIN’S Q equals 
to market value of assets (market value of equity- book value of equity + total assets) scaled by total assets in the 
year t-1. Number of days to completion represents the number of days from announcement to completion. *, **, *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) by Quartlies of KZ Index  
 N Mean  Median Standard 
Deviation 
CAR (-2,0) by Quartiles:     
1st Quartile 1102 -0.076*** -0.059*** 0.051 
2nd Quartile 992 -0.012*** -0.010*** 0.009 
3rd Quartile 1209 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.009 
4th Quartile 1102 0.086*** 0.070*** 0.056 
     
CAR (-3,0) by Quartiles:     
1st Quartile 1101 -0.088*** -0.065*** 0.067 
2nd Quartile 1121 -0.014*** -0.014*** 0.009 
3rd Quartile 1082 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.011 
4th Quartile 1101 0.103*** 0.076*** 0.076 
     
CAR (-2,+1) by Quartiles:     
1st Quartile 1101 -0.090*** -0.070*** 0.058 
2nd Quartile 994 -0.013*** -0.013*** 0.010 
3rd Quartile 1209 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.018 
4th Quartile 1101 0.107*** 0.083*** 0.064 
CAR (-2,0) represents the bidder’s three-day cumulative abnormal returns with day 0 being the M&A announcement 
day; CAR (-3, 0) represents the bidder’s four-day cumulative abnormal returns with day 0 being the M&A 
announcement day; CAR (-2,+1) represents the bidder’s four-day cumulative abnormal returns with day 0 being the 
M&A announcement day.   
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Table 4: Comparison of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) and M&A Premiums between acquisitions of FCTs 
and non-FCTs  
 N Mean Median 
Panel A: Comparison of Bidders’ (-3, 0) Announcement Period CARs  
4th vs. 1st Quartiles    
Bidder of FCTs (4th Quartile) 1,101 0.007*** -0.001 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 1,085 -0.003 -0.001 
Difference  0.010 0.000 
t-stat/Wilcoxon  2.580*** 1.889* 
    
3rd and 4th as a group vs. 1st Quartiles    
Bidder of FCTs (3rd and 4th Quartiles) 2,205 0.008*** 0.000 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 1,085 -0.003 -0.001 
Difference  0.011 0.001 
t-stat/Wilcoxon  3.290*** 2.416** 
    
Panel B: Comparison of M&A Premiums paid by Bidders of FCTs and non-FCTs 
4th vs. 1st Quartiles    
Bidder of FCTs (4th Quartile) 977 4.3698* -1.503*** 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 1,016 38.937 -1.711*** 
Difference  -34.567 -0.792 
t-stat/Wilcoxon  -0.930 -2.181** 
    
3rd and 4th as a group vs. 1st Quartiles    
Bidder of FCTs (3rd and 4th Quartiles) 1,977 3.502** -1.662*** 
Bidder of non-FCTs (1st Quartile) 1,016 38.937 -1.711*** 
Difference  -35.434 0.049 
t-stat/Wilcoxon  -1.350 1.511 
CAR (-3, 0) represents the bidder’s four-day cumulative abnormal returns with day 0 being the M&A announcement 
day. In both panels, targets in quartile 1 are unconstrained (i.e., non-FCTs). Financially constrained targets (FCTs) 
come from quartiles 3 and 4. M&A Premium represents the difference between the deal value and the target’s market 
capitalization four weeks prior to the announcement (expressed as a % of the latter). *, **, *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  
260 
 
 
 
Table 5: Heckman Two-Stage Regressions of Bidders’ CARs 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Sample includes [Q1] vs. [Q4] Sample includes [Q1] vs. [Q3 and Q4] 
 Probit CARs Probit CARs 
FCT  0.046**  0.039** 
DEBTRATIO -0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.000* 
ICR -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BIDDER SIZE 0.068*** -0.003** 0.069*** -0.004*** 
RELATED 0.146* -0.011** 0.064 -0.009** 
CRISIS 0.042 -0.012 0.157 -0.014 
SOX 0.250 0.016 -0.171 0.022** 
ALLCASH -0.329*** 0.015*** -0.184*** 0.013*** 
FRIENDLY 0.140 -0.004 0.027 -0.005 
AACOUNT -0.036 0.002 -0.029 0.003 
TARGET SIZE -0.114*** 0.000 -0.067*** -0.001 
ACA 0.233** 0.010 0.188** 0.009* 
TENDER OFFER -0.112 0.011 -0.093 0.004 
BIDDER ROE  0.000  -0.001 
TECH BUBBLE  -0.014  -0.023* 
MULTIPLE BIDS 0.455***  0.363***  
M&A ACTIVITY -0.308  0.326  
TACOUNT 0.090  0.076  
COMPLETION 0.000  0.000  
TECH TARGET 0.385***  0.358***  
TECH BIDDER 0.450***  0.444***  
IMR  -0.021*  -0.017* 
Constant 2.432 -0.009 -4.629 0.001 
     
Observations 1810 1810 2824 2824 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi- squared 250.320 172.130 225.060 174.090 
Pseudo R-squared 0.100  0.066  
CAR (-3, 0) represents the bidder’s four-day cumulative abnormal returns with day 0 being the M&A announcement 
day. In both probit regressions, targets in quartile 1 takes a value of 0 since they are the least financially constrained. 
FCT is a dummy variable representing financially constrained targets (i.e., targets in Quartile 4 and in Quartiles 3 and 
4 as a group in Panels A and B, respectively. PREMIUM represents the difference between the deal value and the 
target’s market capitalization four weeks prior to the announcement (expressed as a % of the latter). DEBTRATIO is 
the bidder’s total liabilities divided by market value of equity, as of four weeks prior to the announcement. ICR is the 
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interest coverage ratio of the bidder calculated as EBIT divided by interest expenses in year t-1. BIDDER SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of the bidder in the year t-1. RELATED is a dummy variable 
representing M&A where the bidder shares the same two-digit SIC as the target. CRISIS is a dummy variable 
representing the years 2008-2012 related to the global financial crisis that severely restricted the M&A market. SOX 
is a dummy variable representing the years starting 2002 following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. ALLCASH 
is a dummy variable representing deals financed by all cash. Friendly is a dummy variable representing friendly as 
opposed to hostile bids. AACOUNT represents the number of bidder’s advisors. TARGET SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of the book value of total assets of the target in the year t-1. ACA is a dummy variable representing acquisitions of 
certain assets only. TENDER OFFER is a dummy variable representing tender offers. Bidder’s ROE is measured at t-1. 
TECHBUBLE is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 and 0 otherwise. 
MULTIPLEBIDS represents the number of bidders. M&A ACTIVITY is the natural logarithm of the total number of M&A 
in year t. TACOUNT represents the number of target advisors. COMPLETION represents the number of days from 
announcement to completion. TECH TARGET and TECH BIDDER are dummy variables representing tech- targets and 
bidders, respectively. IMR is the inverse Mills ratio derived from the probit model. *, **, *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Heckman Two-Stage Regressions of M&A Premiums 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Sample includes [Q1] vs. [Q4] Sample includes [Q1] vs. [Q3 and Q4] 
Probit M&A Premium Probit M&A Premium 
FCT  -405.100**  -367.300*** 
DEBTRATIO -0.006 -0.738 -0.006 -0.626 
ICR -0.001*** -0.062 -0.000 -0.005 
BIDDER SIZE 0.059*** 18.140 0.067*** 12.030 
RELATED 0.112 36.350 0.054 14.220 
CRISIS -0.022 -29.450 0.111 5.453 
SOX 0.318 -34.960 -0.159 -50.420 
ALLCASH -0.326*** -35.770 -0.188*** -17.310 
FRIENDLY 0.12 -5.586 -0.015 -16.700 
AACOUNT -0.042 -24.340 -0.040 -15.120 
TARGET SIZE -0.110*** 4.381 -0.068*** 6.730 
ACA 0.259** 9.984 0.208** 1.391 
TENDEROFFER -0.021 0.605 -0.008 2.549 
ROEBIDDER  1.740  0.821 
TECHBUBBLE  51.440  43.51 
MULTIPLEBID 0.406***  0.327**  
MAACTIVITY -0.483  0.276  
TACOUNT 0.130*  0.120*  
COMPLETION -0.000  -0.000  
TECHTARGET 0.416***  0.380***  
TECHBIDDER 0.446***  0.433***  
IMR  232.300*  199.200** 
Constant 4.591 72.660 -3.964 156.900 
     
Observations 1,654 1,654 2,568 2,568 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chi- squared 234.120 123.780 207.920 90.550 
Pseudo R-squared 0.102  0.066  
M&A PREMIUM represents the difference between the deal value and the target’s market capitalization four weeks 
prior to the announcement (expressed as a % of the latter). In both probit regressions, targets in quartile 1 takes a 
value of 0 since they are the least financially constrained. FCT is a dummy variable representing financially constrained 
targets (i.e., targets in Quartile 4 and in Quartiles 3 and 4 as a group in Panels A and B, respectively. DEBTRATIO is the 
bidder’s total liabilities divided by market value of equity, as of four weeks prior to the announcement. ICR is the 
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interest coverage ratio of the bidder calculated as EBIT divided by interest expenses in year t-1. BIDDER SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets of the bidder in the year t-1. RELATED is a dummy variable 
representing M&A where the bidder shares the same two-digit SIC as the target. CRISIS is a dummy variable 
representing the years 2008-2012 related to the global financial crisis that severely restricted the M&A market. SOX 
is a dummy variable representing the years starting 2002 following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. ALLCASH 
is a dummy variable representing deals financed by all cash. Friendly is a dummy variable representing friendly as 
opposed to hostile bids. AACOUNT represents the number of bidder’s advisors. TARGET SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of the book value of total assets of the target in the year t-1. ACA is a dummy variable representing acquisitions of 
certain assets only. TENDER OFFER is a dummy variable representing tender offers. Bidder’s ROE is measured at t-1. 
TECHBUBLE is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 and 0 otherwise. 
MULTIPLEBIDS represents the number of bidders. M&A ACTIVITY is the natural logarithm of the total number of M&A 
in year t. TACOUNT represents the number of target advisors. COMPLETION represents the number of days from 
announcement to completion. TECH TARGET and TECH BIDDER are dummy variables representing tech- targets and 
bidders, respectively. IMR is the inverse Mills ratio derived from the probit model. *, **, *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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